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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the use of the internet, mobile phones and other types of new 
and old media by Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan, who are Brazilian nationals of 
Japanese ancestry that migrate transnationally from Brazil to Japan to work. The study first 
discusses the history of Japanese-Brazilian return migration, situating it in a larger history of 
labor migration to Japan and the development of “flexible capitalism” in the “network society” in 
the contemporary world. It also examines the current state of Japanese-Brazilian and Brazilian 
ethnic media in Japan, and discusses the relationship between the Japanese government’s 
policies regarding immigration and multilingual media services and the ways in which 
Portuguese-language media products and services are provided to the return migrants. I argue 
that the government’s indifference towards social and cultural life of non-Japanese residents and 
its reluctance to serve informational and communicational needs of the nation’s diversifying 
population put the provision of multilingual and multicultural media in the hands of the private 
sector, which had an undesirable consequences on Japanese-Brazilian return migrants as the end 
users of the media as a global financial crisis damaged Japan’s economy in 2008.  
Second, this study looks at the actual scenes of new and old media adoption by Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants through content analyses of online materials and ethnographic 
interviews I conducted with Japanese-Brazilian residents in Kobe, Japan. My findings show the 
potentials new digital media has for developing transnational networks and fostering social 
actions, but they also show limitations and obstacles Japanese-Brazilian return migrants face to 
attain full access to those technologies and benefit fully from the use of new media. They 
indicate that while living in well-connected Japan, the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in my 
 iii 
study remain partially connected to digital media and to the World Wide Web.  
Combined, the two parts of this study document Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in 
Japan as “partially connected, partially protected” working class, the presence of which has been 
indispensable for slowing down the collapse of the Japanese economy. At the same time, 
however, the study also suggests that the potentials and social impacts of new media 
technologies are “made” as technologies, society and end users interact, and those can be 
“remade” to better serve Japanese-Brazilian return migrants and other non-Japanese residents of 
Japan in the local setting and transnational migrants and members of diaspora in the global 
context.   
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 1 
Introduction 
 
It was the summer of 2005. I was flying to Japan to see my parents and friends after 
completing my first year of graduate study in the U.S. On the flight from Dallas-Fort Worth to 
the newly opened Chubu International Airport in Nagoya, I sat in the backmost row of the 
economy class. Crammed at the end of the fuselage, the row had only two seats. Sitting next to 
me on the window side was a woman in her early middle age, seemingly traveling by herself, 
just as I was. When I settled into my aisle seat, she asked me one question – if I spoke Spanish. 
Unfortunately, I had to answer “no” to that question. We sat quiet for most of the rest of the long 
international flight. Except for one time. A little before we landed in Nagoya, she indicated to me 
she needed help with filling out her immigration and customs forms she was to present to 
Japanese boarder officials. I might be able to answer a few of her questions if she asked me now, 
after having spent more than five years in the U.S. seeing and hearing bilingual signs and 
instructions, and having learned a little Portuguese to do my dissertation research. Brazilian 
Portuguese share some linguistic features with Spanish spoken in Latin America. But back then, 
I was not able to offer her any help at all. I just watched her struggle with and slowly fill out her 
forms. Later, overhearing some short conversations she had with the flight attendants and 
passengers in other rows, I learned she was coming from Peru, going to Japan to join the 
members of her family working there.	 
 The immigration and customs declaration forms she was trying to decipher was only 
written in Japanese and English, even though they were for foreign nationals entering Japan. 
True, the flight we were on was a U.S.-Japan one, but most passengers from Central and South 
America need to make a connection in the U.S. for flying to Asia and Europe, not to mention that 
the population of the U.S. itself is linguistically diverse. Then, I realized that most of Japan – or 
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at least most of its urban areas – had been made tourist friendly. While they may be barely 
minimal, most public spaces and many businesses have signs and instructions posted in English, 
and sometimes in Korean and Chinese – but only in those “tourist friendly” languages. And there 
had been a significant number of people from South America, countries such as Brazil and Peru, 
coming to Japan to live and work, just like the person who sat next to me on the Dallas to 
Nagoya flight. In fact, Aichi prefecture, of which Nagoya is the capital city, had been known for 
hosting an increasing number of South American workers. Many of those workers worked at 
assembly lines and factories supplying automobile parts to Toyota, a transnational carmaker 
headquartered in Aichi.   
Having spent my collage years in Japan with many kikokushijo (“returnees,” or Japanese 
children who grew up outside of Japan while their parents lived there on their corporate 
assignments) and international students, I thought I knew the difficulty of living in Japan with 
minimal Japanese. But we all spoke English, which receives a privileged status in Japan. 
Although they end up with a varying degree of fluency, all students in Japan learn English 
starting in elementary school. I could not imagine how hard one’s life would be to go around in 
Japan with little Japanese and no English.  
I also knew that the majority of the media in Japan – or at least widely accessible TV 
channels, radio stations, newspapers and magazines – were almost exclusively in Japanese, 
although a few were available with English content. So too, were services geared towards more 
to personal communication. Mobile phones, texting and mobile phone apps in particular, had 
developed in Japan with the needs of “typical” Japanese users in mind – commuting salary-man, 
young office ladies and socially active high school and college students. As users, we know 
about those “typical” users fairly well. We know, for instance, the ways in which high school 
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girls adorn their mobile phones with kawaii accessories, passengers on commuter trains play 
downloaded mobile games on their phones to carve out their personal spaces, and college 
students use text messages to carry on chitchatting even after they part ways for the day and go 
home (Okada 2005, Ito and Okabe 2005, Ito, Okabe and Matsuda 2006, Hjörth 2006, Daliot-Bul 
2007). But we read very little about South American transnational workers and how they used 
the media, even though more than 300,000 of such workers lived, as of this time in 2005, in 
Japan1.  
This dissertation research looks at the use of new media, such as the internet and mobile 
phones, and old media like newspapers, radio and the television by Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants, who make up close to 80% of the South American immigrant population in Japan. 
While an abundance of sociological, anthropological and journalistic accounts of this population 
has been produced following a rapid and significant growth of the population after 1990, few 
studies have been conducted on their media use and practices. In addition to filling this gap in 
our knowledge, this study also intends to understand the relationship between the media, 
technological change and people’s everyday life, especially that of the people who migrate 
transnationally and are members of diasporic groups, and tie the findings back to existing works 
on Japanese-Brazilian return migration to Japan. 
 
Media, Technology and Society 
Study of the relationship between the media, technology and society has a longstanding 
tradition in the field of media and communication studies. Classic works in the field attempt to 
understand the relationships between technology and society by way of assessing the specific 
                                                
1   Following the financial-crisis- and earthquake-led departures, about 210,000 lived in Japan at the end 
of 2011 (Statistical Research and Training Institute, 2013). 
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impacts of different technologies on social organization and structure (Innis 1951; Carey 1989 
[1992]; McLuhan 1964).  
In The Bias of Communication, Innis (1951) argues that a certain communication 
technology (writing on papyrus, writing on clay, writing on parchment, printing press, radio, 
etc.) has its own characteristics inherent to itself, due to its material nature. Those material 
characteristics in turn determine the organization of the society in which the technology is 
utilized. Similarly, Carey (1989[1992]) sees technological change as one of the driving forces 
behind social and cultural change. For instance, Carey contends that the telegraph “permitted for 
the first time the effective separation of communication from transportation … [which] also 
allowed communication to control physical processes actively” (203). Consequently, Carey 
notes, the telegraph gave rise to monopoly capitalism by enabling abstract market to come into 
being, detached from face-to-face trading and from local economy, and by making it possible for 
commodities to be traded (in the futures market etc.) as abstract entities. McLuhan (1964), with 
the famous phrase “the medium is the message,” argues that in order to understand the social 
impacts of technologies (including, but not limited to, information and communication 
technologies), scholars need to know their essential and specific characteristics, which he calls 
“messages.”  
 One may be inclined to dismiss the line of thoughts coming from Innis, Carey and 
McLuhan as “technologically deterministic,” as they ascribe the cause of social change to 
technological objects and innovations, rather than to people and society. More recent studies, 
particularly the ones influenced by a certain strain of science and technology studies (STS), 
however, give another life to this way of understanding the relationship between technology and 
society. They confirm that material objects surrounding our life have far-reaching pertinence, 
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influencing everyday practices, organization of institutions and power structure in society 
(Latour 1987, 1993; Pickering 2005). This group of STS scholars argue that it is thus impossible 
for us to understand society as being separate from scientific developments and technological 
changes, as well as mundane objects that constitute our everyday life (Latour 1993).  
 In addition, as the phrase the “social shaping of technology” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 
1999), another concept that came out of social scientific study of science and technology, 
suggests, technological innovations and new technological objects are also situated in and 
influenced by the structure and organization of society and technological communities, as well as 
business and political imperatives. Technology and society mutually shape each other.  
 The mutual shaping of technology and society thesis also implies that technological 
objects are not as pure and neutral as they are commonly thought to be. In “Do Artifacts Have 
Politics?” (1980), Winner writes “Consciously or not, deliberately or inadvertently, societies 
choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, 
travel, consume, and forth over a very long time” (127). Winner also says, “The issues that 
divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the institutions and practices of politics 
proper, but also, and less obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and 
transistors, nuts and bolts” (128). Winner’s famous example of this is the design of parkways in 
Long Island, New York. Highway bridges there were built with characteristic low overhangs, 
aiming to restrict access of buses to the parkways, thus to limit accesses by the African American 
and lower-income residents, who were more likely to rely on public transportation than more 
affluent – and predominantly white – ones.   
 Writing before the age of personal computers and the internet, Winner’s analysis centered 
on the “arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts.” But things that 
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make up the digital era, such as computers and peripherals, mobile phones, operation systems 
and applications that run on them, databases and protocols that govern data exchanges are all 
designed by people. As such they are artifacts, much like Winner’s bridge. And they have 
politics.  
 
New Media and Society 
When one looks at the discourses surrounding new media – in particular the ones around 
the internet – one sees much excitement about the technology’s translocal, mobile and 
democratic potentials (see, for example, Everett 2002, Rheingold 2003, Mosco 2004). If new 
information and communication technologies really have those potentials, then they would 
largely benefit people like Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan, who are the focus of this 
study. Those people, as transnational migrants, face a particular challenge of maintaining ties 
with Brazil, which is a halfway around the globe from Japan, on top of coordinating everyday 
life at the same time as navigating a foreign cityscape in Japan. Those people, as foreign national 
residents and members of racial/ethnic minority, are also underrepresented in the media as well 
as in policy-making processes.  
At the same time, however, new information and communication technologies widely 
available in Japan may actually hinder return migrants to access those benefits, or even access 
those technologies, as they have been developed with specific, “typical” Japanese users and 
audience – and/or a certain preconceived image of “foreigners” as touristic and business visitors, 
which precludes South American immigrant workers – in mind. The internet and mobile phones 
as localized and marketed in Japan, thus may work just like the immigration and customs form 
the Peruvian passenger on the airplane had to fill out, and not too unlike Winner’s New York 
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bridge. Rather than being a cure-all solution to the physical and cultural displacement and 
underrepresentation they experience in Japan, they can be another obstacle the return migrants 
have to struggle through as they try to settle in Japan and make their everyday life going.  
 Of course, although Winner does not talk about this, people have agencies. That is, as 
users of a particular technology, they can refuse, repurpose, and in some cases even make 
significant revisions to the original technology (Pinch and Bijker 1987, Oudshoorn and Pinch 
2003). With this in mind, this study looks at Japanese-Brazilian return migrants’ media use and 
their access to media from two perspectives. First, it examines the social, political, economic and 
material conditions in which return migrants’ media use is situated. Specifically, I focus on the 
history of labor migration to Japan, the history of development and diffusion of new information 
and communication technology in Japan and the related rise of the “network society,” the current 
state of Japanese-Brazilian “ethnic” media in Japan, and the Japanese government’s immigration 
policy and its domestic policy regarding multilingual media. I contend that these conditions 
influence the affordance and limitations of the media return migrants use in important ways. The 
second part of this study focuses on how return migrants actually use new and old media in 
everyday life and under specific circumstances. Using evidence I collected through interviews I 
conducted in Kobe, Japan, and material I gathered from online sources and a Portuguese-
language newspaper published in Japan, I discuss what specific impacts new media technologies 
have on the life of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan.  
 One must be careful, however, in assessing “social impacts” of new information and 
communication technologies. Many popular and scholarly works on the internet and mobile 
phones assume those impacts to be universal, or at least universal among those who have access 
to the technologies. They assume that once someone attains an access to the internet, that person 
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would actively utilize and engage with the media at a certain level and at a certain consistency 
(Castells 2001, Shirkey 2008). But beyond the issue of access, different group of people have 
different levels of engagement with the technology and different levels and purposes of use, 
influenced by time and financial resources they can invest to devices and to online activities, as 
well as their own skills, interests and priorities (Wyatt, Thomas and Terranova 2002; Hargittai 
2004; Hargittai and Hinnant 2008; Hargittai and Walejko 2008).  
This study in fact finds that the group of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I interviewed 
in Kobe, who were moderately active users of the internet and mobile phones, did not leap the 
benefit of distance shrinking and reflexibity enabling characteristics of the technologies, which 
are often associated with the internet use in studies that look at racial/ethnic minorities and 
diasporic users. My findings suggest the importance of specifying “what the researcher means by 
‘internet use’” (Hargittai 2004: 141) and “identifying their relevant populations” (ibid.: 142) in 
the study of migrant and diasporic users of new information and communication technologies. 
 
Partially Networked, Partially Protected Non-Japanese Working Class 
Overall, this study finds that despite living in well-connected Japan, and despite having 
access to and being moderately active users of the internet and mobile phones, the Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants in the study unevenly and not fully benefit from new media. What I 
present below shows various ways in which Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan are 
being “underrepresented” in Japan, not only in social life and in Japanese mass-communication 
media, but also as users of new media in Japan. And as I discuss in the chapters to follow, this 
condition of “underrepresentation” is strongly tied to other ways in which Japanese-Brazilian 
return migrants are disadvantaged and made “invisible” in Japan, which works favorably to 
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retain them as an expendable, non-Japanese workforce, who can be legally employed but are less 
well-protected compared to domestic workers, thus can be flexibly hired and dismissed 
following the needs of Japanese businesses.  
In Working-class Network Society, Qiu (2009) describes the emergence of the “network 
labor” in China, which largely consists of information have-less, the rural-urban migrant and 
laid-off users of low-cost information and communication technologies (ICTs), and who 
“collaborate with self-programmable and generic labor to become the foundation of China’s new 
working class” (236). Qiu further argues that the making and existence of this new working class 
has been indispensible to informatization of China and to China’s rise in the global ICT market.  
In my study, in a similar but slightly different vein, the formation and the presence of 
Japanese-Brazilian and other South American return migrants as partially networked, partially 
protected working class is important, not for an economic development, which, unlike China, 
Japan may never see again, but for slowing down crisis and keeping up Japan’s economic 
strength in the global arena. Also, while Qiu notes that China’s networked working class “have 
… begun to exert a broad impact on the Chinese informational city and the global network 
society at large” (232), the partially networked Japanese-Brazilian return migrants have less 
visible presence in the domestic and global landscape, partly because the “ethnic” ICT market in 
Japan is much less mature than China’s low-cost ICT market, and partly because of a pure size 
difference (millions vs. a few hundred thousand).  
 
Organization  
The rest of this dissertation is organized into four chapters. In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, I 
outline and discuss the history of “foreign” labor migration to Japan, the history of information 
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and communication technology development in Japan, the rise of “the “network society,” 
“flexible employment” and “flexible citizenship” in the global and Japanese contexts (Chapter 
1), the Japanese government’s policy regarding the provision of multilingual media, the 
emergence, development and stagnation of commercial Japanese-Brazilian ethnic media in 
Japan, and the entrance of globally circulating media products to the life of Japanese-Brazilians 
and Brazilians in diaspora (Chapter 2). I pay extensive attention to these social, political, 
economic and material conditions to emphasize strong ties between society and technology. Not 
only are these conditions important as background information to understand the return migrants’ 
media use, but also they are inseparably connected to what types of media products are available 
to the return migrants and how they can access them.  
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 then turn to the analysis and discussion of the evidence I 
collected through my fieldwork. Chapter 3 looks at how Japanese-Brazilian return migrants 
reacted to the politics of inclusion and exclusion, racial/ethnic tensions and the practice of 
flexible employment to which they were subjected through online mediums, by examining a 
music video posted on YouTube and messages and comments posted on an NGO-run website 
Brasil Net in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Chapter 3 also discusses the roles and 
functions those online spaces have on the lives of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan. 
Chapter 4 turns to the data I collected through interviews at the Kobe Culture Center in the city 
of Kobe, Japan, and examines how this specific group of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants 
experienced new media and old media differently – from the general population users, as well as 
from minority and immigrant users of information and communications technologies 
documented by earlier works.  
Lastly, the concluding chapter summarizes the study’s findings with a discussion on what 
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it means to be “underrepresented” in social life as well as as users of the media and media 
technologies. I also discuss why immigrant and diasporic users of the new digital and networked 
technologies need to be “better represented” in society. While most of what this study documents 
show Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan as “partially connected,” they also suggest that 
the potentials and social impacts of new media technologies are “made” as technologies, society 
and end users interact, and those can be “remade” to better serve Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants and other non-Japanese residents of Japan and, more generally and globally, 
transnational migrants and members of diasporic groups.  
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Chapter 1: The History of Labor Migration, the Rise of Network Society in Japan, and 
Japanese-Brazilian Return Migration 
 
 Transnational migration of workers has become almost a ubiquitous phenomenon in the 
contemporary world (Castles and Miller 1993). Japan, which traditionally has not been seen as a 
major immigrant-receiving country, is now no exception to this global trend (Komai 1995, 
2001).  
Japan has had a significant number of the “old-comer” immigrants of Korean and 
Chinese origin and their descendents as a part of its population, who have been in Japan because 
of the nation’s history of colonial expansion and detraction. Their presence, however, has been 
hidden from the surface, neglected largely in the official and popular discourses and in academic 
works on Japan (Lie 2001). In addition to the “old-comers,” “newcomer” immigrants from the 
Middle East and South, East and Southeast Asia started to arrive in Japan in the early 1980s. 
Those newcomers sought employment in the manufacturing and construction sectors, which had 
been experiencing labor shortages, through informal routes.  
The arrival of Japanese-Brazilian and other South American return migrants in the 1990s 
was an effect of an economic push-and-pull factor similar to the one that brought other 
newcomer immigrants to Japan – economic disparities between Japan and then-slumping South 
America. But the nikkei return migrants were different from the earlier newcomers in one 
significant way. As the descendents of emigrants from Japan to the South American countries in 
the early 20th century, the 1990 change to the Japanese Immigration and Refugee Recognition 
Act officially approved them to engage in manual and low-skill labor, the area of employment 
formerly not available to the newcomer foreign nationals.  
The return migrants therefore occupy a specific place in the lower-end of labor market in 
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Japan as a “legal” but “non-Japanese” reserve of labor power. This status, however, did not come 
with necessary measures to protect them as workers and provide with them vital social services. 
As a result, they have been subjected to the practice of “flexible employment,” in which 
businesses hire and lay-off their employees flexibly to adapt to the ever changing market, 
symptomatic of the late capitalist economy, without adequate support from the government and 
the society.  
Furthermore, as a society that has been seen and often presented itself as “monoethnic” 
(Lie 2001), Japan has been slow to change bureaucratic and social practices to reflect the 
growing linguistic and cultural diversity in its population. Hatano’s (2009) study in Japanese 
schools reveals that the names of the immigrant children are commonly “Japanized” by the 
teachers and classmates. Conventional Japanese names – and for that matter, names of most 
zainichi Koreans and Chinese residents – are written in kanji (Chinese characters) or kanji and 
phonetic hiragana/katakana combinations. They normally fall between three to five characters in 
length, rarely exceeding six characters. Non-Japanese – or more properly, non-East-Asian – 
names, however, are usually transliterated into phonetic katakana, and tend to be longer. Spanish 
and Portuguese names also consist of four or more parts, including multiple middle names and 
family names, as opposed to common East Asian names that have two parts only (one family and 
one personal name).  
Hatano observes that teachers in Japanese schools often assimilate the names of South 
American immigrant children to the more conventional East Asian names, improperly shortening 
and/or transliterating the children’s names in the process. The classmates of the immigrant 
children, too, pick up the way the teachers address them, and call them with the improperly 
Japanized names. Hatano contends that this will cause self-identification and self-expression 
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problems for the school age children of the return migrants.  
As Hatano indicates, this resistance to accept linguistic/cultural diversity in Japanese 
schools could be due to social and cultural factors, such as teachers’ and social workers’ lack of 
knowledge on non-Japanese names and naming practices, but her study also implies that a part of 
this is “interfacial,” or a matter of “user interfaces:” immigrant children’s names are Japanized 
partly because bulletins and roll cards social workers and teachers use tend not to have adequate 
spaces for names that are longer in character count, or that have more than one family and one 
personal name. 
The existence of those social, cultural and interfacial barriers hinder foreign migrants to 
fully participate in and to be fully recognized in society. And while municipal governments, local 
non-governmental organizations and immigrants themselves strive to provide critical services to 
the immigrant population, a national-level policy and supports from the national government are 
absent. Thus, the local support networks that Japanese-Brazilian return migrants turn to for their 
livelihoods are frequently incomplete, fragile, or temporary. Under this circumstance, translocal 
ties afforded by the use of mobile phones and the internet may play important roles both for the 
immigrants who seek support networks that can be sustained over time, and for governmental 
bodies and NGOs who try to extend localized support networks to the migrant worker population 
living widely dispersed.  
At the same time, however, the absence of the national governmental policies and 
supports also means that the range of multicultural and multilingual media products and services 
that fulfills the informational needs of the immigrant population is severely limited, and that the 
return migrants can be left without enough resources to secure their access to mobile phones, the 
internet and other types of media for gathering information and cultural expression.  
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This dissertation looks at this double-bind situation that Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants are in. Using the evidence I collected through in-depth interviews and from various 
websites and Japanese and Portuguese-language newspaper published in Japan, the following 
chapters describe how national-level policies (or lack of them) in Japan and the Japanese 
government’s attitude towards informational and media access needs of non-Japanese-speaking 
public lead to the emergence of this double-bind situation, and how Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants operate under such a condition and utilize new and old media in their everyday life to 
talk about themselves, to stay connected to Brazil and to coordinate their life in Japan.  
Meanwhile, the rest of this chapter discusses the historical developments and 
contemporary situations related to the phenomenon of Japanese-Brazilian return migration. More 
specifically, I outline the general history of labor migration to Japan, the specific history of 
Japanese-Brazilian return migration, development and diffusion of information and 
communication technology in Japan and the related history of the rise of the “network society,” 
“flexible employment” and “flexible citizenship” in the global and Japanese contexts.  
Not only do those factors lay in the background shaping Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants’ media use and media access, but also they more directly affect what the return 
migrants can do with the media by setting up the types of media products and services available 
to them, and what types of accesses they can afford and attain. Although scholars such as Ong 
(1999) argue that immigrants in the contemporary world can take the recent capitalist logic of 
“flexible accumulation,” in which businesses are expected to be adaptable to fast changes in the 
market, and turn it for the benefit of themselves by flexibly amassing social and cultural capital, I 
contend that for Japanese-Brazilian return migrants, and for the group of the return migrants I 
study in particular, asserting their agency over the dominant logic and material condition is an 
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extremely difficult thing to achieve. 
 
History of Japanese-Brazilian Return Migration 
Movement of Foreign Labor into Japan 
While the history of their presence is often overlooked both in popular imagination and 
academic works, Japan has had “foreign” migrant workers within the country since its inception 
as a modern nation state in the late 19th century, and especially after it began colonial expansion, 
starting with the annexation of Taiwan in 1895. The rumor-triggered massacre of Koreans in 
Tokyo that happened in the midst of chaos following the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 
tragically tells us that people from Japan’s colony in the Korean peninsula had been present in 
the city in a significant number by that time, and that racial/ethnic tensions existed between 
migrant Korean workers and the residents of the metropole (Lee 2008). 
The movement of labor before 1945 brought workers to naichi (Japan proper) from the 
colonies of the Japanese Empire, which, at the height of its expansion, controlled territories in 
the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and parts of China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands 
(Yamawaki 2000). The largest labor migration took place in the form of wartime mobilization 
during World War II, which included forced relocation of workers from Korean and Chinese 
colonies to the industrial and mining cities in naichi (Yamawaki 2000).  
This laid the foundation to the post-World War II presence of zainichi (long-term 
resident) Korean communities and ethnic Chinese residents (Weiner 2000). As Japan’s economic 
growth in the 1960s and 70s relied mostly on domestic rural-urban migration of labor (Sellek 
2001) and female part-time workers (Yoda 2006), and not on the importation of foreign 
workforce, these “old-comer foreigners” (Komai 2001: 14) accounted for close to 95% of the 
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non-citizen population in Japan for nearly 40 years in postwar Japan, with people whose roots 
trace back to the Korean peninsula making up about 80 to 90% of the entire old-comer 
population (Statistics Research Institute [not dated], 2010).  
In the early 1980s, however, the composition of the foreign migrant population started to 
diversify with the arrival of “newcomer” immigrant workers from other parts of Asia and the 
Middle East (Weiner 2000; Komai 2001; Sellek 2001) (Figure 1). Economic disparities between 
then-booming Japan and other Asian and Middle Eastern countries have grown large to attract 
workers from these regions.  
This, coupled with labor shortages in the manufacturing and construction sector due to a 
generational shift in the labor market (a larger number of college graduates started to enter job 
market, who in general avoided entry level, “blue-collar” jobs), served as a push-pull factor for 
this transition. The first wave of those newcomers included Filipina and other Southeast Asian 
female workers in the “entertainment” industry, and mostly single male manual laborers from 
South, East, and South East Asian countries, including China, Taiwan, Iran, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh (Weiner 2000; Sellek 2001; Kajita et al. 2005).  
Since the Japanese Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law strictly controlled 
(and to this day continue to restrict, except for the case of “return migrants” discussed below) the 
entrance of “unskilled” workers into Japan, most of those immigrant workers entered Japan 
through informal means. A large number of the early newcomers came to Japan on tourist visas 
and overstayed to work undocumented (Sellek 2001). The higher number of Iranian, Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi immigrants was attributable to the presence of visa waiver programs between 
Japan and those countries, which the Japanese government discontinued later. (Kajita et al., 
2005: 110).  
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Others took advantage of the shugakusei (language and technical school student) visa 
category, for which the visa application process was simplified in 1984. Shugakusei were 
allowed to accept part-time employment while they study in Japan to support their stay, although 
many entered Japan intending to work, using language study as a pretense to obtain visa (Komai 
1995). The number of shugakusei went down significantly in 1990, when the Japanese 
government introduced stricter screenings of the applicants and tighter controls on Japanese 
language schools (that acted as entrance hubs to the majority of the shugakusei) over the 
concerns of illegal (or improper) entry and mistreatment of shugakusei employees by some 
Japanese employers, such as non-fulfillment of health insurance requirements, violation of work 
hour limitations and non-delivery of salary. Nonetheless, the informal influx of foreign workers, 
primarily from China, through this route has not entirely disappeared (Komai 1995).  
In addition, since the late 1980s, Japanese small businesses and factories have been hiring 
workers mostly from South, East and Southeast Asian countries under the guise of kenshusei 
(exchange technical interns). Despite stricter government regulations and inspections on the 
employment of “interns” both for the purpose of boarder control and labor protection, this 
practice continues today (Komai 1995, 2001; The Asahi Shinbun 2010).  
Even with the staggering domestic economy, Japan remains to be a lucrative place to 
work and make money for people from developing countries. That, coupled with Japanese 
companies’ and factories’ search for inexpensive source of labor, employment of foreign 
national workers through less formal means still persists.  
 
Japanese-Brazilian Return Migration 
The history of Japanese-Brazilian return migration to Japan is situated in this general 
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trend of movement of foreign labor into Japan. It is most strongly tied to the labor shortage, 
which, as mentioned above, the manufacturing sector began to experience in the 1980s. 
Japanese-Brazilian return migration, however, has a specific trajectory of its own.  
The root of the return-migration phenomenon is in the large-scale, nationally supported 
emigration of Japanese people to South America, which began in the early 20th century. South 
America was originally conceived as an alternative destination to Hawaii, the mainland U.S. and 
Canada, which started to bar the entrance of Asian immigrants in 1900s. The U.S.-Japan 
“gentlemen’s agreement,” which essentially suspended Japanese migration to the U.S. territory, 
went into effect in 1908. A similar agreement was made between Japan and Canada in the same 
year (Maruyama 2010).  
Then newly independent Brazil needed non-slave agricultural workers to work in 
plantations and to develop its vast uncultivated land. Overpopulation in the rural regions and 
struggling agricultural output moved the Japanese government towards nationally supported 
labor export (Maruyama 2010). Kasato-maru, the first immigration ship from Japan arrived in 
Brazil in 1908. Since then, approximately 250,000 Japanese left Japan to settle in various parts of 
Brazil. Currently, Brazil is estimated to have 1.4 to 1.5 million descendents of those immigrants, 
called nikkeijin, as part of its population (Mori 2010).  
While the majority of the first generation immigrants were agricultural workers and 
settled into rural areas and newly developed colonias, the population urbanized rather rapidly, 
with the second generation migrating internally to major urban areas of Brazil in large numbers. 
Using data from a survey conducted in 1987-88, the last available comprehensive survey on the 
Japanese-Brazilian population in Brazil, Maruyama (2010) points out that contemporary 
Japanese-Brazilians are likely to be urban, with the largest concentration in São Paulo and its 
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vicinities, and middle class. The result of the survey shows that, combined, the number of people 
in managerial and clerical, trade and sales, and professional and technical jobs exceeds 60% of 
the Japanese-Brazilian population (173-174). Maruyama (2010) also notes that in 1987-88, the 
Brazilian-born third generation already made up the largest portion of this population (41.3% of 
the entire Japanese-Brazilian population), and the younger generations had higher rate of 
interracial marriage: 42% of the third generation and 61.6% of the fourth generation responded 
to the survey that they were “mixed race,” rather than “Japanese” (175-177).  
While a smaller-scale return migration existed in the 1980s, the amendment of the 
Japanese Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition law in 1990, which assigned a special 
visa status to non-Japanese citizens of Japanese decent, initiated the larger flow of Japanese-
Brazilian return migration to Japan (Figure 2). Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) describe the 
movement of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants to Japan in six stages. In the period between 
1980 and 1984 (the first stage), a part of the issei (first generation) population, who had migrated 
to Brazil in years immediately after World War II, started returning to Japan primarily for 
financial reasons. Most of the issei returnees have kept their Japanese citizenship while living in 
Brazil, and therefore required no special endorsement to seek employment in Japan. The 
returnees also relied on their personal and familial ties to find jobs. This movement of the issei 
thus went undocumented and mostly unnoticed both in Brazil and in Japan. Nonetheless, those 
issei returnees laid foundations for the later return migration of the nisei (second generation) and 
the sansei (third generation) (4-6).  
 In the second stage between 1985 and 1988, the Brazilian population in Japan did not see 
much significant increase. The year of 1985, however, witnessed the first instance of 
employment brokerage advertisement on a Brazilian newspaper (Mori 1992, quoted in Kajita et 
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al. 2005:6). Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi argue that the dekassegui (temporary work) brokerage 
network between Brazil and Japan was originally formed during this period, as Japanese 
businesses began eyeing Brazilians of Japanese descent in Brazil as a potential source of 
inexpensive labor (Kajita et al. 2005:6). The labor shortage in Japan and the high rate of inflation 
in Brazil in the 1980s also contributed to the emergence of this brokerage/migration network 
(Kajita et al. 2005:6). Most of those who entered Japan to work during this period were either the 
issei returnees or the children of the issei (nisei), who were able to seek employment in Japan, 
even under the more restrictive old immigration law, on a special visa category as “spouses, 
children and other relatives of Japanese citizens” (Kajita et al. 2005: 6, note #4). 
 With the change made in the Japanese Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act 
in 1990 that allowed foreign nationals with Japanese ancestral ties up to the third generation to 
enter (or “come back”) on a special visa status and join the unskilled labor force in Japan, (which 
effectively opened doors to the sansei population), the number of Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants entering Japan saw a drastic increase. In the period between 1989 and 1992, which 
Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) categorize as the third stage, more than 100,000 Japanese-
Brazilians return-migrated to work in Japan. Many of the migrants found employments in Japan 
through brokers, and worked in the manufacturing sector where the labor shortage was most 
severely felt (Kajita et al. 2005: 7-8). 	 
 After 1992, Japan entered a prolonged period of economic downturn. In the period of 
1993-1996 (the fourth stage), following job loss in the manufacturing sector, Japanese-
Brazilians’ workplaces expanded to entry level and mostly manual employment in the food 
industry, agriculture, fishery and waste management. This also led to the geographical dispersion 
of the immigrant population. In earlier stages, the majority of Japanese-Brazilian workers lived 
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around industrial areas in Gunma, Shizuoka and Aichi, developing “Brazil town” neighborhoods 
in the cities of Oizumi (Gunma), Hamamatsu (Shizuoka) and Toyota (Aichi); however, during 
this period, a part of the return-migrant population began to relocate to neighboring prefectures 
of Nagano, Mie and Gifu.  
Furthermore, according to Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005), employers started to see 
migrant workers not as a remedy to the labor shortage, but as a source of flexible labor that can 
be hired and laid off as their needs dictate. As I discuss below, this is not only characteristic of 
the ways in which Japanese-Brazilian workers are treated in Japan, but also, as Castells (2000) 
points out, symptomatic of the highly informatized and globally connected late capitalism in the 
“network society.” Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi argue that this has led to the pattern of 
employment and domestic migration (i.e. within Japan) of Japanese-Brazilian migrant workers, 
which rendered them “invisible” to the eyes of local, non-migrant residents. Because Japanese-
Brazilians moved from town to town searching for job openings, often in the unit of individual or 
nuclear family, and lived in the apartments their employer allotted to them, the members of local 
communities rarely got in touch with the Japanese-Brazilians as individuals (Kajita et al. 2005: 
8-10).  
 The fifth period of 1997-1999 saw a generational shift in the incoming Japanese-
Brazilian return migrant population. In this period, the sansei generation started to enter Japan to 
work in larger numbers than the nisei. This also meant an increase in the number of school-age 
children of the sansei, and an increase in the number of migrant workers with limited knowledge 
of Japanese language. Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi observe that a variety of community- and 
education-related issues began to surface during this period, such as disputes between local 
residents and the immigrant population, and the issue of providing primary and secondary 
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education to Japanese-as-a-second-language children (Kajita et al. 2005: 10-11). Beyond 
language, educational scholars focus on how school age Japanese-Brazilian and other nikkei 
children develop their identities through their life at Japanese schools. These works also discuss 
teachers’ roles and the reception of the immigrant children by Japanese students (see, for 
example, Sekiguchi 2003, Kojima 2006, Morita 2007). 
 Finally, in the 2000s (the sixth stage), as residential patterns such as the emergence of the 
neighborhoods and apartment complexes highly populated by migrant workers became more 
visible, and with a rise in attention to social welfare and human rights issues of the immigrants, 
more politicized and comprehensive reviews and discussions on the conditions of Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants and other foreign migrants have begun to take place. Although not yet 
fully developed, municipal governments and NGOs started to deal with the issues surrounding 
immigrant workers in a more integrative manner (Kajita et al. 2005: 11-12). 
 Because it has a specific history and is situated in a specific economic relationship and 
national policy, Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) contend that the movement of Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants do not fit with the four-staged immigration theory of Castles and Miller 
(1993), a well received theory in the field of immigration studies.  
Castles and Miller propose that transnational labor migration proceeds to permanent 
settlement of the immigrants in four stages: first is the movement of younger and single 
temporary workers who have strong ties to the home country, second is the extended stay and the 
initial emergence of immigrant social networks, third is family reunion within host societies and 
formation of more persistent ethnic communities, and fourth is the stage of permanent settlement 
(26). Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) observe that Japanese-Brazilian return migrants rely 
more on employment brokers than on familial ties when they migrate to Japan, and, contrary to 
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popular imaginations in Japan, Japanese-Brazilian return migration is still characterized by the 
dekassegui model and most of the return migrants do not plan to settle in Japan for an extended 
period of time (13-14). At the same time, however, as Okubo (2005) notes, it is not uncommon 
for Japanese-Brazilian workers to do multiple dekasegui stints, moving back and forth between 
Japan and Brazil.  
Dekassegui (Portuguese/Spanish transliteration, sometimes also written dekasegui or 
decasségui. In Roman transliteration commonly used in the English-speaking world, the word is 
spelled dekasegi) is a Japanese term originally used to describe temporary and/or seasonal rural-
urban labor migration within the nation. The term was also used by the Japanese emigrants who 
moved to Hawaii and North and South America in the early 20th century suggesting they would 
come back home to Japan like domestic dekassegi workers after a period of intensive labor – 
although most did not return in spite of their original intentions. The word dekassegui is now 
commonly used in Brazil to refer to labor migration of Japanese-Brazilians to Japan and by 
return migrants themselves to describe their own intentions (Ishi 1999; Mita 2009). The original 
Japanese term is a combination of de (to move away) and kasegu (to earn money), and in the 
contemporary usage it implies that a dekasegi person returns home after a certain period of time, 
often after making enough money. I discuss how the model of dekassegui influences Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants’ aspirations and lifestyles as transnational workers in Chapter 3, along 
with how the return migrants express their reactions to the fact dekassegui is the dominant mode 
of transnationality for Japanese-Brazilians. 
 
Japanese-Brazilian Return-Migration and Racial/Ethnic Politics 
Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) contend that the original intentions behind the 
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decisions to allow special visa status to the third generation nikkei (people of Japanese ancestry) 
population were not to selectively import them as immigrant labor force. Citing multiple 
government sources, the authors argue that family reunion was the primary purpose of the 
institution of this visa category, and the decision to include up to the third generation was 
situated in a broader context of the maintenance of the boundary of Japanese 
denizenship/citizenship. The same 1990 change to the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act that instituted this new visa category also recognized certain citizenship rights 
of zainichi Koreans and long term Chinese residents, who are third generation and beyond. In 
their view, and in the “official” explanation given by the government administrators, the 
subsequent dekasegui boom and the arrival of Japanese-Brazilian and other nikkei South 
American return migrants in large numbers were unintended consequences of the 1990 change 
(110-119). 
 That is not to suggest that the acceptance of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants (and 
especially its sansei and beyond contingency) is separable from racial/ethnic politics. Indeed, 
Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) maintain that the category of nikkeijin (people of Japanese 
ancestry) as interpreted and implemented by the Japanese immigration law is a historical and 
political construction that has emerged through the process of redrawing of the boundary of the 
Japanese nation and setting up a line between Japanese citizens and foreigners in pre-war and 
post-war Japan (3; 110).  
As the Japanese Empire expanded with the colonization of Taiwan, Korea, China and 
other parts of Asia and retracted with the end of the World War II, Japan has left people of 
“Japan proper” origin outside of its post-WWII border in its former colonies (and Japan 
controlled Manchuria), and people from the former colonies and territories within this new 
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national boundary as “foreigners.” As Iwabuchi (2002) notes, pre-war Japan’s project of colonial 
expansion employed the strategy of kominka, the project to assimilate and integrate colonial 
subjects to imperial citizens. This lead to “Japanization” of the “ethnic others” living in Japan’s 
colonial territories (9). As the war ended and former colonies gained autonomy, however, the 
Korean and Chinese residents of the naichi cities became “foreigner” again. Japanese migration 
to Hawaii and the Americas in the late-19th and early-20th century also produced a large body of 
diasporic Japanese and their descendents.  
Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) insist that therefore, the (proximate-)citizenship status 
granted to the nikkeijin population has to be understood in relation to the treatment of those who 
live in Japan and have ancestral ties to the former colonies of the Japanese Empire. Of the main 
focus here is zainichi Koreans who have most visible presence in the post-war “Japan proper.” 
The category of nikkeijin was constructed through the Japanese government’s project to 
(re)define the boundary of Japanese citizenship and legal-residentship (3).  
Hatano (2006), however, opposes to this in a book review of Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi 
(2005), condemning that their discussion is a simple retelling of the government officials’ formal 
explanation. Using the minutes of the National Diet’s general and sub-committee meetings and 
words of government workers quoted in magazine articles, Hatano points out that the Diet 
members and ministry officials were well aware of the presence of the nikkei population in South 
America as a potential source of labor power for Japanese businesses and factories, and were 
able to foresee the possibility that the creation of this visa category would instigate an inflow of 
return migrant workers. Thus, Hatano notes, the dekasegui boom and the arrival of the nikkei 
return migrants from Brazil and other South American countries that followed the 1990 change 
to the immigration law were “clearly expected outcomes,” rather than  “unintended 
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consequences” (11).  
Hatano further suggests that this creation of the teijusha (permanent resident) category 
for the overseas nikkeijin population might have been the national government’s passive 
concession to the “market.” Had the government officially tagged return migrants as “immigrant 
workers,” Hatano contends, they would have needed to exercise tighter control and mandate 
protections. Instead, the change to the visa categories that actually took place allowed Japanese 
businesses to freely “import” foreign workforce without the national government’s intervention 
and exploit nikkeijin as the source of “flexible” labor (11-12).  
It is difficult and beyond the scope of this study to trace the original intentions of the 
policymakers and the government administrators without further evidence, and even more so to 
establish whether or not the power of the market circumvented the decision of the national 
government in this case. Hatano’s view, however, looks at the complex relationship between the 
capital, nation-states and transnational flows of people in the late, globalized capitalist economy, 
similar to what Ong (1999) does in her analysis. It is also more plausible than the explanation 
Kajita et al. provide, which posits that the Japanese Diet members and ministry officials were 
naively unaware of the possible consequences of the policy change they were discussing. Ong 
(1999) proposes that “zones of graduated sovereignty” exist in the current condition of global 
capitalist economy, where nation-states, responding to market demands, strategically subject 
“different segments of the population to different mixes of disciplinary, caring and punitive 
technologies” (22). Hatano (2006), as well as Ong’s original study, shows that this extends 
beyond the nation-states’ domestic population to transnationally mobile people and how a 
nation-state accepts and treats them.  
Furthermore, the intentions of the policymakers aside, the desirability of Japanese-
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Brazilians as foreign workers has always been discussed in racial/ethnic terms. Tsuda (2001; 
2003) documents that in the early years of return migration, it was often argued that those who 
have “Japanese blood” would have stronger affinities to the “Japanese way of life” and would 
assimilate to the Japanese society more quickly than those without. As Iwabuchi (2002) argues, 
citing numerous anthropological and sociological works, “Japanese national/cultural identity has 
been constructed in an essentialist manner through the country’s conscious self-Orientalizing 
discourse,” and “Japan is represented and represents itself as culturally exclusive, homogeneous, 
and uniquely particularistic through the operation of a strategic binary opposition between two 
imaginary cultural entities, ‘Japan’ and ‘the West’” (7). Similarly, Yoshino (1992) writes,  
Mere emphasis of the Japanese difference from, and neglect of similarity with, other 
peoples as a way of defining Japanese identity [, which is a widely accepted way of 
thinking,] promotes a strong and problematic feeling of ‘unique us.’ The assumption 
that uniquely Japanese modes of thinking and behaving are incomprehensible for non-
Japanese tends to hinder social communication between Japanese and foreign residents 
and the latter’s integration into social life in Japan. (37) 
 
In the presence of such an imaginary, the discourse of “shared Japanese blood” was used to 
promote the preferablity of Japanese-Brazilians, who would not disrupt “homogenous and 
particularistic” workspaces and local communities.  
In later years, this “shared blood” assumption has transformed into often racialized 
oppositions from local residents and pressures to assimilate (Tsuda 2001, 2003; Roth 2002). 
Kajita et al. (2005), too, acknowledge that although the Japanese immigration law may give 
certain privileges to the nikkei return migrants based on the politics of boundary making between 
Japanese and non-Japanese, local, non-immigrant residents saw return migrants in communities 
as gaikokujin (foreigners, or as the authors document, burajiru-jin [Brazilians] or nanbei-jin 
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[South Americans] but not as nikkeijin) and the employers treated them as a source of 
inexpensive and expendable foreign labor, who sit outside of the “normal” employment 
practices, worker protection and salary standards in Japan (123-130). 
 Okubo (2005) also shows through his analysis of local labor markets in Japan that rather 
than contributing to or exacerbating labor market segmentation (i.e. polarization of the market in 
to the highly-paid and protected elite segment and the low-wage and low-social-security informal 
segment), Japanese-Brazilian and other nikkeijin workers enter the market, which has already 
been segmented. The contemporary Japanese industry has developed the structure of “multi-
layered subcontracting” (Okubo 2005: 91), in which major manufacturers subcontract parts of 
their labor to middle-sized businesses and factories, which in turn subcontract parts of their work 
to small- and micro-sized factories. This structure was used as a buffer against economic 
changes, by enabling major manufacturers to flexibly adopt their production volume to 
fluctuating supply and demand. Under this structure, smaller employers have been using 
informal workers (domestic migrant workers and female part-time workers) as the source of 
flexible labor. This gave them a way to adapt to changing demands from above from their 
contractors.  
Okubo (2005) argues that the nikkeijin workers entered this segmented labor market, 
replacing domestic informal workers in the low-skill, short-term labor market, which is also 
characterized in Japan as 3K (pronounced “san-kei”) jobs. The three Ks refer to kusai (smelly), 
kitanai (dirty, unsanitary) and kiken (dangerous). Because of the visa condition, the nikkeijin 
return migrants were able to engage in manual labor, but not recognized as full citizens. This set 
the nikkei people aside from employment-seeking illegal immigrants, who are also a source of 
expendable labor but posed more risk to the employers, as well as from Japanese informal 
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workers, who are better protected by labor laws and conventions and thus less “flexible” from 
the viewpoint of the employers. Okubo (2005) suggests that because of this status, Japanese-
Brazilian and other nikkei workers are treated as proximate Japanese but not fully Japanese in the 
labor market. The “nikkei ethnicity” constructed by the visa category makes their labor power a 
distinctive “commodity.”  
This in turn suggests that the less-skilled, short-term labor market, which traditionally has 
been feminized (and “ruralized,” in a sense that rural-urban seasonal migrants have constituted 
another large portion of labor force in this market along with female workers), is now 
increasingly becoming racialized. 
 
Incomplete, Fragile and Temporary Social Support 
Immigration laws in the post-WWII Japan approached the issue of immigration only from 
the viewpoint of control. The main interest was to manage who can and who cannot enter/and or 
stay in the country on what conditions. That the debates I discussed in the previous section, 
which took place prior to the 1990 change to the Immigration Act, often centered on the 
discussion of the “desirability” of the nikkeijin and other types of immigrants is reflexive of this 
tendency. 
Until the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications developed “Tabunka Kyosei 
Suishin Puroguramu” (“The Program to Promote Multicultural Coexistence”) in 20062, the 
national government has not had a comprehensive set of policies to deal with civil right and 
welfare issues of immigrants once they enter Japan (Komai 2001; Kajita et al. 2005). In addition, 
as the cases of shugakusei visa and exchange kenshusei interns most clearly exemplify (see 
                                                
2 http://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/286922/www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/2006/060307_2.html  
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above), the enforcement of the control itself has been “ad hoc” and arbitrary at best (Weiner 
2000: 59). Many scholars concur that this lack of a cohesive policy framework led to the 
emergence of various diversity related issues, especially in the areas of medical care, education, 
disaster response and acceptance of newcomer immigrants in local societies (Komai 2001; Sellek 
2001; Kajita et al. 2005).  
 Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) contend that this lack of a comprehensive set of 
policies kept immigrant population vulnerable to the corporate logic of flexible employment. 
They also argue that, because of the absence of policy frameworks at the national level, the 
“local” has become an important hub for providing health care to immigrant workers and 
education for immigrant children, and devising policies that reflect increasing diversity of the 
population. Even with the “Tabunka Kyosei” program, the actual implementation of assistance 
and policy is left to municipal government offices, while the national government offers 
suggestions and financial and technical supports).  
Kajita et al. document the instances in which, although not yet fully developed, local, 
usually city, governments and residents began multilingual and multicultural services and public 
policy forums. One of the most prominent developments was the establishment of Gaikokujin 
Shuju Toshi Kaigi (The Association of Cities with High Foreign National Population)3 in 2001. 
Currently having 28 member cities/townships, the association hosts forums for the members to 
exchange ideas and develop policy suggestions, and the member cities and townships lobby 
prefectural and national assemblies collectively to realize necessary policy and budget changes. 
Komai (2001: 118-137) also points out that municipal governments, NGOs and volunteer groups 
have played crucial roles in the absence of national level decision-making and support.  
                                                
3 http://www.shujutoshi.jp/index.html  
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 While efforts at the local level may have seen some degree of success, they do not 
address the full range of problems that Japanese-Brazilian return migrants need to deal with. In 
particular, localized mechanisms of support frequently run into troubles in the face of the 
employment pattern of the return migrant workers and the pattern of residency and migration 
within Japan related to that. Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) suggest that the practice of 
flexible employment led to geographical dispersion of migrant worker population within Japan, 
and to frequent relocations of each worker (9-10, 186-204). Consequently, each migrant worker 
became “invisible” to the eyes of the non-migrant local residents, although migrant workers (or 
“foreigners”) as a group gained visible presence in local landscapes (9).  
 Additionally, frequent relocations coupled with the lack of national level support mean 
for the immigrants that they would need to cultivate new local support networks and adopt to a 
new set of local multilingual/multicultural services each time they move. Local governments and 
communities that have never had large numbers of immigrants in their resident body before, and 
therefore has not been the member of the Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi mentioned above, are 
often unprepared to provide services to the population that has newly, and in many cases 
suddenly, become linguistically and culturally diverse. As I discuss more in details in chapters to 
follow, many of these and other related issues surfaced again in the period immediately after the 
2008 global financial crisis, when a large number of the return migrants experienced a sudden 
job loss and turned to municipal and national agency offices for help. 
 Therefore, Japanese-Brazilian return migrant workers in Japan commonly have to rely on 
local support networks for their livelihoods, but those local networks are often incomplete, 
fragile, or temporary; and this is one area, where, with a purported affordance to enhance 
translocal connections and ties (Wellman et al. 2003), one expects to see high reliance on the 
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internet and mobile phones. In fact, Japanese-Brazilian return migrants have web “portals” and 
mobile websites to exchange information on local events, stores that sell Brazilian products, 
places that offer legal and linguistic consultation, tips on medical and healthcare, job openings 
and other things.  
The providers of this type of web services include both businesses, such as IPC World 
who runs the mobile-centric POKEBRAS website4, and NGOs like the Center for Multicultural 
Information and Association in Osaka who started a website named Brasil Net to help Japanese-
Brazilian return migrant population after the 2008 financial crisis. As “portals” on the internet 
and the mobile web, one can access these websites from anywhere in Japan or the world. In 
addition, Portuguese-language publications, such as newspapers and ad-centric free papers 
circulate outside of the areas of high Japanese-Brazilian concentration, and there is a loosely knit 
network of Brazilian schools and culture centers that intersperse the nation.  
As I discuss further in Chapter 4, however, those online and offline resources only 
provided partial compensation for being away from Brazil Towns for the Japanese-Brazilian 
return migrants I interviewed in Kobe. While the city has one Brazilian culture center, the 
Japanese-Brazilian population there was widely dispersed within the city and the nearby areas, 
and largely because of financial concerns and lack of time, the return migrants I talked to did not 
use the internet and the mobile to actively seek out information available on the web. Rather, 
their new media use, particularly the mobile phone use, was limited to communication and 
coordination among the members of the immediate family. 
 
Japanese-Brazilian Return Migration and Network Society 
Digital media and new information and communication technologies in general figures 
                                                
4 http://www4.pokebras.com/  
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importantly in transnational movements of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants. Not only did their 
arrival in Japan in the early 1990s coincided with the beginning of popular diffusion of mobile 
communication technologies and later the internet (Okada and Matsuda 2002), but also they 
came to the workplaces highly affected by the “network society” (Castells 2000). In particular, as 
I discuss below, the practice of flexible employment, which according to Kajita, Tanno and 
Higuchi (2005) became prevalent among the employers of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in 
the mid- to late-1990s is a characteristic of the globally connected late capitalist economy.  
 
Internet and Mobile Phone Diffusion in Japan 
The first experimental computer network connecting three universities in Tokyo was put 
in use in 1984 (Okada and Matsuda 2002). While popular diffusion had to wait until 1995, Japan 
is now one of the “well-connected” countries regarding the rate of the internet adoption among 
its general population. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications report 
(2009), 91.1% of the households in Japan have internet connections, with a very small 
rural/urban difference of about 4%. Approximately 74% of the households have broadband 
connections (cable, fiber optic, DSL or 3G wireless). Popular activities among the internet users 
in Japan include “accessing government/corporate websites” (56.8% of the active users), “email” 
(49.1%), “accessing personal websites and blogs (to read)” (47.4%), and “buying and selling 
products and services” (45.5%). 
One characteristic aspect of the internet use in Japan is that a large number of active users 
connect to the internet and use online services from their mobile phones, and this trend has been 
present before the popular diffusion of smartphones. The same 2009 Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications survey result indicates that 68.2% of all active users of the internet connect 
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to the internet both from personal computers and mobile phones. 16.6% of the users use personal 
computers alone, while 9% access to the internet from their mobile phones only. mixi, the largest 
SNS in the Japanese market, reports that approximately 70% of the traffic to their site come from 
mobile phones (MarkeZine, 2009).  
The advent of smartphones and tablet computers (such as iPad) in the past few years have 
changed the landscape of mobile internet access in the major mobile phone markets of the world. 
A 2011 comScore report entitled Digital Omnivores points out a rapid growth of non-computer 
internet traffic in Singapore, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Japan, Australia, Canada, Spain, 
India, France and Brazil (6). In Singapore, the U.K., the U.S. and Japan, access from mobile 
phones accounted for about 4.5% of the nation’s entire internet traffic in August 2011, while 
about 3.5% of the traffic came from mobile phones in Australia and India, and about 2% in 
Canada and Spain in the same period (7). The report also notes close to the half of the U.S. 
mobile phone owners, or more than 116 million people, use mobile phones for “mobile media” 
(13).  
Before the current smartphones boom, however, the rate and the number of Japanese 
mobile and internet use stood out in the world. In 2006, Miyata, Boase, Wellman and Ikeda 
write, 
Accessing the Internet through mobile phones has already become integrated into daily 
life for a significant proportion of the Japanese population (Barnes and Huff 2003). By 
the end of May 2001, more than 40 million Japanese were able to access the Internet 
through their mobile phones, with the number rising 55percent to more than 62million 
by the end of March 2003 (Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and 
Telecommunications, Japan 2003). By contrast, only 4 million North Americans could 
use mobile phones to access the Internet in August 2000 (Funk 2001). In fact, mobile 
phones that can access the Internet have been so rare in the English-speaking world that 
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we had to coin a new word, webphone, to refer to them. (145) 
 
The “webphone” here refers to feature phones equipped with mobile web browsers, which, as 
Miyata et al. note, was widely popular in Japan before the popular diffusion of smartphones.  
Miyata, Boase, Wellman and Ikeda (2006) also write, “The percentage of young adults in 
Japan who use webphones to email is much higher in the United States and many parts of 
Europe, where webphone e-mail has failed to attract a majority of people from any age group” 
(145). Based on the study they conducted in Yamanashi, Japan, the authors argue that “[p]eople 
are on the move, getting information, making arrangements, and contacting friends and relatives 
through wireless webphones and wired PCs. […] it is a trend toward mobile connectivity, which 
we call mobile-ization, that is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout Japanese society” 
(Miyata et al.: 160).  
This, however, is one area where access disparity between the general population and 
immigrant users of the technology becomes prominent. While the general population users in 
Japan may be moving towards “mobile-ized” sociability, my findings, which I discuss in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 4, indicate that some groups of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants do not 
subscribe to and utilize the data connection functionality of their mobile phones. In the society 
where the general mode of communication is “mobile-ized,” the non-use of mobile internet 
separates the immigrant users from the general population users, and differentiate their 
experiences with the technology. 
 Japan has more than two decades’ history of embracing mobile communication. 
Popularization of mobile telecommunication devices in Japan goes back to pagers (called 
“pocket bells” or “pokeberu” for short). The service has been present since 1968, but the 
penetration rate started to rise in the late 1980s, when young female office workers and college 
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students began using the device for more personal, rather than business, communication. The use 
has spread to high school students by 1993. At its peak in 1996, pager services in Japan had close 
to10.8 million subscribers. While personal mobile phones first went into service in Japan with a 
limited market in 1987, mobile phone use spread after 1997 to wider group of users including 
students, homemakers and retirees, rather rapidly replacing pagers  (Okada and Matsuda 2002).  
As such, Japan was one of the earliest adopters of the mobile communication technology 
in the world. Still, Japanese users were, somewhat surprisingly, slower to take up mobile phones 
compared to other early adopting markets in Europe and other parts of East Asia. The GSM 
communication system introduced to Europe in the early 1990s contributed to the rapid increase 
in mobile phone subscription in European markets (Ling 2004). In 2000, countries such as 
Austria, Italy, Finland, Sweden and Norway had mobile phone adoption rates of more than 70%, 
England, Ireland and Portugal close to 70%, while Japan fell far behind at 52.6%. Taiwan and 
Hong Kong also had much higher penetration rates of more than 80% in 2000, whereas only 
36.5% of U.S. people owned mobile phones at that time (Okada and Matsuda 2002). 
This, however, changed gradually through the 2000s, and the current rate of mobile 
phone adoption among the general public is higher. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (2009) estimates that 75.4% of the total population actively uses mobile phone 
services, with adoption rate reaching as high as 97.3% for the people aged between 20 and 29, 
96.7% for the 30-39 age group, and 94.8% for the 40-49 age group.  
The same study shows that lower-income families and the elderly are also well-connected 
through mobile phones. About half (55.7%) of the respondents from families with less than 2 
million yen (approximately $20,000 at the 2008 exchange rate) annual household income had 
mobile phones, while the rate was 66.8% for the respondents from families with household 
 38 
income between 2 million and 4 million yen (approximately $20,000-$40,000), compared to the 
national average of 75.4%. For the elderly population, 54.5% of the respondents between 60 and 
64 years of age, and 40.6% of the people between 65 and 69 had accesses to mobile phones in 
2008. Since there is an overlap between some elderly households and lower-income households 
(i.e. households solely relying on post-retirement pensions as the income source), one can project 
that the rate of mobile phone penetration is actually higher for working-age people from lower-
income families.  
At the same time, the gap between these groups and the national average is much wider 
when one looks at the rate of internet adoption. Only 34.6% of less than 2 million yen annual 
income homes has internet connections, and the penetration rate is slightly less than 50% 
(49.7%) for the families with 2 million to 4 million household income. Of the people of 60 to 64 
years of age, 48.5% have internet connections, while for the 65-59 age group the rate drops to 
27.3%. This indicates that the groups within the general population that are commonly seen as 
socially disadvantaged, namely the lower-income families and the elderly, are rather well-
connected to the telecommunication networks in Japan, owing to the availability of mobile 
phones.  
In contrast, as I discuss further in Chapter 4, the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I 
interviewed often did not have accesses to the full range of mobile phone services (i.e. voice, text 
messaging and mobile web access), largely because of the transient nature of their stay in Japan 
and their transient employment statuses. This further suggests the presence of disparities between 
mobile phones as experienced by the general population users and mobile phones as experienced 
by the immigrant users. Transnational workers in this sense make up one group of the 
“information have-less” in otherwise well-connected Japan, those who have “limited income and 
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limited influence in policy process” despite being online and using mobile phones (Qiu 2009: 3-
4), along with the very poor and very old segments of the nation’s non-immigrant population. 
 Yet, while the general population is relatively well-served and the diffusion rates of the 
internet and mobile phones to them are well-documented and analyzed, Japanese scholars and 
government bodies discuss the issue of “digital divide” and “digital inequalities” in Japan only 
along the lines of gender, generation, region (rural vs. urban) and income level (Ono, 2005; The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2009). No literature exists that adequately 
document the access gap, digital inequalities and differentiated use that may exist along the lines 
of race and ethnicity, citizenship and visa statuses and national origins (i.e. Japanese nationals vs. 
“old-comer” immigrants vs. “newcomer” immigrants). One paper that discusses the “digital 
divide” in Japan even asserts, “Race is also not an issue since Japan is a homogenous country” 
(Otani, 2003: n/p). My study, along with literature I reviewed in this Chapter, however, suggests 
that Japan is not, nor has it ever been, “homogenous.”  
Furthermore, the “mobile phone culture” in Japan is frequently presented and discussed 
in relation to youth culture and urban/suburban users (Okada 2005; Ito and Okabe 2005; Hjörth 
2006; Daliot-Bul 2007). Analyses often center on how kawaii (cute) aesthetics of the girls lead to 
the emergence of a large mobile phone personalization market (that includes both physical 
accessories and downloadable ringtones, wallpapers and other applications) (Okada 2005; Hjörth 
2006), or how the needs to cope with urban-suburban train commutes fostered a specific text 
messaging behavior (Ito and Okabe 2005) and developments of applications focused on 
individual play (e.g. games) (Daliot-Bul 2007). Many other mobile phone applications (both on-
line and downloadable), such as city maps, train route maps and restaurant guides are designed 
with the needs of urban commuters in mind. 
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Nonetheless, immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities often have different patterns of new 
media adoption from general population users. Existing works suggest that people who migrate 
domestically and transnationally rely on new information and communication technologies, the 
internet in particular, as one of the safety-net mechanisms. Discussion forums, chat rooms, 
instant messages and email lists (and mobile phones) fulfill immigrants’ instrumental (finding 
jobs and places to live) and emotional (staying in touch with family and friends, coping with 
major life course events) needs by providing with them a means to maintain ties with their home 
societies, as well as ways to find people in and information on their host communities (Adams 
and Ghose 2003; Hiller and Franz, 2004; Mitra 2005, 2006; Horst 2006; Wilding 2006; Yao, 
2009; Madianou and Miller 2012).  
Previous studies also indicate that online forums, chat rooms, peer-to-peer music sharing, 
and email lists serve as important venues for immigrant adults and youths to negotiate and 
express their identities (Boczkowski 1999; Panagakos 2003; Ignacio 2005; Parker and Song 
2006; Elias and Lemish 2009). Not only do these online services provide immigrants with places 
to express their ethnicity- and nationality-based identities (Boczkowski 1999; Panagakos 2003), 
but also they offer spaces to discuss about their experiences of being immigrant subjects, and 
reformulate their identities (Ignacio 2005; Parker and Song 2006; Elias and Lemish 2009).  
As I show in more details in upcoming chapters, Japanese-Brazilian return migrant users 
of the internet and mobile phones are connected to the network in different ways from the 
general population users in Japan and, even from minority and immigrant users of new media 
documented in earlier works. As I discuss in Chapter 4, due partly to their transient employment 
status, most of the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I talked to at the Kobe Culture Center were 
moderately active users of mobile phones and the internet at most. Although they utilized 
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different types of new media and old media to stay connected to Brazil and organize their 
everyday life, none of the people actively posted on or participated in public online spaces. The 
ways they and other Japanese-Brazilians in Japan used mobile phones, the internet, landline 
phones, the satellite TV and ethnic newspaper, thus, did not give them capabilities to freely 
transcend the boundaries set up by the traditional nation-states, or engage in a personalized mode 
of identity (re)formation. 
Likewise, what they experience through the media use is also different. For instance, as I 
show in Chapter 2, the Japanese government’s and the authorities’ unwillingness to respond to 
the informational and media access needs of the immigrant labor population limited the variety 
of media products and services available to the Japanese-Brazilians, while at the same time the 
return migrants, whose position in the job market has been constricted to that of temporary 
workers, struggle to sustain their access to the internet, mobile phones and other types of media 
and cultural products through commercialized outlets.  
 
Network Society and Immigrant Workers 
Castells in The Rise of the Network Society (2000) says, “The restructuring of firms and 
organizations, allowed by information technology and stimulated by global competition, is 
ushering in a fundamental transformation of work: the individualization of labor in the labor 
process” (282: italics in the original text). Castells also writes,  
The prevailing model for labor in the new information-based economy is that of a core 
labor force, formed by information-based managers …, and a disposable labor force 
that can be automated and/or hired/fired/offshored, depending upon market demand and 
labor costs. Furthermore, the networked form of business organization allows 
outsourcing and subcontracting as forms of externalizing labor in a flexible adaptation 
to market conditions. (295-296: italics in the original text). 
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Castells notes that Japan until the early 1990s did not follow this transformation, or at least so it 
looked to the eyes of casual observers. On the surface, Japan seemed as if it had kept its unique 
practice of long-term employment even in the age of networked capitalism, seemingly going 
against the logic of flexibility.  
Castells explains, however, this was because Japan had built its own labor market 
structure over time, which can supply required flexibility. Most important in this structure was 
the existence of skilled female part-time workers, who were “adaptable and provid[ed] flexibility 
to Japanese labor management practices” (292). As Castells describes, women in Japan 
“massively enter the labor force in their early twenties [(as college graduates)], stop working 
after marriage to raise their children, and return later to the labor force as part-timers” (293).  
While Castells attributes the presence and persistence of this labor market structure to 
traditional Japanese values such as the stability of patriarchal family, Yoda (2006) argues that the 
discourses around femininity and motherhood in Japanese society were carefully manipulated 
and constructed hand in hand with the development of post-World War II Japanese economy, so 
that female labor and Japanese families fit with and serve the logic of capital accumulation. In 
any case, aside from the place of traditional values in their analysis, Castells and Yoda concur 
that the presence of adaptable female labor largely contributed to Japan’s economic prosperity 
and stability.   
Castells also notes, however, that in the late-1990s, “there were signs that the Japanese 
model of labor market was on its way to structural transformation” (293). The prolonged 
economic recession following the burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s and pressures 
applied by global competition moved Japanese companies to move to the model of more flexible 
employment. In addition, as Castells writes “[i]n the 1990s, figures for foreign immigration and 
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day laborers started to rise, introducing additional choice and flexibility in the lower-skilled 
segments of the workforce” (295). 	 
Echoing this analysis of Castells’s, Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005; see also Okubo 
2005 discussed above) argue that although they were first seen as a quick solution to the labor 
shortage, which was a major concern for Japanese manufacturers in the early 1990s, Japanese-
Brazilian and other Central and South American return migrants, along with the local working 
class population, are now subject to the practice of flexible employment, a practice symptomatic 
of the informatized, networked and globalized late capitalism that requires the logic of 
flexibility.  
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants are not in a strict sense of the word “virtual 
immigrants” (Aneesh 2006) like South Asian call center workers, Indian H1B immigrants in the 
US high-tech industry (Lowell 2001) or Chinese rural-urban migrants at the production lines of 
computers and mobile phones (Qiu 2009), who are referred to as the invisible and highly 
exploited workforce behind the glorious “information society.” Most of the return migrants do 
not directly deal with information and communication technologies at work.  
Nonetheless, as such, their transient employment statuses and unstable living conditions 
are strongly tied to the global and local deployment of new information and communication 
technologies and digital media. As Castells points out, the practice of “flexible employment,” 
which contributes greatly to Japanese-Brazilian return migrants’ transient status, is a product of 
those technologies entering office and factory floors, linking businesses and production sites to 
the global network, compelling them to adopt the logic of flexibility. Thus, while Japanese-
Brazilians migrate physically to Japan and the nature of their work is heavily physical, their 
presence in Japan clearly signals to us that we are living in the “network society,” in which our 
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desires and realities are inseparably tied to the diffusion of information and communication 
technologies. 
Ong (1999) in Flexible Citizenship argues that in the present age of globalized late 
capitalism, “’the regime of flexible accumulation’ reigns, whether in the realms of business 
philosophy and high finance or in production systems, labor markets and consumption” (3). The 
practice of “flexible employment” Castells (2000) and Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) discuss 
in their works is one manifestation of the logic of flexibility. In such an era, however, individuals 
are not passive victims of the logic of flexible accumulation, nor do governments sit powerlessly 
as transnational corporations eat away the traditional power and boundaries of the nation-states. 
They adopt the logic of flexibility themselves and use the logic for their own gain.  
As Ong writes, “individuals as well as governments develop a flexible notion of 
citizenship and sovereignty as strategies to accumulate capital and power” (6). “’Flexible 
citizenship,’” according to Ong, “refers to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, 
and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing 
political-economic conditions” (6). Thus, Ong says, 
while mobility and flexibility have long been part of the repertoire of human behavior, 
under transnationality the new links between flexibility and the logics of displacement, 
on the one hand, and capital accumulation, on the other, have given new valence to such 
strategies of maneuvering and positioning. Flexibility, migration, and relocations, 
instead of being coerced or resisted, have become practices to strive for, rather than 
stability. (19) 
 
Seen in light of Ong’s analysis, Japanese-Brazilian return migrants to Japan are not simply 
forced to move by economic stagnation in Brazil and coerced into instable “flexible 
employment.” Rather, they actively and creatively internalize and utilize the logic of flexibility 
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to accumulate capital for their own.  
Several existing works document the presence of Japanese-Brazilians who strategically 
and/or opportunistically move between Brazil and Japan for capital gain. Mita (2002) talks about 
dekasegui returnees in Bastos, in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, who navigate between Japan and 
Brazil by adopting two identities. In Brazil, they use “Japanese” identity – associated with hard 
working and honesty, while living and working in Japan, they emphasize their gaikokujin 
(foreigner, non-Japanese) identity to ease their transition. In doing so, those Bastos nikkeijin 
create more choice for themselves, enabling them to exploit opportunities of capital 
accumulation both in Brazil and in Japan. Furthermore, Mita notes that local Japanese-Brazilian 
community in Bastos values return migration to Japan and dekasegui returnees. Mita quotes one 
of her interviewees, who praises dekasegui saying “it is good for Bastos Japanese, because they 
[(dekasegui returnees)] bring Japanese culture and Japanese ways of organizing back [to Bastos 
from Japan]” (236; my translation). Thus, by being flexibly transnational, Japanese-Brazilians 
from Bastos in Mita’s study accumulate not only financial capital but also “cultural capital.”  
Ishi (2003) discusses the cases of a Japanese-Brazilian entrepreneur, a Japanese-Brazilian 
musician and “commuter” Japanese-Brazilian migrants who frequently travel back and forth 
between Brazil and Japan. Ishi argues that those people draw on the transnational network of 
Japanese-Brazilians and their legal privilege to freely enter and work in Japan and strategically 
move between the two countries. Echoing Ong (1999), Ishi writes that those Japanese-Brazilians 
“are the active agents of the migration process, alert to the new opportunities of the IT 
[(information technology)] age, conscious of the ‘cost-benefit equations’ of when, how, and why 
they should move or stay in or between Brazil and Japan” (217).  
Still, the ability to creatively manage their opportunities and futures – “agencies” in 
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Ong’s word – which those people in Mita’s and Ishi’s study seem to have come from economic 
and cultural resources. In Mita’s case, as Mita herself notes, the nikkeijin community in Bastos 
has kept closer ties to Japanese culture and Japanese language through the years compared to the 
Japanese-Brazilian population living elsewhere (Mita 2006).  
Owing largely to the history of the city (Bastos has its root in a Japanese agricultural 
settlement developed in the 1920s), Bastos has had a higher-than-average concentration of 
Japanese-Brazilians. Mita reports close to 20% of the current resident of the city are of Japanese 
descent, whereas Japanese-Brazilians account for about 1% of the population of Brazil. Because 
of this, the nikkei residents of Bastos have closer accesses to Japanese cultural products through 
Japanese rental video shops and Japanese-language satellite channels. According to Mita, the 
second- and third generation Japanese-Brazilians from Bastos are more likely to be able to 
converse in Japanese than the nisei and sansei Japanese-Brazilians from other areas of Brazil.  
Thus, Bastos nikkeijin are better able to adjust to the life in Japan than Japanese-
Brazilians from other areas when they become return migrants, which also gave them better 
opportunities to become flexible. In Ishi’s case, too, the Japanese-Brazilian entrepreneur, 
musician and “commuter” migrants he follows are “successful” people, who can move between 
Brazil and Japan more easily because they have sufficient financial resources to do so.  
My findings, which I discuss in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, suggest that many Japanese-
Brazilians, especially after the wave of unemployment following the 2008 global economic 
crisis, were financially and perhaps culturally and linguistically constrained, and were not able to 
fully exercise their ability to strategically manage their opportunities, even with the aid of 
information and communication technologies.  
In Chapter 3, using a YouTube video and messages from Japanese-Brazilian return 
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migrants posted on Brasil Net, an NGO-hosted website in Japan, I further explicate the 
conditions the return migrants were in after the 2008 crisis. I also use the video and the messages 
to illustrate how the return migrants understood and reacted to the situation.  
Chapter 4 looks at Japanese-Brazilian return migrants as moderate users of new media, 
and discusses that the ways in which they utilized mobile phones and the internet did not grant 
them capabilities to freely move around the space between Brazil and Japan and take a full 
control of their destiny. As I show in the chapter, financial constraint was one of the reasons of 
moderate use.  
  
As I discussed above and explore further in the following chapters, the acceptance of 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants and their livelihood in Japan are mediated by specific, 
racialized politics of inclusion and exclusion; local and translocal ties are important to the 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants due to the lack of national level integration policy and 
support mechanisms; and their living and working conditions, as well as types of access they 
have to media products and services are inseparably connected with the informatized “network 
society” and popular diffusion of digital media. The intertwined presence of those factors makes 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan and their use of digital media a crucial topic of an 
academic inquiry to address questions regarding the relationships between life experiences, 
subjectivity and the use of technology, and the relationships between media technology and 
society.  
In this chapter, I outlined the history of labor migration to Japan, the history of Japanese-
Brazilian return migration to Japan, development and diffusion of information and 
communication technology in Japan and the related history of the rise of the “network society,” 
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“flexible employment” and “flexible citizenship” in the context of Japan and globally. In the 
next, I turn to the discussion of the development of Japanese-Brazilian return migrant media in 
Japan, including newspapers, the satellite television, community radio stations and online 
information and news portals, and how the Japanese government’s immigration policy and media 
policy lead to the emergence of a specific type of commercialized ethnic media.  
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Figure 1: Composition of foreign national residents in Japan 1960-2008 
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Figure 2: Number of Brazilian nationals living in Japan 1985-2008 
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Chapter 2: Japanese-Brazilian and Brazilian Media in Japan 
 
According to Iwabuchi (2010), in 2006, a group of foreign-national residents of Japan 
organized a meeting with then Prime Minister Koizumi. In the meeting, the group expressed their 
concerns to Koizumi about “the excessive monoculturalism of Japan’s broadcasting services, and 
the lack of programming aimed specifically at non-Japanese residents in Japan” (Iwabuchi 2010: 
414). Koizumi listened to the group and promised that his cabinet would move forward with a 
project to bring multilingual media to Japan; however, as Iwabuchi writes, “in the cabinet 
meeting a few days later, the project was mysteriously converted into a discussion of how to 
enhance national brand images in the world by developing an English-language international 
broadcasting service, which could stand alongside BBC World, CNN and CCTV [(China Central 
Television)] International” (Iwabuchi 2010: 414). The international service went on the air in 
2009, but the domestic multilingual public broadcast never became a reality.  
Fast-forward four years. It was a hot September day in 2010. I was sitting down with two 
people in a meeting space inside a small office, which a non-profit organization and a start-up 
web content business company shared in a business district close to the center of Osaka city, 
Japan. One was from the organization, whose mission was to provide multilingual and 
multicultural news, announcements and information to the non-Japanese-speaking residents in 
the area. The other was the president of the venture business, which branched off from the non-
profit and sold multilingual news and entertainment contents to the mobile phone users in Japan, 
who did not read or write in Japanese. I was asking them about a website that the non-profit had 
launched a few years before to help Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in need in the aftermath 
of a 2008 global financial crisis, and about mobile web portal sites the start-up company hosted. I 
was interested in how Japanese-Brazilian return migrants used those websites and mobile web 
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portals.  
At one point in the interview, however, the president of the start-up told me that he 
thought the Portuguese-language site for Brazilians was almost “done as business,” and his 
business was looking to put more effort into the Tagalog-language site and deliberating starting a 
service in Vietnamese. While it had been viable to target Japanese-Brazilian return migrants 
when the Japanese economy was better and the ethnic market was stronger, he said, doing 
business for Filipinos/as would be more stable and crisis-proof, because many of the Philippines 
nationals living in Japan were there as spouses of Japanese nationals (and although still less in 
number, as medical and healthcare workers), and thus were less likely to leave Japan even in the 
time of bad economy.  
Those are two separate anecdotes from two different points in time. Still, those stories are 
connected. The two cases show us the Japanese government’s continued indifference to, and 
unwillingness to cater to, the informational and communication needs of transnational, 
multicultural and non-Japanese-speaking residents of the country, and suggest the consequences 
of such inaction. They are byproducts of the government’s immigration policy, which, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter, traditionally paid little attention to the civic and social life of 
foreign nationals who enter the country to work and live (Komai 2001; Sellek 2001; Kajita et al. 
2005; Higuchi 2010). 
 This chapter presents a history and the current state of (Japanese-)Brazilian media in 
Japan, and how the global financial crisis of late 2008 affected the industry. By discussing 
several examples of Portuguese-language and multilingual media producers and service 
providers, the chapter also illustrates how Japanese government’s immigration and media 
policies frame what media products and services are available to Japanese-Brazilian return 
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migrants in Japan, and how the return migrants can access them.  
In the absence of public broadcast and media services, many Japanese and Brazilian 
ethnic businesses entered the market, looking to capitalize on specific informational and 
communication needs of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants. Most of those businesses were 
small-scale start-up companies, not affiliated with established media businesses in Japan. While 
some thrived, the income of the return migrant population those businesses counted on was an 
instable one.  
Supported only by short-term contract work, the buying power of the return migrants 
fluctuated widely, reacting directly to ups and downs of the domestic (and by extension global) 
economic climates. The combined presence of those factors means that the operations of those 
businesses, as well as the return migrants’ access to the media have been unstable and 
unpredictable, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis.  
In addition, I discuss the relationships between Rede Globo (the Globo Network), a 
Brazilian commercial television network, and Japanese-Brazilian return migrant viewers of 
Globo programs, which shows us another instance in which nation-states’ and media businesses’ 
imperative influence the return migrants’ access to media products and services, and the 
relationship between Japanese-Brazilians and globally circulated media products that originate 
from Japan.	 
 
The Emergence and Development of (Japanese-)Brazilian Media Businesses in Japan 
As Costa (2007) documents, in the beginning of the 1990s, “when the [Japanese-
Brazilian] emigrants got to Japan for the first time… [they] felt alienated from their origin 
society because of difficulties and high cost of obtaining news, both about their families and 
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about what is happening back in the country [(Brazil)]” (132, my translation). As Costa notes, 
international calls between Japan and Brazil cost more than $2.00 per minute, and internet and 
email, still in a very early stage of popular diffusion, were not yet accessible alternatives for 
expensive telephone calls (132).  
In addition, while English-language “bilingual” news had been available on the television 
(especially through the national public broadcaster NHK), radio and in print in Japan, no TV 
channels or newspapers offered news or announcements in languages other than English and 
Japanese at that time. Not fluent in either of the languages, return migrants often had to rely on 
letters and materials sent to them by their friends and family members for the news from Brazil 
(Costa 2007:133).  
In contrast to the U.S., where the national conglomeration of media ownership has been a 
developing concern of the advocates of democratic media (Bagdikian 2004, McChesney 2008), 
smaller regional and local media businesses, particularly newspaper companies, survived well in 
Japan. While major national newspapers, such as the Asahi Shinbun, the Yomiuri Shinbun and 
the Mainichi Shinbun dominate the market in large urban areas of Tokyo and Osaka, regional 
and prefectural papers claim the majority of local audience in smaller cities and non-urban areas 
(Fujita 2005: 32-34). According to Fujita (2005), this is largely a legacy of the Imperial 
government’s dictation during World War II. The wartime government forced mergers of 
regional newspaper companies to enforce its “one prefecture, one paper” policy to strengthen 
governmental censorship on news and editorials and to control the distribution of paper, which, 
at the end of the War, had become a scarce resource in Japan along with other things (35).  
While this maintains a certain degree of diversity and local ownership in the media 
market, those national and regional newspaper companies often are a part of cross-media 
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conglomerates at a national or regional level, owning and/or investing in TV stations and radio 
stations. For instance, Fujita and Ito (2005) note that the Asahi Shinbun owns a part of the TV 
Asahi network and the Yomiuri owns a share of the national network headed by Nippon TV (41). 
Likewise, a regional newspaper company Yamagata Shinbun, for instance, has stakes in four of 
the five television and AM and FM radio stations in its primary market, Yamagata prefecture 
(Fujita and Ito: 41).  
Because they have a large share in the local newspaper markets and because they own 
and/or control the majority of media outlets in the area, many local and regional media 
companies have been self-sufficient – they have been able to maintain strong local presences by 
catering to the informational needs of the conventional local residents, who, in majority of the 
cases, are monoethnically Japanese, without fear of competition from newer local start-ups or 
national media companies.  
In addition, while the number of return migrants from South America increased rapidly 
after 1990 to quickly hit the order of 100,000, the majority of the population was concentrated in 
a few cities and townships dispersed throughout the country. The “ethnic” media market at that 
time was still small, making up only a fraction of the target market of the local, regional and 
national newspaper and media businesses. Local, regional and national media companies thus did 
not, and to this day most still do not, recognize the return migrant population as a potential 
market for their products, and do not offer Portuguese or Spanish language content or services.  
NHK, Japan’s sole national public media corporation that have two national television 
channels, two satellite channels and three national radio channels (two AM and one FM) has 
been airing a part of their programming in bilingual in Japanese and English, as well as with 
closed captioning and sign language for viewers with special needs, but they did not expand their 
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language repertoire, partly because of technological limitations (i.e. most television airwaves can 
only transmit two voice channels at the same time). Being a public broadcasting company, NHK 
does not have any news printing outlets.	 
 The situation where the return migrants had to rely on personal communication for news 
changed rather quickly, however. Seeing a small but promising market for a Portuguese-
language press, Yoshio Muranaga, a Japanese entrepreneur and a returnee from Brazil started a 
company International Press Japan, which began printing the International Press, a Portuguese-
language weekly newspaper in 1991 (Costa 2007: 133; IPC World corporate website5). Costa 
documents that several other enterprises followed suit, and four to five newspapers quickly 
populated the market for Portuguese-language print media by 1995 (Costa 2007: 133). Costa also 
notes, however, due to competition and wide adoption of the internet by the return migrant 
population, all but two, the International Press and Tudo Bem, another Portuguese-language 
newspaper, have survived to 2007, the time of his writing (133-134). Some publishers and 
businesses also started to circulate weekly and monthly free-papers (Costa 2007: 134), many of 
which are still available today. Advertisements for stores, products, services and employment 
dominate the content of most of those free publications. 
 Adding to the print press branch, the International Press group in 1995 started a television 
subsidiary for broadcasting programs from Rede Globo, a Brazilian national television network. 
The company began airing the programs through Japan’s PerfecTV (now Sky PerfecTV) satellite 
network in 1996 (Costa 2007: 134; IPC World corporate website). Around the same time, 
Portuguese-language (and some Portuguese/Spanish) community-based and regional radio 
stations, organized mostly by grassroots groups and non-profits, emerged in Hamamatsu and 
                                                
5 http://www.ipcworld.co.jp/history_jp.html 	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Aichi, areas with high concentrations of the return migrant population.  
 Moreover, with the popular diffusion of the internet and mobile phones, Portuguese-
language information “portal” websites that specifically target the needs of Japanese-Brazilian 
return migrants became common. IPC Digital Bridge Communications, another subsidiary of the 
International Press Group opened a mobile-accessible website for the return migrants in 2000 
(IPC World corporate website). Costa (2007) documents that by 2007, a number of portal 
websites with news, announcements and job postings have become available on the internet, and 
observe that a large portion of the content that Brazilian communities in Japan used to receive 
from newspapers and the television have migrated online (135).  
During the course of my fieldwork in 2010, I also learned about several online services 
that allow paying users (usually by means of prepaid cards) to watch television programs from 
Brazil through video streaming. These offer direct re-transmission of news, soap operas, sports 
and other entertainment programs broadcast in Brazil. Although some told me those businesses 
may be operating in the gray area of copyright regulations, the services were openly marketed to 
the return migrant residents in Japan. As the year I did my fieldwork was also the World Cup 
year, I saw and collected several marketing materials for this type of service, which included 
references to World Cup soccer matches with Brazilian commentaries. (Figure 3) 
 One notable characteristic of the media products and services I outlined above is the 
absence of public actors. While some municipal governments began making multilingual official 
announcements for their diversifying resident population both in print and on their websites 
(Komai 2001; Kajita et al. 2005), the provision of media services has been left to the private 
sector. Because many of the industrialized countries of the world have colonial and postcolonial 
relationships with African, Asian, Middle Eastern and Caribbean countries and have sizable 
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bodies of immigrant population within their boarders, the situations of ethnic minority and/or 
immigrant media in those countries may not compare directly with the case in Japan; however, 
Shiramizu (2011) notes that France, for instance, has a system for supporting minority media in 
which the national government subsidizes the operation of community radio stations for 
racial/ethnic and linguistic minorities when the size of one minority group within one local area 
hits a certain threshold.  
The French case contrasts sharply with how the minority media is run in Japan and in the 
U.S. currently, where the operation of ethnic newspaper, radio shows and stations and TV 
stations are left to the private sector and to the logic of the market. Other than a few community 
and regional radio stations, which are run by grassroots and non-profit organizations – but 
without governmental subsidies – Portuguese-language newspapers, free-papers, television 
programs, online portal sites and mobile news and information sites have been offered as 
commercial products and services in Japan.  
Furthermore, unlike the case in the general media market, most of those private 
businesses are small-scale companies started by Japanese-Brazilians themselves or by Japanese 
entrepreneurs who saw the return migrants as a potential target. In many cases, those start-ups 
had little connections with established media businesses. Japanese national and regional media 
corporations, which had traditionally been publishing in Japanese-language only (with a few 
exception of the largest national newspaper companies such as the Asahi Shinbun and the 
Yomiuri Shinbun, which had English editions, and NHK’s bilingual news programs) did not 
recognize the newly diversified part of the population as their potential audience, nor did they 
see it as a valuable investment to add human resources to publish multilingual editions.  
The International Press newspaper, which had an article sharing arrangement with the 
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Japanese Yomiuri Shinbun when it first launched, and the satellite TV operation of the 
International Press group, which resells programs from Globo, a Brazilian national television 
network, are a few exceptional cases in which the return migrant media companies had some ties 
with the established media corporations. Still, the International Press group’s role in those 
relationships is best characterized as a customer of the news and programs those larger media 
corporations produce, rather than that of an active contributor or co-producer, both content-wise 
and financially.  
Despite their success in the ethnic media market, the International Press group also 
remains to be a small-scale operation compared to other Japanese media companies. As of 2008, 
International Press employed about 130 people group-wide, for operations including publication 
of the International Press newspaper (and its online edition on ipcdigital.com), transmission of 
the Globo programs, production of original contents for the IPC TV channel, hosting a mobile 
website pokebras.com and retailing products imported from Brazil (Hayama 2008). Hayama 
(2008) also quotes Yoshio Muranaga, the founder and the president of the International Press 
group, who maintains that when Muranaga launched the International Press in 1991, neither he 
nor his family members who helped him start the company had any experience with the print 
media (18-19).  
 At the same time, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Japanese-Brazilian and other 
South American return migrant population was pitched as a promising market, particularly for 
starting-up businesses: and it was not only because the government sector and established media 
companies did not have or come up with services for the newly and rapidly diversified 
population, but also because of their work and lifestyles.  
Taga (2008) estimates that an average Brazilian return-migrant worker working in the 
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manufacturing sector made annual income of 3.6 million yen (approximately 30 to 32 thousand 
USD at the 2006 exchange rate of 1 USD = 115-12- yen) in 2006-2007. While this is lower than 
the national average, (according to the national statistics Taga cites, an average Japanese worker 
made approximately 4.7 million yen, or about 40,000 USD at the 2006 exchange rate, annually 
in 2006), Taga argues that because many Japanese-Brazilian return migrants see their stay in 
Japan as short term (also see discussion on the notion of dekassegui in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3) 
and do not pay pension fund and social security dues, about 90% of their gross income is 
expendable (21). In comparison, an average Japanese family’s expendable income is about 84% 
of the total household income.  
Adjusted for international remittance the return migrants make to their home and relatives 
in Brazil and for their propensity to save, Taga calculates that Japanese-Brazilian return migrant 
workers spend approximately 52% of their income for shopping and leisure in Japan. Based on 
this, Taga, who at the time of the writing was a consultant at Ogaki Kyodo Bank in Mie 
prefecture, contends that the 72,000 Japanese-Brazilian workers living in the Tokai region that 
encompasses prefectures of Aichi, Gifu and Mie in 2006-2007 spent total of 142.8 billion yen, 
and with associated services and spending, boosted the gross production of the region by 0.28% 
(22-23).  
Taga further argues that this market existed hitherto outside of general Japanese business 
activities (23). He thus urges Japanese businesses to see the opportunity and “enter into and 
strengthen economic partnership” (23, my translation) with Brazilian residents. Among the 
business areas, Taga proposes that information and communication services as one of the most 
prospective, claiming, “Brazilians tend to buy newer technologies, and many own latest mobile 
phones. The adoption rate of personal computers is also high, and the internet and [electronic] 
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mail have become important source of information. Mass-communication and informational 
services by Brazilian and Japanese-Brazilian businesses have deeply penetrated their 
communities, and the amount of information that runs through the communities are considerably 
high” (26, my translation).  
During my 2010 fieldwork, I observed that many businesses that targeted Japanese-
Brazilian and other South American return migrants were still mostly owned and operated by the 
return migrants themselves, rather than being part of everyday operations of Japanese-owned 
businesses. The narrative evidence I collected from the return migrants in Kobe through 
interviews show that the Japanese-Brazilians I talked to had access to a variety of media products 
and services, including newspapers, free papers, websites on the World Wide Web and basic 
mobile phone services. Those observations partially agree with Taga’s analysis of the return 
migrant ethnic market.  
At the same time, however, some methodological assumptions Taga employs for his 
estimation do not reflect the actual lifestyle of Japanese-Brazilian residents adequately. For 
instance, the figure Taga uses to estimate the amount of expendable income is adopted from the 
figure for Japanese families and applied to return migrant individuals. This method assumes each 
individual Japanese-Brazilian worker maintain economic life on one’s own, whereas in reality 
many live in dual-income households. Also, while I was able to partially attest to the return 
migrants’ propensity to buy latest electronic and telecommunication gadget in advertisements in 
free papers, which featured many personal computers and mobile phones, the return migrants I 
interviewed at the Kobe Culture Center did not have enough financial resources to invest in those 
products, and many told me that they thought mobile phones as unnecessary luxury.  
While Taga’s analysis did not fully reflect the reality of the return migrants’ life in the 
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period before 2008, nor did it anticipate their lifestyle change following the global financial 
crisis, it nonetheless tells us the image that Japanese businesses and financial institutions had of 
the Japanese-Brazilian return migrant residents prior to the 2008 crisis. The return migrants were 
not seen as financially struggling immigrant workers, but rather as having a generous expendable 
budget, even though that amount may have been smaller than that of average Japanese families. 
Most importantly, entrepreneurs and the financial sector looked at the return migrant population 
and their activities as a promising market, into which Japanese businesses can expand.  
Furthermore, while some conceptual and numerical basis of Taga’s argument may be 
debatable, his claims may not have been a farfetched one in the economic climate prior to 2008, 
as some early media start-ups such as the International Press group enjoyed a steady growth. The 
future turned not so rosy for those companies, as well as newly starting-up businesses, however, 
when the 2008 global financial crisis hit Japan.  
 
Portuguese-language Media in Japan after the 2008 Economic Crisis 
In June 2008, a start-up company based in Shizuoka named Vida announced that it would 
open a Portuguese-language, mobile-accessible “portal” website Vida no Japão (“Life in Japan” 
in Portuguese). The website would originally be made available on mobile web networks of two 
of the Japan’s largest mobile phone operators, Softbank’s and au’s, and it would feature 
information and announcements for foreign national residents from local governments, 
information and advertisements on restaurants, shops and services, medical and law Q&A 
services in Portuguese, as well as mobile web versions of a Portuguese-language internet radio 
and a free paper6.  
                                                
6 http://japan.zdnet.com/release/10372612/ 
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Before smartphone consumption took off in Japan around 2010, mobile web “menu sites” 
such as this one were popular among mobile phone users in Japan. Mobile phone carriers list 
those sites as official pages on the landing page of their mobile web services, and site operators 
are able to collect fees, usually ranging from 52 yen to 525 yen (approximately 50 US cents to 5 
USD at the 2008 exchange rate of 1USD = 100 to 105 yen), from subscribers through the carriers. 
At the beginning of 2008, NTT docomo’s i-mode service alone had 11,745 such sites7, and other 
carriers had comparable numbers, although the sites that targeted general Japanese consumers 
tended to be more specific in their focus (e.g. entertainment news, sports news, game download, 
fortune-telling, etc.) than the ones that targeted the “ethnic” markets. News portals that featured 
stories from print editions of newspapers were one of the most popular services, with 62 national 
and regional newspaper companies providing their stories to those sites in 2005. Most of those 
news portals charged up to 315 yen/month for a subscription (Ito 2005: 68).  
While a few other “ethnic” companies, including the IPC group, had been offering 
similar mobile sites for the return migrant population, Vida argued their service was distinct, as it 
would include local news, information and announcements, whereas other sites focused more on 
news from Brazil (J-Cast News 2008). The start-up intended to charge 315 yen (approximately 3 
USD) a month for the full access to the site (users of the free version could access public service 
announcements only), which was exactly the same as other competing services (such as IPC’s 
pokebras.com) and comparable with the news portals for the general Japanese audience, with 
210 yen (2 USD) extra for the mobile access to the internet radio shows8.  
Arguing that 80% of the Japanese-Brazilian return migrant population accessed the 
                                                
7 http://www.nttdocomo.co.jp/corporate/ir/binary/pdf/finance/subscriber/imode_fy2007_080418.pdf  
8 http://japan.zdnet.com/release/10372612/  
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internet through mobile devices, it projected to secure 5,000 subscribers by the end of 2008 (J-
Cast News 2008). The founders of the company, who characterized themselves as “aspiring” 
young Japanese entrepreneurs, looked to “promote the ideal of tabunka kyosei (multicultural 
coexistence) from the Japanese side” through this business (company’s press release9). 
 In retrospect, they could not have chosen a worse time to start their new business. A few 
months after Vida no Japão went into service in July 2008, the global financial crisis that began 
with the collapse of an U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers hit Japan’s economy and its 
manufacturing sector. Towards the end of 2008, factories and assembly lines that had been hiring 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in large numbers on short-term contracts started to let go of 
those easy-to-cut-off temporary workers.  
Because the Japanese Immigration Control law and other national government policies 
did not recognize them actively as “immigrant workers,” many of the laid-off return migrants did 
not receive adequate protection of employee rights, nor were their re-employment secured 
(Kajita et al. 2005; Hatano 2006). Facing these difficulties, about one-fourth of the return 
migrants left Japan for Brazil, while the rest remained in Japan with less favorable work and 
living conditions than what Taga (2007; see above) described (Higuchi 2010).  
In the wake of this unanticipated turn, the start-up changed directions. Teaming up with 
Brasil Fureai-kai, a grassroots mutual help group formed by Japanese-Brazilians, the company 
announced in January 2009 that it would feature announcements and reports from the grassroots 
group, local government offices and Hello Work (national employment security agency) offices 
on the free area of its mobile website. But a few months later, the company’s corporate website 
went offline, and the start-up posts no further business activities (nor the fate of its own). The 
                                                
9 http://japan.zdnet.com/release/10372612/ 
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mobile website and the related services it promised to offer, too, dissipated with the company. 
 Some larger businesses and the ones who have been in the scene for longer were not as 
unfortunate as this Shizuoka start-up, but they were nonetheless affected by the sudden downturn 
of the Japanese economy, lay off of the return migrant workers from factories, and the following 
shrinkage of the Japanese-Brazilian ethnic market they targeted and relied on. Another, Osaka-
based, Japanese, Brazilian and Peruvian joint-owned mobile web content company, for instance, 
survived the loss of subscribers to its Portuguese and Spanish service partly resulting from the 
economic crisis. This company, started in 2001, has been hosting mobile websites on networks 
of Vodafone (now Softbank) since December 2001 and au since May 2002. Its service was also 
added to NTT Docomo’s i-mode network in 2007. While the Shizuoka start-up I discussed above 
focused on the Japanese-Brazilian market and on providing local information, the Osaka 
company’s service, while charging the same 315 yen/month subscription fee, focuses on news 
and entertainment content (games and ringtones), and is offered in three different languages: 
Tagalog (spoken in the Philippines), Spanish and Portuguese.  
That the company had diversified its target market, in addition to them being in business 
longer, perhaps helped them withstand a bad economy. Still, seeing that it is losing customers 
from its Spanish and Portuguese services, the company decided to shift its business focus. One of 
the presentation slides I obtained from an anonymous source during an interview at the company 
says the business was looking to put more effort into the Tagalog-language site and deliberating 
starting a service in Vietnamese.  
As the president of the multilingual content company in the anecdote I included at the 
beginning of this chapter mentioned, doing business for Filipinos/as would be more stable and 
crisis-proof, because many of the Philippines nationals living in Japan were there as spouses of 
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Japanese nationals, and thus were more likely to stay in Japan even in the time of bad economy. 
His comment, as well as the company’s future plans slides tell us that business-like thinking 
dictate decision making processes even at companies like those that have intimate connections 
with non-profit, community-based organizations working to help non-Japanese residents in the 
area.	 
 Mobile web portal services were not the only businesses affected by the economic 
conditions after the 2008 crisis. Reflecting the decline in subscription and advertisement income, 
the International Press newspaper, for instance, also had to change its size from full to tabloid 
size and significantly reduce page numbers in each edition in March 2009. Transamerica, a 
Portuguese-language community radio based in Nagoya went off the air in April 2009 when 
declining supports from local Brazilian businesses who had been sponsoring the programs forced 
the station to close. The station gave up its license permanently later in July (“Zainichi Burajiru-
jin” Chunichi Shinbun, July 17, 2009; “FM DANVO” Asahi Shinbun, July 24, 2009).  
In the absence of public service, the informational needs of non-Japanese-speaking 
residents are left to non-governmental organizations and to the private sector, whose operations 
are less stable than governmental or government-supported institutions. In addition, most of 
those who entered the “ethnic media” business were small-sized start-ups, remotely connected 
with established media corporations in Japan.  
This may be due partly to the established businesses’ inability to recognize the immigrant 
population as potential markets in the early stage of the return migration “boom” in the 1990s. In 
an in-person interview, the founder-owner of the Osaka business revealed to me that the 
company’s mobile website service did not fly at the beginning. It was because the major mobile 
phone carriers, not seeing values, did not accept his company’s request to list its website in their 
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mobile web networks. It was only when, he told me, KDDI’s local sales team working in parts of 
Gunma prefecture (which received a large number of return migrants in the early 1990s) realized 
the Japanese-Brazilians in the region wanted to use Portuguese-language mobile web portals that 
the carrier made the Osaka company’s website a part of its EZweb network, and it was not until 
an UK company Vodafone bought J-Phone and non-Japanese executives took over management 
that the carrier became sensitive to the informational needs of non-Japanese-speaking citizens 
and his company’s website was accepted to Vodafone web. Vodafone later sold its Japanese 
operation back to a Japanese corporation Softbank Mobile in 2006, which now operates the 
network. Softbank kept the Osaka company’s site as a part of its “menu sites.” 
Of course, In the latter case, Vodafone’s decision can also be seen as the transnational 
corporation’s move to capitalize from what it saw as an emerging ethnic market in Japan, rather 
than a show of one executive’s “sensitivity” towards the needs of foreigners. As a global 
corporation, Vodafone and its senior managers may have been well aware of the potential of the 
emerging low-cost market and racial/ethnic minority market from their experiences in other parts 
of the world.  
The situation of Japanese-Brazilian “ethnic” media market in Japan casts a stark contrast 
to the case of the Spanish-language media in the U.S., for instance, where an increasing number 
of mainstream media conglomerates, such as Knight-Ridder and Los Angels Times, are entering 
the ethnic media sphere by developing Spanish language editions or buying stakes in existing 
Spanish language papers (Garza 1994; Rodriguez 1999; Molina Guzmán 2006). The negative 
repercussions of market monopolization by the media conglomerates are well discussed, 
particularly in relation to the U.S. and global market (e.g. McChesney 2007). But, as the cases I 
discussed above indicate, even small (and in many cases socially aware) businesses that cater to 
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smaller ethnic markets do follow the logic of corporate capitalism. While they may not be as 
predatory as mega-corporations, they, too, make opportunistic moves to maximize (or at least to 
secure) profits, or pack up and leave when they cannot.  
In fact, both the Shizuoka start-up and the Osaka company presented themselves as 
“social business” providers, as “socially aware” corporations who use their business skills and 
tools for the benefit of the society and local communities. The Shizuoka group stated the mission 
of their enterprise as “promoting the ideal of tabunka kyosei (multicultural coexistence)” through 
business (corporate website10; the company’s news release11). The Osaka company emphasizes 
as a part of its corporate identity that the business has roots in a grassroots volunteer group that 
worked on promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity in the Kansai region of Japan, and have 
worked extensively with municipal governments, designing multilingual websites for prefectural 
and city offices and developing disaster alert e-mail systems and medical interpreter matching 
systems in multi-language for several city governments. Its corporate website states that “our 
mission is to realize, through utilizing information and communication technologies and 
providing multilingual information service, ‘tabunka kyosei shakai’ (society where multi-culture 
can coexist), society in which people reach out beyond the boundaries of ‘Japanese’ and 
‘foreigner,’ recognize differences in nationality, culture and language, and respect each other to 
share diverse and enriched living spaces” (my translation). Still, their mission with a strong 
social and philanthropic undertone was ultimately subsumed under the logic and standard 
practices of the business sector.  
In addition, while the phrase “tabunka kyousei” (multicultural coexistence) and “tabunka 
                                                
10 Now offline. Accessed October 2008. 
11 http://japan.zdnet.com/release/10372612/  
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kyousei shakai” (the society where multiple cultures can coexist) attained a status of a “buzz 
word” among NGOs and start-up companies to attract attention and funding after the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications announced the “Tabunka Kyosei Suishin Puroguramu” 
(“The Program to Promote Multicultural Coexistence”) in 200612, what it means to implement 
“tabunka kyousei” is not well defined. Sometimes it refers to a promotion of the provision of 
multilingual education and civic and medical services, but sometimes it is a simple celebration of 
food, art, music and festivals from other cultures, which do not meet the most pressing needs of 
immigrant worker populations, such as the lack of linguistic and job-related training and 
consultation (Higuchi 2010). At other times, the concept is conveniently extended to include 
“multiple cultures” of different generations of Japanese-national residents and people from 
different parts of Japan (Fukae Tabunka Kodomo Matsuri13).  
The types and qualities of access Japanese-Brazilian return migrants had to the media are 
also embedded in labor relations and employment practices under which they have moved to 
Japan, which in turn is embedded in the global condition of capitalism, as well as in the Japanese 
national government’s policies towards non-national residents. As Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi 
(2005) point out, although they were first seen as a quick solution to labor shortage, transnational 
workers, along with the local working class population, are now subject to the practice of 
flexible employment, the practice imposed by the globalized, informatized, and networked 
version of capitalism.  
Flexible employment affects Japanese-Brazilian return migrants as the users of the 
internet and mobile phones. Being a part of the flexible workforce on short-term contracts, many 
                                                
12 http://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/286922/www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/2006/060307_2.html   
13 http://www.hnpo.comsapo.net/img/u632/MI22885_090E.pdf  
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Japanese-Brazilians experience frequent relocations, sometimes to the areas with very small 
immigrant population. The migration pattern of Japanese-Brazilians – moving as an individual or 
in a unit of nuclear family – allows them to adapt to the practice of flexible employment, but it at 
the same time means that they have less familial ties to lean on in the time of crisis.  
Moreover, citizen services in Japan, such as municipal offices and public employment 
security offices, are usually open to the immigrant workers, but are frequently not staffed or 
organized adequately to meet the needs of those people. Also, as Higuchi (2010) argues, local 
governments, which traditionally been interested in the (multi)cultural aspect of return migrants’ 
presence and neglected the fact that they were there as workers, often do not have programs to 
help immigrants secure employment and find ways to be reemployed through training and 
consultation. And even with multilingual announcements and events and festivals to appreciate 
South American cultures have become routine parts in some local municipalities, tabunka kyosei 
(multicultural coexistence) in Japan is far from being institutionalized. Hatano (2009), for 
instance, reveals that everyday instructions in grade schools are not sensitive to the presence of 
students from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.  
Because of such scarcity of social and familial supports, the consequences of 
unemployment are often more dire for transnational workers. From my interviews, I learned that 
the first things they forgo facing financial struggles are mobile phone and mobile internet 
subscriptions. In contrast, the non-working segments of Japan’s general population, particularly 
the unemployed youth and the elderly, tend to remain well connected to information and 
communication services, particularly through the use of web-enabled mobile phones (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications 2009).  
In other words, although the immigrants can be as connected as the general population 
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while their livelihood is stable, they are likely to become disconnected more quickly when 
detached from their sources of income. Unlike China, India and African countries, which have 
mature and active low-cost mobile phone markets, the cost of maintaining information and 
communication services is relatively high in Japan. A home internet subscription normally costs 
5,000 to 6,000 yen (approximately 60 to 80 USD) a month, and an individual mobile phone 
contract with a data plan costs from 5000 yen to the upward of 10,000 yen  (as high as 125 USD) 
for a month. For immigrant workers, who tend to have less long-term savings, family assets such 
as home and extensive familial support, this expense quickly becomes a financial burden when 
they lose the source of steady income.  
That the Japanese-Brazilian and other South American transnational workers in Japan are 
treated as flexible workforce and that the Japanese government is unwilling to initiate public 
broadcast that fulfills the needs of non-Japanese-speaking residents mean that the return 
migrants’ access to the media depends largely on the economy (in the case of the Japanese-
Brazilians, the strength of the manufacturing sector in particular) and the strength of the ethnic 
market, and its long-term stability is not guaranteed. This also suggests that the promotion to 
information “haves” from “have-nots” is not a single occurrence, unidirectional event. 
 
Globally Circulating Media Products and Japanese-Brazilian Return Migrants 
Relationships between Rede Globo (the Globo Network), a national television/media 
network in Brazil, and Japanese-Brazilian return migrant viewers show us another way in which 
policies of the nation states and the operation of commercial media influence the transnational 
population’s life and experience with the media. Rede Globo, a broadcasting arm of a Brazilian 
media corporation Organizações Globo, is one of the largest television networks in Brazil. 
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According to its corporate website, the network has 122 broadcasting stations throughout the 
country, and delivers its programs to over 183 million Brazilians (Rede Globo corporate 
website14). In addition, the network’s international branch, TV Globo Internacional (Globo TV 
International) transmits Globo programs to 114 countries in the world via two satellite signals15, 
as well as to Japan through a custom arrangement with IPC, the television branch of the 
International Press organization (which delivers programs to viewers in Japan through Japan’s 
Sky PerfecTV network)16.  
 Costa (2007) documents that when IPC first tried to bring Globo’s programs to Japan, the 
Globo group in Brazil had little knowledge about Japanese-Brazilian communities in Japan and 
their market potentials. Thus, the Brazilian company was reluctant to license transmission rights 
to IPC. It took a partial involvement by the Brazilian Embassy in Japan to convince Globo 
International to expand into the Japanese Market. Costa writes that the Brazilian Embassy 
facilitated contracts and supplied information about the Japanese-Brazilian return migrant 
population to Globo (134: Costa was a consultant to Consulate General of Brazil in Japan at the 
time of writing of his report). The subsequent success, however, lead Globo to change its mind 
and start producing custom programming for transmission in Japan (134-135). Costa reports that 
at the time of his writing, the Globo channel on IPC TV had approximately 40,000 subscribed 
viewers (135).  
In recent years, Globo began sponsoring Brazilian Day festivals all around the world, 
including the one held in Japan (Ishi 2011). As Ishi notes, through extensive sponsorship, Globo 
                                                
14 http://redeglobo.globo.com/Portal/institucional/foldereletronico/ingles/g_globo_brasil.html  
15 http://redeglobo.globo.com/Portal/institucional/foldereletronico/ingles/g_globo_mundo.html  
16 http://www.ipcworld.co.jp/history_jp.html  
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aims to “remind” expatriate Brazilians of their Brazilian roots and identities, so that they remain 
royal to “Brazilian” programs the company produces and delivers worldwide (236). At the same 
time, Ishi contends, those Brazilian festivals promote awareness among overseas Brazilian 
nationals that they are part of a “Brazilian diaspora” (237). This goes along with the recent 
efforts by the national government of Brazil to emphasize and encourage formation of expatriate 
Brazilian communities around the world. Ishi mentions that in order to promote these efforts, 
government officials often appear in Globo produced programs intended for overseas Brazilians 
(238). Ishi thus suggests that Globo’s interest in global expansion and the Brazilian 
government’s interest in tapping into the resources of expatriate co-nationals, along with other 
efforts by overseas Brazilian entrepreneurs are working synergistically to create the global 
network of Brazilians and Brazilian businesses (244-245).  
Ishi also points out commercial and economic imperatives behind these moves. As he 
notes, Globo benefits from fostering expatriate Brazilian communities because overseas 
Brazilians are paying customers of the network. Whereas in Brazil Globo programs are aired for 
free, supported by advertisement revenue, international viewers who receive the same programs 
through satellite transmission pay a monthly subscription to Globo (245). The government of 
Brazil also benefits from Brazilian culture and cultural products promoted in the international 
sphere, and international remittance from overseas Brazilians, too, help boost the domestic 
economy of Brazil (246).  
As Ishi also indicates, however, the networks of expatriate Brazilians and the diasporic 
Brazilian identity constructed through commercial and government-led programs may be 
problematic to Japanese-Brazilian people, as they may temporary suspend “Japanese” ethnic 
identity in favor of building and promoting a monolithic “Brazilian” identity (247-249). In 
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addition, while Globo and the Brazilian government are interested in networking affluent 
overseas Brazilian entrepreneurs, such an economic imperative that drives their moves leaves 
geographically dispersed and financially struggling expatriate workers, such as the people I 
interviewed at the Kobe Culture Center. Events like Brazilian Day celebrations target people in 
the area of high Brazilian concentration and/or the areas of high economic activities, such as 
Tokyo in the case of Japan. 
 Other scholars argue that globally circulating media products that originate in Japan also 
have played important roles in the lives of Japanese-Brazilians in Brazil and in Japan. Tsuda 
(2001) notes that many return migrants he study have had positive impressions about their ethnic 
homeland of Japan because media portrayal of Japan in Brazil, both through Japanese made 
media products and Brazilian made programs and online materials, is frequently positive, 
focusing on good work ethnics and economic success. Still, Tsuda argues, physical contacts with 
actual Japanese residents through immigration lead the return migrants to distance themselves 
from Japanese identification. In Japan, return migrants feel stronger sense of affiliation with 
“Brazilian” culture, partly because of negative impressions they begin to form about Japanese 
people, and partly because local Japanese residents treat them as “foreigners,” rather than as 
Japanese.  
Similarly, Mita (2002) documents that Japanese-Brazilians in the city of Bastos in Brazil 
have had frequent access to Japanese culture through Japanese television programs available 
from rental video stores throughout the city and through Japanese karaoke. The Bastos Japanese-
Brazilians used their “Japanese” ethnic identity for their own gain while in Brazil, as Japan has 
been associated with positive images of hard work and economic success. At the same time, Mita 
writes that many Bastos nikkeijin flexibly adopt the identification of Brazilian or gaijin 
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(foreigner) when they return migrate to Japan to ease their transition.  
 The Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I talked to at the Kobe Culture Center were the 
people living away from areas of high immigrant population and thus had less frequent access to 
the events for expatriate Brazilians, such as the Globo sponsored Brazilian Day festivals. Most 
did not have direct access to Globo channels due to high cost of satellite subscription.  
At the same time, they utilized various means, including the Globo website and 
YouTube, to access news and television programs from Brazil. The Kobe Culture Center itself 
focused on events that have specific Brazilian and South American flavors, rather than the ones 
that emphasize the hybridization of Japanese and South American cultures. Through the analysis 
of YouTube videos and online message board texts, however, I also learned that while there are 
some return migrants who put heavy weight on their Japanese heritage and distinctly Japanese-
Brazilian experience, there are others who do not question that their “home” is in Brazil.     
 
Iwabuchi (2010) argues that “[t]he public duty of the broadcasting system to serve 
diverse ethno-linguistic backgrounds and to address the concerns of citizens from differing 
socio-cultural milieux has become an even more pressing matter as transnational cross-border 
flows intensify” (414). The same argument applies to the media outside of those categorized as 
broadcasting media, as some online spaces, such as video sharing sites and message boards, 
have, as I show in chapters that follow, potentials to become places where minority, immigrant 
and diasporic people can express themselves and raise multiple voices.  
In this age of globally connected digital media, having a stable, reliable and affordable 
access to digital devices and networks that allow people to connect to those spaces is as 
important as securing culturally and linguistically diverse mass-communication media that 
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reflect their interests and concerns. The Japanese government’s approach, which did not see the 
provision of needed access and content diversity its own duty and left it to the private sector and 
to NGOs and non-profits, was inadequate, as it failed to provide adequate protection against 
economic downturn and market fluctuation, and as I showed above, hindered the Japanese-
Brazilian return migrant and other foreign-national residents to gather information, share 
experiences, express themselves and coordinate their actions in the time of economic struggle 
when they most needed those means.   
My discussion of Rede Globo channels also showed that the access to and experiences 
with the media services and products Japanese-Brazilian return migrants have are touched not 
only by Japanese government’s immigration and media policies and business imperatives of 
Japanese and (Japanese-)Brazilian ethnic businesses in Japan, but also by interests and policies 
of the Brazilian government and those of Globo, a transnationalizing Brazilian company. 
Japanese-Brazilians also had previous contacts with “Japan” through globally circulating media 
products, which, according to Tsuda (2001) and Mita (2002) shape their reactions towards Japan 
when they physically migrate to their “ethnic homeland.” 
 
So far in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, I have discussed social, political, economic and 
material conditions that lay in the background of Japanese-Brazilian return migration to Japan 
and the return migrants’ access to and use of media. Rather than simply being pieces of 
background information, however, those conditions are inseparably tied with what media 
products and services are available to Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan, and how they 
can access to those products and services: the history of labor migration to Japan, the history of 
development and diffusion of new media technologies in Japan and the related rise of the 
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“network society,” “flexible employment” and “flexible citizenship” in Japan and worldwide, the 
country’s Immigration Control Law that does not account for or protect social and cultural life of 
the immigrants, the government that has been indifferent to and unwilling to support multilingual 
media for the nation’s diversifying population, the rise and stagnation of Portuguese-language 
media in Japan, and the entrance of globally circulating media products into the life of Japanese-
Brazilians and diasporic Brazilians all frame and delimit the type and quality of access the return 
migrants have to the media and to information they need.  
In next two chapters, I turn to analyses and discussion of my research findings. In those 
chapters, I present how, despite limitations, Japanese-Brazilian return migrants raised their voice 
through YouTube and online message boards, and what those voices say (Chapter 3), and discuss 
specific affordance and limitations of old media products and new media technologies in the 
context of Japanese-Brazilian return migration to Japan (Chapter 4).  
 
 78 
Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 3: An advertisement card for a prepaid video streaming 
service. 
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Chapter 3: A Broken Sonho Lindo (Beautiful Dream): Japanese-Brazilian Return 
Migrants’ Voice on YouTube and Brasil Net 
 
In his 2008 monograph Here Comes Everybody, Shirky argues that the development and 
diffusion of what he calls "social tools," such as email, text messaging, personal websites, blogs, 
photo and video sharing services and social network sites enhance people's tendency and 
capacities to share, collaborate and organize collective actions. Shirky contends that because 
those applications of the internet and mobile phone technologies reduce the cost of publishing 
and coordinating actions of large groups, individuals can now share news, photographs and 
videos with large group of people, work together to create contents, and take collective actions 
without relying on hierarchically organized, traditional institutions. This enables people to 
“organize without organizations” as Shirky indicates in the subtitle of the book. The author 
draws his primary examples largely from the US cases (or from the cases in the English-speaking 
world), such as flashmobs in New York and (English-language) Wikipedia editing. However, he 
also discusses how politically dissident groups, such as pro-democracy groups in Egypt and anti-
government protesters in Belarus utilize those social tools to disseminate news and organize 
mass-protest in the presence of repressive authorities. 
While Shirky's discussion mostly focus on general public users of the internet and mobile 
phones, his propositions about the impact of new media on sharing, collaboration and collective 
action have numerous implications for racial/ethnic minority and diasporic users' adoption of 
those technologies. People who receive less coverage in the mainstream media and less amount 
of assistance from mainstream institutions in the host society may benefit greatly from the 
potentials of social tools to reduce the cost of publication and coordination. In addition, the 
collapsed cost, as well as an accelerated speed of information diffusion and group coordination 
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may support collaboration among transnationally dispersed population. The findings I discuss in 
this chapter show, however, while Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in my study benefit from 
social tools’ capacities to reduce the cost of publishing, they face significant limitations. 
In this chapter, I examine two cases in which Japanese-Brazilian return migrants utilized 
digital social media tools: a YouTube music video entitled “Sonho Lindo,” and the messages 
posted on an NGO-run website Brasil Net. Both the video and the body of messages were 
composed by Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan as reactions to and reflections on the 
condition of their life after the global financial crisis that began and gave a severe blow to the 
Japanese economy in late 2008. These data serve two purposes in this chapter. First, I use the 
clip and the messages to further explain and analyze the situations and characteristics of 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan in the period immediately following the crisis, 
adding to what I presented in Chapter 1. Second, I look at the video and the messages to assess 
the meanings and functions these types of web presences have on Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants in Japan, on Japan’s general public and on other expatriate Brazilians living in different 
parts of the world. 
 
Reacting to the Financial Crisis: An Analysis of a YouTube Video “Sonho Lindo” 
On February 9, 2009, a YouTube user named OyakawaKyooday uploaded a music video 
entitled “Sonho Lindo – Brasileiros no exterior” (“A beautiful dream – Brazilians abroad”) to the 
video sharing site17. The people behind the YouTube ID were the Oyakawa Kyoodai (The 
Oyakawa Brothers), who, according to their 8p.com.br band profile18 (linked from the 
                                                
17 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kl3_at_-ZvA  
18 http://www.8p.com.br/olhaminhabandadepoprock/kyoodai/perfil  
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description of the video), was a brothers-duo of Douglas Oyakawa and Marcelo Oyakawa, 
originally from Brazil. (On the YouTube user page, they indicate their hometown is São Paulo, 
Brazil). The song “Sonho Lindo” was the duo’s original creation.  
In the uploaded video, a message from the band prefaces the actual song. With a beautiful 
photo of Mount Fuji in the back, and the intro of The Boom’s “Shimauta” (“An Okinawan Island 
Song”) playing in the background, the message flows in to the screen when one hits the play 
button. (The Boom is a Japanese commercial band known for its Okinawa-influenced style, and 
“Shimauta” is one of their most successful songs. In addition to being a major band in Japan, The 
Boom and its Okinawa-flavored sound are popular in Brazil, with many Japanese-Brazilians with 
Okinawan roots embracing the music). The prefacing message reads: 
Era inverno quando desembarquei pela primeira vez no Japão. 
No coração, um misto de medo e esperança.  
Na bagagem, um sonho, o sonho de todo dekassegui: 
Trabalhar, ganhar dinheiro e voltar pra casa. 
(It was winter when I set my foot for the first time in Japan. / In my heart, I had a mix of 
fear and hope. In my bag, I had a dream. A dream any dekasegi people would have: / 
Work hard, make money and return home.) 
 
Then the background turns to a darker, evening view of Mount Fuji, while the message 
continues. 
Mas, a realidade bateu de frente com o sonho. 
E deste choque nasceu esta canção. 
Que vai além do desabafo e traduz os sentimentos da maioria dos brasileiros que vivem 
no exterior. 
(But the reality collided with the dream. / And out of that shock, this song was born. / It 
goes beyond an outburst of my emotions and reflects the sentiments of many of the 
Brazilians living abroad.) 
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Finally, with the background changing to an image of a Japan Airlines airplane at an airport gate, 
and then to the aerial view of the city of São Paulo, the last verse of the message appears on the 
screen: 
E o sonho, o verdadeiro sonho desse nosso povo, é um só... 
Voltar pra CASA!!! 
(And the dream, the true dream of the people like us, is only… / To return HOME!!!) 
 
Not only does this preface tells us about the origin of the song that they made the song out of the 
broken dekassegui dream and clarifies the message the lyrics carry that the song is intended to 
represent the feeling of all expatriate Brazilians, but also it suggests that the song addresses the 
underlying global economic condition, under which the duo wrote the lyrics and the music.  
Toward the end of the year 2008, hit by a global financial crisis of a great magnitude, 
businesses that had manufacturing bases in Japan laid off and stopped contract renewals with 
their short-term contract workers. A large number of entry-level Japanese workers were 
unexpectedly cut off from their sources of income just before the holiday season. Affected, too, 
were the transnational workers from Brazil and other Latin American countries, who had been 
working in the factories on temporary contracts through the arrangements made by specialized 
labor brokerage companies.  
While the impact of the haken-giri (cutting off of the contract workers called haken 
rodosha) has been felt equally by the entry-level Japanese laborers and immigrant workers, the 
lack of social and familial support and the limited availability of multilingual information and 
help efforts made the situation very difficult to bear for the South American dekasegui workers 
(“Support Needy” 2009). The “sentiments” this song intended to convey, thus, were the 
emotional reactions of the return migrant workers to this time of crisis. 
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The subsequent video and the actual song continue to carry the emotional tone the 
preface sets up. With the images of Japanese-Brazilian workers, which may be the Oyakawa 
brothers themselves, or may be their personal friends, working in factories and the photographs 
of the children in the background, the song goes: 
Noites intermináveis  
Comigo a solidão 
E junto com saudade 
A coragem vem do coração 
Saber que a vida não é só grana e prazer  
E que no fundo o sofrimento faz crescer 
(Endless nights / loneliness stays with me / together with homesickness [nostalgia]. / 
Courage comes from the heart / to know that life is not only about money and pleasure / 
and that your suffering grows in the background.) 
 
(*) O que era fácil então ficou difícil 
Acordei de um sonho lindo  
Na beira do abismo 
O que era fácil então ficou difícil 
Acordei de um sonho lindo 
Na beira do abismo 
(It was easy but then became difficult / I woke up from a beautiful dream / standing at 
the edge of the abyss.)  
 
Um sonho lindo que virou vaidade 
Alimentado pela ambição 
Na busca eterna da felicidade 
Muitos se perdem pela contra-mão 
Com tanto luxo e riqueza por ai 
Porque será que é tão difícil dividir 
(A beautiful dream that became self-love / fueled by ambition / in an eternal search for 
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happiness / many went the wrong direction / with richness and wealth out there / why is 
it so difficult to share?) 
 
(*) Repeat 
 
With the second verse (“Um sonho lindo que virou vaidade…”) playing, the video begins to 
show a series of photographs taken in Tokyo and other major cities of Japan. Towards the end, 
the images change to the major cities of the world, such as Rome, Paris, London and New York, 
showing representative landmarks of each city, and the video finishes with an iconic picture of 
Hollywood showing the Hollywood sign. While the inclusion of those images in the last part of 
the video is a little enigmatic, and not explained in the video or in the comments, they may 
signify broken dreams of the singer, of making money and visiting those cities, or they may 
represent those who have “gone the wrong direction,” the top economies who have not been 
sharing wealth with the rest of the world.   
The video quickly caught the attention of the internet users. The YouTube statistics on 
the video (Figure 4) indicate that viewers shared the video on Orkut, a Google-run social 
network service popular among Brazilian users, soon after OyakawaKyoodai uploaded the clip 
on February 9, 2009. The statistics also show that the video achieved 50,000 views in less than 
half a year, and by August 2010, has been viewed more than 100,000 times. Currently (in March 
2012), the clip has been played for 15,345 times, and it is one of the OyakawaKyoodai’s most 
viewed videos. The band has uploaded several other music videos and the video clips of their 
live performances. Those clips on average post 3,000 to 5,000 views at the time of this writing.  
Most accesses to the video came from Japan and Brazil, again according to the YouTube 
statistics, but responding to the wide call of the Oyakawa Kyoodai, who in the title of the music 
video and in the message prefacing the song addressed not only Brazilians in Japan, not only 
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Japanese-Brazilians, but diasporic Brazilians in general, the video has also been viewed by users 
from throughout the Americas, and in Europe, Russia and Australia. One message posted “2 
years ago” (relative to the time of this writing) by one YouTube user reads, “I live in Austria and 
I know exactly what you are talking about.”  
Ishi (2011) characterizes the 1990s as the period when the “dekassegui consciousness” 
(dekasegi ishiki) dominated the minds of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan, the 2000s 
as the period when they began to have the “immigrant consciousness” (imin ishiki), and the 
2010s as the time in which the “expatriate-Brazilian consciousness” (zaigai burajirujin ishiki) is 
on the rise. To Ishi, the “dekassegui consciousness,” prevalent among Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants in Japan in the 1990s, was a mindset that drove many return migrants to see their stay 
in Japan as temporary and as a means to earn as much money as possible (see also Ishi 1999). 
“Immigrant consciousness” in turn let the return migrants see their life in Japan from the 
viewpoint of longer-term settlement, and think about their social life in Japan. The “expatriate-
Brazilian consciousness” that Ishi contends is recently on the rise turns the return migrants away 
from Japan to focus on Brazil, with an awareness that they are a part of the worldwide Brazilian 
diaspora. Ishi himself is a Brazilian with Japanese roots, who has been teaching at a university in 
Japan.  
While Ishi sees a strong involvement of the Brazilian government in the recent activation 
and appraisal of the Brazilian diaspora identity and cautions that this may lead to the effacing or 
a temporary suspension of the nikkei identity of the Japanese-Brazilians in preference of the 
Brazilian identity, he also documents the formation of transnational networks of expatriate 
Brazilians (in the case he documents here, it is a business network built among Brazilian 
entrepreneurs living in Brazil, Japan and the US), connected to the rise of the Brazilian diaspora 
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identity. Still, this rise of “expatriate-Brazilian consciousness” may be limited among overseas 
Brazilian entrepreneurs, who are central focus of Ishi’s study, and not widespread among 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrant workers. The people I talked to during the course of my 
fieldwork, as well as return migrant workers interviewed in Kanako Kuriahra’s 2008/2011 
independent documentary film “A Grandpa from Brazil” characterize their stay in Japan as 
“dekassegui” Many also intends to go back to Brazil after achieving personal goals of making 
enough money to start a business or own a house in Brazil, rather than to stay in Japan as 
permanent residents or stay abroad and contribute to Brazilian economy from there. 
Urging that all overseas Brazilians’ dream now is to simply return home with an image of 
São Paulo, the Oyakawa Kyoodai’s music video makes a claim that the members of the Brazilian 
diaspora are rooted in Brazil, and addressing all expatriate Brazilians, the video strategically or 
inadvertently creates ties between Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan and Brazilian 
immigrants in other countries, who are not necessarily of Japanese descent. YouTube and the 
music video here helped the formation of these ties outside of the government-led or business-
focused transnational network of overseas Brazilians. Existing works indicate that web platforms 
such as newsgroups, discussion boards and blogs provide important channels for immigrant, 
diasporic and racial and ethnic minority users of the internet to express themselves and share 
specific information they need (Boczkowski 1999; Panagakos 2003; Adams and Ghose 2003; 
Hiller and Franz, 2004; Ignacio 2005; Mitra 2005, 2006; Horst 2006; Parker and Song 2006; 
Wilding 2006; Yao, 2009; Elias and Lemish 2009). In those cases, immigrants, racial/ethnic 
minorities and people in diaspora benefited from the reduced cost of publication and the 
enhanced capabilities to share news and information (Shirky 2008).  
My study and other reports indicate YouTube is another platform those people utilize to 
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stay in touch with their origin society, access news and information in the host society, and for 
self-expression. Some of the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I talked to at the Kobe Culture 
Center told me that they watch television programs from Brazil on YouTube. One also said she 
watches religious service videos that people from her church in Brazil post on the video sharing 
site. In addition, one can find more practical-oriented videos on YouTube, such as the one that 
shows how to open a debit card account in Japan in Portuguese19.  
One can also read the video and the lyrics of “Sonho Lindo” both as a self-reflection on 
one’s dekasegui experience and a critique of the conditions in which Oyakawa Kyoodai’s 
experiences are situated. Taken together with the prefacing message, one can hear from the first 
verse of the song a critical reflection on what Ishi (see above) calls “dekassegui consciousness” 
mindset, which focuses on “making money.” The second verse is slightly more equivocal. 
Perhaps one can interpret the verse as a (self-)critique on Japanese-Brazilian return migrant 
communities in Japan, which some writers describe as lacking mutuality, because return 
migrants have to compete with each other in the limited job market (Sugiyama 2008). One can 
also read it as a critique on the Japanese government and the top economies of the world, which, 
despite owing much of their prosperity to the works of migrant and immigrant workers, such as 
the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan, fail to recognize their contribution and refuse to 
help when the workers face difficulties.  
As such, the Oyakawa brothers’ video was a reaction to the global financial crisis and its 
numerous consequences. In this particular case, YouTube served as a site for the duo to express 
their views and emotions, as well as a venue that fostered the formation of transnational ties 
between diasporic Brazilians outside of the government-supported or business-led realms, 
                                                
19 e.g. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJXdHfODSSQ  
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although one cannot trace through the interface of YouTube how far these ties reached and how 
long they lasted beyond a one-time interaction on the comment area of a YouTube video.  
At the same time, however, this music video was not a “pure” expression of the Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants’ consciousness. While no visible gatekeeper seemingly exists on 
YouTube, content mediators manage video sharing on the website, based on YouTube’s policies 
(Roberts dissertation [ask Sarah which one of her documents I can cite here]). In addition, the 
content of the music video was restricted, precisely because of the choice to present it as a music 
video.  
Music videos on YouTube and on broadcast media follow a certain format. First, and 
perhaps foremost, a music video has to center on a music track, and the visual images that 
accompany the song are supposed not to stray too far from the theme or the mood of the song, 
although there is much room for creativity and interpretive instability there. The music track, in 
this case was in a contemporary rock/pop style, also (pre-)determines certain aspects of the 
message the music video could carry. The lyrics of contemporary pop/rock songs are usually 
narrated from a perspective of one person. In many cases, and especially when the singer is the 
writer of the song herself/himself, listeners treat the perspective of the narrator of the lyrics and 
that of the singer-song-writer as equivalent. Moreover, songwriting, lyrics writing in particular, 
is commonly seen as an individual, rather than collaborative, effort, much like monograph 
writing. A contemporary pop/rock song, thus, privileges expression of an individual’s 
experiences and feelings, rather than allowing co-existence of multiple viewpoints.  
The sentiment expressed through “Sonho Lindo,” therefore, is that of Douglas Oyakawa, 
and is not a collectively developed one. As I discuss below, an individual’s voice can be as 
crucial as an action by a collective in the “network society,” and as one can see on the comments 
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section of the video’s YouTube page, many viewers, many of whom expatriate Brazilians, 
sympathize with the song’s message. However, it is a characteristic that sets this music video 
apart from the collection of messages on Brasil Net I discuss next, which included conflicting 
understanding of the desire to go “home.” 
 
Japanese-Brazilian Voices on Brasil Net 
YouTube was not the only place where Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan 
voiced their reactions and discontents to the 2008 economic crisis and the events that took place 
subsequently. Messages sent to and posted on Brasil Net, an NGO-run website clearly illustrate 
the conditions the return migrants were placed in, in the period immediately following the crisis, 
and how they reacted to the situation. The rest of the chapter looks at those messages from 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan, to further explicate the conditions of the return 
migrants in the post-crisis period and discuss their reactions.  
Brasil Net was started in January 7, 2009, by a non-government, nonprofit organization in 
Osaka as a response to the financial crisis and following large-scale layoffs of Japanese-Brazilian 
workers. The website was made accessible both from PCs and using mobile phones. The NGO 
has a long history of providing multilingual services in the area. It was first established after the 
great Hanshin earthquake of January 1995 by a group of volunteers who had gathered to help 
non-Japanese-speaking residents of the quake stricken area by translating aid-related information 
and operating a telephone hot line. The non-profit in 1996 also served as a multilingual 
information hub during the O-157 (E-coli) outbreak in Japan, and in 2004 ran a multilingual, 
mobile phone-accessible website during the rescue effort to help the regions in Niigata prefecture 
hit by the Chuetsu earthquake (of October 2004).  
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As the organization’s involvement in the rescue effort of the Chuetsu earthquake 
exemplifies, This NGO has unique expertise not only in multilingual informational support but 
also in deploying web-based services and see it as a part of their mission. Their effort is also 
unique in that they span off a private business that targets the same niche “market” of 
multilingual and multicultural residents of Japan, to whom the non-profit wing of their operation 
offers the service. Their business wing, owned and operated by one of the former volunteers, was 
able to enter business of catering to the informational and communicational needs of the non-
Japanese-speaking and multicultural residents partly because the Japanese government’s 
indifference towards and unwillingness to provide media services to those people. As I discussed 
in Chapter 2, because of this government’s stance, many private businesses enter and leave the 
foreign language media market in Japan, as the absolute market size itself is considerably smaller 
compared, for instance, to the market for Spanish language media in the U.S. The number of 
subscribers to business’s service reached ten thousand in 2008 (all three language aggregated) 
but has been in decline since 2009 (the company’s internal document and interview). 
An internal report of the Multicultural Center describes the purpose of the Brasil Net 
website as follows.  
(The purpose of Brasil Net is to) disseminate information on employment and everyday 
needs in Portuguese to Brazilian people (living in Japan), who have been heavily struck 
by the recent economic downturn and the following job-losses, through keitai (mobile 
phone accessible) websites, and protect their job stability and the quality of life. The 
website also publicizes messages sent from Brazilian people in Japan in Japanese 
translation, to deliver their voices to the Japanese people. By making their own voices 
heard, the website aims to develop deeper understanding to the current situations of the 
Brazilian people in Japan within the Japanese society, to influence policy-making, and 
to encourage more people to join community based efforts to help Brazilians regain job 
security and stable lives. (The NGO’s internal report: 2) 
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Brasil Net featured legal and region specific aid (seikatsu shien) information, contact information 
to local support agencies, Japanese learning resources, and relevant news stories translated into 
Portuguese, as well as the messages to the Japanese readers and the messages they received from 
the Brazilian viewers of the site. A total of 115 messages translated into Japanese and posted on 
the website between December 2008 and January 2010 were used for this study. (Some messages 
were sent to and received by the NGO before it launched the full version of the Brasil Net 
website).  
The following discusses some of the most illustrative of those messages. The analysis of 
the messages confirms the findings of the existing works, particularly the ones which highlight 
the continuing lack of effective public service for the immigrant population in Japan and the ones 
which document the existence of racial/ethnic tensions between Japanese citizen residents and 
return migrants. At the same time, my analysis also reveals more complex pictures. This in turn 
leads us to consider the functions of the online venues as a medium of self-expression.  
 
All-inclusive Space? 
As I discuss below, Brasil Net provided a space for Japanese-Brazilian return migrants to 
express their feelings and opinions. Without Brasil Net, other Japanese media outlets would not 
have picked up their voices, and Japanese general public would not have known about the 
conditions of Japanese-Brazilian workers. At the same time, however, the message board on 
Brasil Net was not an all-inclusive space. The design choice of the webmasters, the ways in 
which they solicited messages, and access gap existing among return migrant users of the 
internet and mobile phones dictated, to a degree, the types and tones of messages and the nature 
of interactions that took place on the website. Thus, before going into the analysis of individual 
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messages, I consider those limitations in this section. 
When one looks at the messages posted on the website as a whole, a few characteristic 
features stand out. One of those is a lack of interactions between individual messages. The 
messages were published on the website in a non-interactive manner, and seemingly no messages 
referred to other messages posted earlier. This suggests that although the webmasters of Brasil 
Net made it sure that all the messages sent to them were posted to the website without being 
edited except for the addition of translation, the messages that appeared there were far from 
being unmediated. In other words, design choice made by the webmasters influenced the type of 
messages and interactions that took place through Brasil Net.  
The website had separate pages for message submission and message display. The choice 
was probably inevitable and I would argue it was also perfectly appropriate, to achieve one of the 
stated goals of the website “to deliver [the] voices [of Japanese-Brazilian residents] to the 
Japanese people” (internal report: 2). In order to make the messages accessible to the average 
Japanese audience, they had to be accompanied by Japanese translations. However, as a result, 
none of the messages posted on Brasil Net seemed to have engaged with each other. The choice 
to include Japanese translations and design the website around it helps the organization to gain 
attentions and supports from all parts of Japan they need. At the same time, the design prevented 
development of discussion among message senders.  
Furthermore, the way in which the messages were solicited, and that the extra step of 
translation was added to the message posting process may have precluded certain categories of 
expression. There is, most conspicuously, a lack of jokes or satire. Works done in different 
settings document the creative and even subversive use of humor by racial and ethnic minorities 
(Nakamura 2002a; Ignacio 2005); however, the knowledge that her/his message would be read 
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by the NGO and translation staff may have discouraged message writers to send any messages 
that could be considered not serious. This is another instance in which the webmaster’s design 
and strategy choice strongly mediated the types of messages posted and the types of interactions 
that took place on Brasil Net, despite that the messages went from the sender to the reader 
unmodified. 
 Finally, as my analysis of the messages below reveals, Japanese-Brazilian return migrants 
in Japan do not form a homogenous group but are divided by generational, economic and 
regional differences that exist within the population. Some of those differences map on to the 
uneven pattern of internet and mobile phone adoption by the return migrants. As I discuss further 
in Chapter 4, among the people I interviewed at Kobe Culture Center, the younger and more 
recent immigrants from urban areas of Brazil were more likely to be connected to the internet 
and mobile web than those who were from agricultural regions of Brazil, older and living in 
Japan longer. That the access to information and communication media in Japan improved 
rapidly over the last few decades, especially in the areas of affordable international calls and 
mobile internet partly explains this. Those who came to Japan more recently had better options 
available to them when they chose their strategies for communicating with people in their home 
society and coordinating their everyday life in Japan using information and communication 
technologies. It is also because many of the younger, urban Japanese-Brazilians already had a 
part of their local social networks online when they moved to Japan, whereas the older return 
migrants from non-urban areas often did not.  
The access and use gap that exists among Japanese-Brazilian return migrants thus may 
have contributed to setting the overall tone of the body of the messages sent and posted on Brasil 
Net, towards the suppression of the voice of older generation Japanese-Brazilians. Those who 
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had less consistent accesses to the internet and mobile web or those who used those technologies 
less often may not have felt as comfortable to read and post messages as those who had better 
and frequent accesses. Since the older generations and people who migrated to Japan earlier 
tended to be less active users of the information and communication media, the messages might 
not have represented their views well.  
Still, while those return migrants may have posted less, one should also note that some 
messages I discuss below, particularly the ones that attempt to draw a line between “good” and 
“bad” Brazilians, did seem to reflect the perspectives of the older, nisei (second-generation) 
Japanese-Brazilians, recalling and emphasizing the legacies of the first-generation Japanese 
settlers. The access and use gap thus may have pre-selected the group of Japanese-Brazilians 
who read Brasil Net and sent messages to the website; however, the messages displayed a certain 
degree of variation among them. 
 
Discontent 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, the Japanese government’s approach towards immigration 
was narrowly focused on the aspect of control (Komai 2001; Sellek 2001; Kajita et al. 2005). 
This, coupled with the government’s reluctance to acknowledge Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants as “immigrant workers” (as opposed to “people visiting their ethnic homeland”) in the 
official discourse caused Japanese national and municipal governments to fall behind in creating 
effective policies and systems to help non-traditional, non-Japanese-speaking residents in the 
areas of multilingual service, education, health care, labor protection and job security (Komai 
2001; Sellek 2001; Kajita et al. 2005; Sugiyama 2008).  
In contrast to the “newcomer” immigrants from Brazil and other South American 
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countries, zainichi Koreans as “old-comer” immigrants who have been in Japan for several 
generations have had accesses to ethnic schools, although their social and legal statuses have 
been far from stable, nor have they been treated equally to Japanese citizens in social life and 
policy processes (Lie 2001). Also, most of younger generation zainichi Koreans, who were born 
and raised in Japan, have less trouble communicating social service providers in Japanese. For 
the more affluent professional class transnational workers from Europe and the U.S., private 
businesses and private “international” schools have been serving their needs (Cohen 1977). 
While a wide range of issues have been surfacing episodically ever since return migrants 
started to enter Japan in large numbers in 1990, the lack of services in those areas surfaced as a 
problem the return migrants had to face as a collective in the period following the 2008 financial 
crisis. The problem also came in front of the eyes of the general public.  
Higuchi (2010) documents a massive departure of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants 
from Japan following the crisis. By the end of 2009, Higuchi notes, approximately 80,000, or 
about one fourth of Brazilian nationals who had been in Japan moved back to Brazil (53-55). 
Higuchi attributes this large-scale departure to failure of local government policies. He argues 
that local governments in Japan, tasked with “integrating” newly diversified population, focused 
mainly on tabunka kyosei (“multicultural coexistence”) as their policy goals. While partially 
successful, those policy efforts neglected that Japanese-Brazilian and other South American 
return migrants were in Japan as immigrant workers, not simply as members of cultural groups 
different from traditional local residents. The local governments’ efforts, Higuchi contends, 
therefore were conspicuously lacking in the area of job security measures for the return migrants.  
In particular, according to Higuchi, the provision of language and special skill training 
courses for the immigrants had been inadequate, which would have increased their chance of 
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finding next employment after being laid off for the economic crisis, and would have increased 
their chance of settling in Japan, while certain special skill training programs have been readily 
available for Japanese citizens (59-62). Without support from those programs, many return 
migrants had no other choice but to leave Japan.  
What Higuchi’s analysis does not account for, however, is that the other four third of the 
population who remained in Japan still had to rely on those insufficient and slow to improve 
services. Articles from Japanese national newspapers from this period clearly illustrate that local 
government and national agency offices were less well prepared to receive the return migrants as 
their clients. For instance, The Asahi Shinbun in November 2008 reported concerns and 
confusions among local officials, who were unsure about how to service Japanese-Brazilian 
residents: 
Nagahama city, Shiga, has nearly 3,000 Japanese-Brazilian residents. Second- and 
third-generation Japanese-Brazilians, descendants of the Japanese emigrants to the 
South America, have been granted permanent residentship in Japan with the amendment 
of the Immigration Control Law in 1990. The Ministry of Public Management plans to 
include permanent residents in the governmental benefit plan. Some Japanese-Brazilian 
residents, however, have difficulties reading and writing in Japanese. Whether or not 
they can understand the plan and instructions and properly file for the benefit remains a 
question.  
 
A city official working on the matter told The Asahi Shinbun, “quite honestly, we have 
not given a thought to how to reach out to the Japanese-Brazilians. The city is still 
debating which department should handle the filing.” Koga city, Shiga, which also has a 
large number of Japanese-Brazilian residents, will assess their options after a briefing 
session with prefecture officials on December 4. A city official working on the case 
expressed his (her) concern, “we cannot imagine what kind of confusion we will see.” 
(“Governmental Benefit Plan,” November 29, 2008. My translation) 
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Because many Japanese-Brazilian return migrants were let go of the short-term haken 
employment following the crisis as Higuchi (2010) writes, unemployment was the prevailing 
issue. Many haken agencies, on which the return migrants have relied on, were no longer able to 
offer enough number of jobs for them. Consequently, the unemployed return migrants turned to 
the national job security agency, called Hello Work. As The Yomiuri Shinbun, another Japanese 
major national newspaper, reported on November 16, 2011, 
Under the worsening job market conditions, Brazilians face stronger and stronger 
adversity. (...) Unemployed adults swarm Hello Work offices. Hello Work Toyohashi 
receives about 20 to 30 job seekers every day. The number of non-Japanese job seekers 
is increasing since fall. The majority is Brazilians. The count reached 1,084 at the end 
of November, doubling the number of people the Hello Work served the same period 
last year. (…) 
 
Wagner Freire, a forty-year-old Brazilian who looks for a job at Hello Work Toyohashi, 
has lost his job at an automobile parts factory in Kosei city, Shizuoka this November. “I 
cannot find a next job. If I cannot find one, I do not have any choice but go back to the 
country,” he says. (“First to be laid off,” my translation) 
 
Hello Work offices, however, were as unprepared as municipal government offices to the arrival 
of non-traditional clients. Many messages return migrants sent to Brasil Net point this out, and 
express frustrations with how the Hello Work offices treated them, and ineffectiveness of the 
Hello Work system in helping non-Japanese-speaking job seekers. 
The Hello Work offices are overwhelmed and unprepared, cannot meet everyone, 
especially people who do not speak the language (i.e. Japanese). (January 19, 2009) 
 
I live in the Aichi-ken area, and I wonder why are there so many jobs offered at the 
Hello Work, but when we say we are gaikokujin (a foreigner) or burajiru-jin (a 
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Brazilian) we are not accepted, while Japanese job seekers are accepted? (February 27, 
2009) 
 
Here in Gifu, I wonder if the Hello Work is only for Japanese or for all the unemployed: 
they send us to job interviews in all the locations but until now no foreigner has gotten a 
job through those interviews. It is not just for Brazilians. It is happening for all the 
foreigners looking for jobs. It is a complete nonsense. (April 24, 2009) 
  
A person from Gifu-ken here. I wonder if the Hello Work office here works for 
foreigners as well, because until now I do not know anyone who got a job from there. 
(May 2, 2009) 
 
The writers of other messages further directed their anger to the Japanese government for not 
helping them, and treating them as if they were an expendable labor force.  
(The government) only pay attention to immigrants when they need them as workers. 
But now, when the situation is critical, none of its branches are here to help us. 
(December 5, 2008) 
 
I think it is unjust for the firms to layoff the foreigners first. When workers were 
needed, we the gaijins (foreigners) were the ones who worked really hard. (January 5, 
2009) 
 
Unfortunately we do not have any ways to go back to Brazil. What can you do to a 
person who is in a situation like mine? I want the authorities to answer that question. 
Japanese people should be reminded that Japan achieved the status of the second largest 
economy in the world thanks to the hard works of the foreigners (immigrant workers) 
and at least give us some help when we are in need. Please understand that we are not 
asking for money, only for jobs. (January 5, 2009) 
 
As Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi (2005) argue, the absence of a comprehensive set of policy and 
protection for immigrant workers kept the return migrant population vulnerable to the logic of 
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flexible employment, which displaced many of them when the economy stumbled in the late 
2008. In addition, the local governments’ lack of awareness that the return migrants are workers 
and the resulting lack of training programs may have aggravated the situation even further and 
exacerbated their chance of getting next job once laid off, as Higuchi (2010; see above) points 
out. 
 Furthermore, many of the messages implicitly, and in some cases overtly, expressed a 
mistrust that Japanese-Brazilian return migrants felt for the Japanese society, a sense of doubt 
that they have been subjected to unfair treatment because of their skin color, physical 
appearances, language abilities, religion and for being a gaijin (“foreigner”). Some examples 
include messages like: 
I would like the government to see the foreigners with less prejudice, because we are 
not begging, and with a little more respect and consideration. We worked hard and paid 
expensive taxes as any Japanese people do. … Not all foreigners are deviants. (…) We 
are not garbage. All the foreigners should help and collaborate each other to receive a 
more decent treatment from the (Japanese) government. (December 15, 2008) 
 
I wish the Japanese government to really help the general (Japanese) population in need 
as well as the foreigners, who have helped reconstruct Japan during the past decades 
and now in need of the government’s help in this difficult moment, and tell our 
situations to the society so that they understand our causes and sufferings and help us as 
brothers, not as strangers. Because many of them consider foreigners as invaders and 
discriminate against them based on color, national origin, culture or religion. 
(November 2009) 
 
Although Japanese-Brazilians’ desirability as temporary workers were originally articulated in 
terms of shared blood lineage and cultural proximity, many journalistic, sociological and 
anthropological works note that once they arrived in Japan and began entering workplaces and 
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local communities, the return migrants were treated as “strangers,” seen as irresponsible, noisy 
and scary (Tsuda 2001, 2003; Roth 2002; Kajita et al. 2005), and even uncool (Sugiyama 2008). 
Tsuda (2001, 2003) notes that while many Brazilians of Japanese descent feel a strong affinity to 
“Japan” when they are in Brazil, the majority of return migrants he studied began to feel stronger 
sense of affiliation to “Brazil” once they were in Japan, confronted by the local residents’ 
essentialistic view on culture and identity, as well as treatment based on stereotypes.  
The messages posted on Brasil Net indicate the existence of the feeling of uneasiness, if 
not utter frustration and anger, of the experience of being a “foreigner” and “stranger” in Japan. 
The feeling is articulated at several different levels, namely as a mistrust and frustration against 
local Hello Work offices and as gripes against the national government of Japan. 
 
Internal Divisions and Disagreements 
As Maruyama (2010) suggests using the data from a 1987-88 survey, the majority of the 
Japanese-Brazilian population in Brazil has become urban, highly educated and racially mixed 
by the late 1980s. This population became the reservoir for would-be return migrants to Japan in 
the 1990s and after. Using the result of the questionnaire distributed and collected through the 
Brazilian Consulate General’s offices in Tokyo and Nagoya in 2006, Costa, who was a counselor 
to the Brazilian Consulate General in Tokyo, shows that the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants 
in Japan inherit those characteristics. According to Costa (2007), 66.41% of the respondents 
were from the state of São Paulo in Brazil, with about 25% from the city of São Paulo, and more 
than 60% had a high school degree or higher. Regarding the racial/ethnic self-description, Costa 
finds about 30% of the respondents were the nisei (second generation Japanese-Brazilians), 45% 
sansei (third generation), 17% non-nikkei (no Japanese ancestry) and 5% “mestiço” (“mixed-
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race”).  
Based on this survey, Costa argues that the majority of the Brazilian immigrant workers 
in Japan have stable visa status, are from Southeastern states of Brazil, have middle class 
educational and occupational backgrounds, and had similar occupations in Japan as factory and 
assembly line workers. (Approximately 66% of the survey respondents say they engage in “blue 
collar/manual labor”). Costa thus contends that Brazilian immigrants in Japan form a relatively 
homogenous group, compared to Brazilian immigrants in the U.S. who are more likely to be 
diverse in terms of origins in Brazil, class backgrounds, occupational patterns and visa statuses 
(i.e. some are illegal immigrants in the U.S.). Furthermore, Costa claims that this relative 
homogeneity, coupled with geographical proximity in which Brazilian immigrants in Japan live, 
enables the formation of the “expatriate Brazilian community” with a relative ease (see also Ishi 
2011. As Ishi points out, Costa’s observation goes hand in hand with the Brazilian government’s 
interest in fostering overseas Brazilian communities and the awareness of Brazilian diaspora).  
 The messages posted on Brasil Net, however, shows that the Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants are far from uniform. Rather, there are significant divisions and disagreements within 
the population. 
I have been in Japan for 20 years and started to understand why Japanese people are 
prejudiced against Brazilians. (…) Many Brazilians do not try to adapt the Japanese 
culture as the Japanese people did to the Brazilian culture. I live in a danchi (an 
apartment complex) and many Brazilians living here walk around half naked, grill meat 
on verandahs, throw things, drive around noisy cars early in the morning, sell and buy 
strange things. (…) And ask for respects? We the nikkei people (people of Japanese 
descent) have gained respect in Brazil because we followed the Brazilian ways of life.  
(March 16, 2009) 
 
This morning I was waiting for a bus. Some other Japanese people were in line as well. 
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A gaijin (foreigner) looking person was passing by on a bicycle, and he spat out f-words 
to the Japanese people in Portuguese. I thought it was an ugly thing. (…) Someday you 
may need to turn to this country (Japan). If you are not satisfied, why you don’t go back 
(to Brazil)? Only those who think this country as good and try to learn from it deserve 
to stay here, not those who are just interested in okane (money). (April 17, 2009) 
 
The first quote above suggests the presence of a generational gap and conflict within the return 
migrant population in Japan. The writer of the message identifies herself/himself with “we” the 
nikkei people, who “followed the Brazilian ways of life” in Brazil, and condemns “them,” those 
who are not willing to learn Japanese ways.  
When one reads closely the results of the survey Costa (2007) discusses, the labels of 
“nisei” and “sansei” are generational markers, in addition to being racial/ethnic markers, 
although Costa interprets them only as the latter. Costa sees the finding that 75% of the Brazilian 
population in Japan belong either to the nisei or the sansei categories as the evidence that the 
population is homogenously Japanese-Brazilian. The second generation nisei and the third 
generation sansei, however, are sometimes markedly different in their proximity to Japanese 
languages and cultures, as well as their attitudes towards “Brazilian ways” (see, for example, 
Maruyama 2010). With sansei making up half of the return migrant population and nisei one-
third, the resentment over the others’ attitude towards cultural differences and assimilation, 
which this message contains, may be an artifact of intergenerational conflicts. Perhaps those who 
the writer of this message implicates are of the sansei generation, or perhaps those who identifies 
themselves as non-nikkei or mixed.   
 The second message reflects a similar sentiment, but it also condemns “those who are just 
interested in okane (money)” This is similar to one possible reading of the Oyakawa Kyoodai’s 
music video I discussed above, the reading that sees the lyrics of “Sonho Lindo” as a critique of 
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the “dekassegui consciousness” (Ishi 1999, 2011) that puts earning money in front of any other 
goals.  
 Therefore, contrary to the assessment of Costa (2007) that characterized Brazilians in 
Japan as a relatively homogenous group, the messages on Brasil Net shows that there are 
significant internal divisions and disagreements among the return migrants. As I discussed above, 
the generational difference may be one factor contributing to the division. In addition, 
differences in regional background may be playing an important role. Sugiyama (2011) in one 
interview work points out the existence of discrimination among the return migrants based on the 
place of one’s origin in Brazil. In the article, Sugiyama’s return migrant interviewee confides 
that he has been ridiculed by other (Japanese-)Brazilian return migrants from São Paulo because 
of his Pará accent, because Pará is a state in northern Brazil seen as rural and underdeveloped. 
Mita (2002) suggests that Japanese-Brazilians from the Brazilian city of Bastos have more 
proximity and stronger affinity to Japanese way of life because of the history of the city, which 
put the Bastos nikkeijin in an advantageous position in cross-cultural encounter situations, both 
in Brazil and in Japan.  
 Those messages also indicate that although an access and use gap is present among 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan as I discussed above, the body of messages posted 
on Brasil Net included a certain variety of views. Interestingly, while the older, nisei generation 
return migrants were less likely to be active users of the internet and mobile web, the views the 
messages I analyzed in this section expressed were seemingly more closely aligned with those of 
the older generation, who tends to have closer proximity to the legacies of the first generation 
Japanese settlers and Japanese ways of life, or perhaps those of people like Bastos Japanese-
Brazilians (Mita 2002; see above), who have maintained contacts to Japanese cultures despite 
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their younger age.  
 
“Home” 
In the “Sonho Lindo” music video, the Oyakawa Kyoodai stated that the true dream of all 
Brazilians abroad was “to return home,” and that “home” was undoubtedly Brazil. The question 
of where to call home, however, was a more complicated one for many of the Japanese-Brazilian 
return migrants facing the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, as expressed through 
messages sent to Brasil Net:	 
The emigration of nikkei Brazilians started more than 20 years ago. Today many have 
decided to build their lives in Japan, had children, brought the family, bought homes 
and cars and settled in. They need job security, so they can continue to build their lives 
here and contribute to the growth of the country. (January 27, 2009) 
 
Our children like Japan and are proud that their ojiichan (grandfather) is Japanese. We 
have Japan and Brazil as options, but our children only have Japan as an option. 
(February 27, 2009) 
 
I decided to participate by sending my email, because I do not have an intention to 
return to Brazil, and would like the Japanese in general to know that many of us are like 
myself, did not come to Japan just to make money and live a better life in Brazil. (…) 
My life is here. (…) I love this place, although I do not know how to explain it, and it is 
hard for me to imagine myself moving away from here. I am employed, working in the 
same factory for almost seven years, and I live in the same city since 1995, paid my 
taxes on time, and have my hoken (mandatory insurance), and finally. (...) I follow all 
the rules, and respect those who respect me. (May 1, 2009) 
 
Complicating the picture the Oyakawa Kyoodai’s song presents, the return migrants who sent 
those messages to Brasil Net felt that their current, effective “home” is in Japan, and are unable 
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or unwilling to leave. It was possibly because they are at different stages in their lifecourse 
(single vs. having family and children, renting vs. owning a house in Japan, etc.), and/or because 
of the length of their stay in Japan. 
While echoing indecision about where one’s home should be found in the messages 
above, a message posted on May 11, 2009 makes a reference to the emergency package the 
Japanese government offered to South American return migrants in 2009, following the rise in 
the unemployment rate of the return migrants after the 2008 financial crisis.  
(…) The time has passed and many young people who came to Japan got married, had 
children, children grew up and become out of touch from Brazil. There are many reports 
of people who do not want to go back because you know that while we are in crisis here 
it still is a first world country and see, feel and enjoy the life here. ... And one more 
thing. I wonder why the Brazilian government does not give us 300 million yen or any 
other help (to help us return to Brazil), if they say the practice of the Japanese 
government is discriminatory? (May 11, 2009) 
 
As the writer mentions in the passages after “and one more thing,” the national government of 
Brazil criticized the Japanese government’s decision to offer money to South American 
immigrants who would be willing to “go back” to their original countries, arguing that the 
Japanese government was trying to “kick out” foreign workers in the face of bad domestic 
economy.  
Contrary to the way in which the Brazilian government reacted to the emergency fund, 
however, the writer of this message felt it was the Brazilian government, the government of 
his/her “home” country, who was actually disenfranchising overseas Brazilians in trouble, not 
offering any help for them to come back to the country. Perhaps she/he felt this sense of 
disenfranchisement even more strongly, because of his/her identity as a Japanese-Brazilian, 
although there is no way to tell this person’s self-described racial/ethnic identity from the post. In 
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spite of the history of presence for more than 100 years, and despite making significant 
impressions in Brazil’s national political and cultural sphere, the Japanese-Brazilian identity in 
Brazil is that of one of the racial/ethnic minorities, whose “Brazilian-ness” has been, and 
continues to be, contested (Mita 2002).  
 Still, other messages indicate that some return migrants see Japan only as their transient 
home-away-from-home and the place for dekassegui.  
That's right, nothing can be done to the global crisis. Enjoy the support that the 
government is giving to people to return to the country of origin. This is the only chance 
to return with a little money. It is “better than nothing” and I have already decided to 
leave (laughs). (April 8, 2009) 
 
Remember that none of us came here as an obligation. Those who had made good 
money already went back. Those who are staying now are the losers who did not save 
enough money. (May 6, 2009) 
 
These competing messages reveal that different perceptions of “home” exist among Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants. As Costa (2007) shows, close to 75% of his respondents indicated the 
purpose of their stay in Japan as “work.” Still, the group of Japanese-Brazilians in Japan is far 
from being homogenous as Costa presents it to be. Their goals, their lifecourse and the lengths of 
their stay in Japan are different, and sometimes their situations are so disparate as to produce 
conflicting views on the lifestyle of dekassegui and the perceptions of “home.” 	 
 
Meanings and Functions of Online Spaces for The Return Migrants 
As I showed above, the Oyakawa Kyoodai’s YouTube video opened up opportunities, 
outside of the government-supported and business-led realms, of making transnational emotional 
ties between expatriate Brazilians living in different parts of the world through interactions in the 
 107 
comment section, although one cannot observe or confirm if and how long those ties lasted 
beyond those conversations. The music video and the messages posted on Brasil Net also 
presented views that sometimes conflicted with each other. Those lead us to consider what 
meanings and functions those online spaces have for the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants 
living in Japan. Not only did those online venues functioned as spaces for the return migrants to 
voice their views and opinions, but also they served as alternative spaces, which bring together 
different and differing voices.  
 For instance, as The Asahi Shinbun and The Yomiuri Shinbun articles on the impacts of 
the financial crisis on Japanese-Brazilian return migrants and on the confusion in local municipal 
offices on the ways to the serve increasingly diversifying resident body (quoted above) partly 
exemplify, the Japanese national newspapers (printed in Japanese) reported about the situations 
of the return migrants, but not so much from the return migrants’ own point of view.  
In contrast, the “Sonho Lindo” music video and the messages posted on Brasil Net 
brought “the voices” of Japanese-Brazilians to the public, the former through the musical and 
visual presentations and the latter through Japanese translations the website provided. Likewise, 
the messages on Brasil Net brought to the fore the existence of disagreements among the return 
migrants, as opposed to Costa’s government-initiated report that, motivated partly by the 
Brazilian state’s interest in networking and culturally and economically “capitalize” on 
expatriate Brazilians, characterized the Brazilian immigrant community in Japan as “relatively 
homogenous.”  
 Ono and Pham in Asian Americans and the Media (2009) note “the Internet has the 
potential for actors to cultivate and use this space to construct and/or promote resistant ideas” 
(155, emphasis removed), and “individual Asian Americans inhabit the new media space and put 
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forth different representations while contesting and sometimes reinforcing new and old media 
representations” (155). The YouTube video and the messages on Brasil Net I discussed above 
have a similar effect on Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in the Japanese society of making 
multiple voices heard.  
At the same time, however, Ono and Pham seem to play down the significance of the 
utility of the internet to bring about social changes, stating that “there is only so much that ‘you’ 
can do as an individual in both new and traditional media” (155). They contend that the 
examples of Asian American online actions they consider are “not part of, nor do they aim to be, 
a collective effort to challenge or resist dominant media and dominant media representation” 
(155). Their denigration of online actions is predicated on a traditional image of social 
movement, which implies organized collective action. As Shirky (2008) argues, however, with 
the aid of new information and communication technologies and their capacities to let people 
share and work together quickly and inexpensively, individuals may be able to collaborate and 
affect social changes without hierarchically (or even democratically) managed organizations.  
It is true that the Asian American blogs and comic strips Ono and Pham use as examples, 
as well as the Oyakawa Kyoodai’s music video and messages on Brasil Net are voices of the 
outspoken individuals. And although messages on Brasil Net are presented as a collection, those 
are not collectively formulated statements or action plans. Still, this type of voice can play an 
important role in driving social change in the age of globally connected digital media.  
Similarly, Castells in The Internet Galaxy (2001) contends “the Internet brings people 
into contact in a public agora, to voice their concerns and share their hopes” (164). Castells also 
argues that the internet as a crucial tool of resistance for less well-represented groups such as 
racial, ethnic and cultural minorities, immigrants and indigenous people, as well as for social 
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movement groups striving to bring changes to the world. As he writes, “Power [(in the network 
society)] is primarily exercised around the production and diffusion of cultural codes and 
information content. The control of communication networks becomes the lever by which 
interests and values are transformed in guiding norms of human behavior” (ibid.: 164). Having 
media connection and worldwide internet-based alliances is one of the effective ways to mirror 
and counteract the networking logic of domination, which Castells sees as prevalent in the 
information society (Castells 2004: 82-84).  
Furthermore, being connected to global networks can empower organizations working on 
local issues, as it “strengthen their autonomy and representativeness in their local settings. This is 
because they would benefit from information, support, resources, and legitimacy from global 
sources of solidarity and connection, rather than being exclusively dependent on their local ties” 
(Castells 2001: 154). While Castells’s view on social movements, like that of Ono and Pham, 
still rests on the image of organized collective action, connecting individuals to individuals may 
become more crucial under the transformation towards the network society Castells describes in 
his works. As Shirky (2008; also see above) contends, the popular diffusion of social tools 
powered by the internet and mobile phone technologies are enabling individuals to “organize 
without organizations.”  
At the same time, and importantly, however, Castell’s “individualization” thesis and 
Shirky’s idea of “the power of organizing without organization” assumes a certain level of stable 
and unrestricted access to the internet and mobile phones, or “social tools” as Shirky calls them. 
That is, their propositions are based on a condition that once a user gains an access to those 
media, she/he will be able to utilize them somewhat consistently and freely, without financial 
and time constraints or being disturbed by other people, with whom she/he may need to share the 
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device.  
My evidence indicates, however, that the internet and mobile phone access the Japanese-
Brazilians I talked at Kobe Culture Center had were not as stable as what Castells and Shirky 
expect an average user would have. The lack of job security and financial instability they faced 
heavily influenced their access to those media, suggesting that those who have an access at one 
point may lose the access depending on their financial situations. Furthermore, although many 
did utilize what Shirky calls “social tools,” which include email, instant messaging and text 
messaging, most of those return migrants were unable to spend as much time spreading 
information to others and participating in online forums (see Chapter 4 for more details). Shirky 
(2008) argues that social tools on the internet and mobile phones make publishing “effortless” 
(79). My evidence suggests, however, for a certain group of users, the time and number of steps 
needed to “publish” on the simplest of the social tool platform – say, forwarding an email 
message – may be perceived as a prohibitive amount of “effort.”  
Therefore, while YouTube and Brasil Net’s message board served as an alternative space 
for Japanese-Brazilian return migrants aspiring to express themselves in the cases I analyzed 
above, and those messages may have potentials to spread from individual to individual to finally 
initiate change in people’s values or non-organized collective action, it is unclear whether or not 
those benefits reach moderate and unstable users of the internet and mobile phones, such as the 
ones I interviewed at Kobe Culture Center.  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, one’s ability to turn around the logic of “flexible 
accumulation” and use it for one’s own financial and cultural capital gain (Ong 1999) is based on 
and limited by the amount of financial and cultural resources one has in the first place. Likewise, 
one’s capability to turn it around and use the “networking logic of domination” to counteract 
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hegemonic powers (Castells 2004) also depends on and is restricted by the types and quality of 
access one has to the globally connected digital media.  
Even further, individual-to-individual expression and sharing of “interest and values” 
may not be as simple a matter as Castells and other scholars assume them to be. Castells in The 
Internet Galaxy (2001) contends that a new form of sociability emerged through social and 
technological changes that took place in the late 20th century. “[T]he new, dominant pattern,” 
Castells writes, “seems to be built on … what Wellman calls ‘personalized communities,’ 
embodied in me-centered networks. It represents the privatization of sociability” (128). 
According to Castells, “[t]hese trends are tantamount to the triumph of the individual … 
individuals are in fact reconstructuring the pattern of social interaction, with the help of new 
technological affordances, to create a new form of society: the network society” (133).  
Similarly and more recently, other works suggest that social network sites (SNSs) are 
changing the way people interact and form communities in online settings (boyd 2006; boyd and 
Ellison 2007; Baym 2007). boyd (2006; see also boyd and Ellison 2007) argues that associations 
found on SNSs are based on the “egocentric” social network of a user. Whereas more traditional 
online communities (formed around websites, discussion forums, email lists and chat rooms) are 
built based on common interests, “Friending” mechanisms on SNSs “[allow] people to choose 
people first and interest second” (boyd 2006).  
Baym (2007) similarly notes that with new forms of social software now available, 
people practice “what might be called ‘networked collectivism’ in which loose collectives of 
associated individuals bind networks together” (n/p). This is “a new form somewhere between 
the site-based online group and the egocentric network, distributing themselves throughout a 
variety of sites [(including SNSs and personal blogs)] in a quasi-coherent networked fashion” 
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(n/p).   
While suggestive of how SNSs and other new forms of social software may transform the 
ways in which communities are built and sustained in online settings, those works focus on 
“typical” users of those services – urban/suburban users and young users in boyd (2006; 2008), 
and music enthusiasts in Baym (2007) – whose personal interests are often unaffected by other 
social categories, such as ethnicity, race, nationality, social class and sexuality. Yet, other studies 
show that those social categories, ethnicity, race and social class in particular, may still play 
important roles on SNSs (Hargittai 2007; Byrne 2007).  
Hargittai (2007) finds that in her sample of college students, a student’s choice of an SNS 
service (which SNS the student primarily uses) is correlated with educational attainment of the 
parents (a proximate measure for the student’s class background) and the student’s racial/ethnic 
background. Byrne (2007) finds that although the discussions rarely develop to off-line 
collective actions, forums on BlackPlanet.com often take up issues that concern the nation-wide 
African American community. These cases suggest that collective identities may still hold 
salience in the seeming prevalence of “individualized” social networks and “individualizing” 
media technologies such as the internet and mobile phones (Parker and Song 2006), and that 
racial/ethnic minority, immigrant and diasporic users of those technologies form different types 
of online (and offline) social networks and alliances.  
Also, in Here Comes Everybody (2008), Shirky argues that online collaborative spaces 
such as Wikipedia can circumvent the “Tragedy of the Commons,” where “free-riders” disrupt 
collaboration and destroy common good, fend off mal-intended contributors and sustain and 
improve itself because people “love.” Shirky contends that “Wikipedia exists because enough 
people love it and, more important, love one another in its context. … What love does for 
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Wikipedia is provide the motivation both for improvement and for defense” (141). He also writes, 
with the aid of social tools that lower the cost of mutual care-giving, “[w]hen people care enough, 
they can come together and accomplish things of a scope and longevity that were previously 
impossible” (142).  
This Shirky’s proposition contains important implications regarding how racial/ethnic 
minority, immigrants and diasporic people may be able to build connections and maintain them 
in the age of connected digital media. Still, Wikipedia is a general interest project, which have a 
potential to attract “love” and “care” of a large number of people, possibly without lengthy 
explanation or persuasion. In the cases I discussed above, YouTube as a web service may be of 
interest to enough number of people to sustain it as a collaborative platform. The Oyakawa 
Brothers’ video, however, is based on and speaks to a very specific set of sentiments and 
experiences of being an immigrant worker and being an expatriate Brazilian. Brasil Net, too, is 
originally intended for people who share similar experiences and concerns, and those 
experiences and concerns are mediated by one’s race, ethnicity, national origin and 
transnationality.  
In cases such as those, is it possible to get enough number of people to “love” and “care” 
about those spaces? How far are people willing to extend their “love,” even with the presence of 
social tools that, according to Shirky, lower barriers to do so? And worse, if “love” is what is 
necessary to sustain collaboration and collective action online, while general interest projects 
such as Wikipedia may be able to sustain themselves and even flourish because they can 
accumulate enough “love,” projects based on interests mediated by specific experiences of being 
a racial/ethnic minority, immigrant and/or member of diaspora may find it difficult to thrive 
precisely because they cannot compete in the market for “love.” Thus, although Shirky’s 
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assessment of the potential of the internet and social tools to unleash “the power of organizing 
without organization” offers promising implications, it is unclear whether or not all users of the 
internet and social tools, including racial/ethnic minority, immigrant and diasporic users can 
fully enjoy those benefits. 
 The internet, moreover, is valuable for immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities not 
because it enables the transmission of unmediated, “authentic” voices and representations as 
some argue. As I presented above, Oyakawa Kyoodai’s artistic and political expression on their 
music video was mediated not only by YouTube’s policies and expectations of YouTube users, 
but also by conventions surrounding production of rock/pop music and music videos. Likewise, 
the design and strategy choices of the webmasters, as well as the platform on which the message 
board was made available (on the internet and mobile web) heavily influenced the Japanese-
Brazilian voices articulated through messages sent to Brasil Net.  
Nakamura (2002b) writes “there are few, perhaps no, media forms which are ‘purely’ 
authentic, just as there are few which are homogeneously and uniformly hybrid. Media forms are 
bumpy, layered, and pitted with the imprint of contact with other cultures; none avoid the mark 
of imperialist power relations. And the Internet is no different” (n/p). Nakamura continues, 
“What the Internet does offer, however, is a range of imagistic and interactive practices that 
produce a distinctively different mediascape from the world of the static literary text” (ibid.: n/p). 
The examples I discussed above, Brasil Net, in particular, are more textual than visual and 
limited in interactivity. Nonetheless, Brasil Net cultivated a space inside the World Wide Web 
where articulation of multiple voices was possible. Messages posted there contributed to 
complicate the characterization of the return migrant population on Japanese national 
newspapers and on a Brazilian governmental publication. The Oyakawa Brothers, utilizing the 
 115 
platform of YouTube and the genre of music video, opened up a possibility to construct 
transnational emotional connections among expatriate Brazilians outside of the realms of 
governmental interventions and business interests.  
Because of the limit imposed by the website design and perhaps by not-so-high active 
participation rates of the users and viewers, the effects the Oyakawa Kyoodai’s video and Brasil 
Net produced were not immediately visible in the forms of lively and reflexive discussions or 
follow up videos on the YouTube page or the website themselves. Still, that those spaces existed 
was a positive addition to the assortment of media channels for Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants, the general public in Japan and Brazilian nationals living in different parts of the world.  
 
This chapter looked at a music video “Sonho Lindo” posted on YouTube by the Oyakawa 
Kyoodai and the collection of the messages sent to and posted on Brasil Net in the period 
immediately following the 2008 global financial crisis, which were Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants’ reactions to the crisis. By analyzing those reactions, I further explicated the situations 
and the characteristics of the return migrant population in the post-crisis period. Facing 
unemployment, the return migrants also had to deal with Japanese bureaucracy and social service 
agencies, which were underprepared to work with the non-Japanese-speaking and multicultural 
population. In addition, as my analysis of the messages on Brasil Net revealed, unlike the ways 
in which the population is depicted on the mainstream and official governmental sources, there 
were internal differences, differentiations and disagreements among the Japanese-Brazilian 
return migrants in Japan during that period.    
Furthermore, I used those reactions to examine the roles the Oyakawa Kyoodai’s video 
and Brasil Net played for the return migrants, the general public of Japan and the diasporic 
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Brazilians from around the world. My analysis shows that both the “Sonho Lindo” video and 
Brasil Net cultivated alternative spaces on World Wide Web, which enabled articulation of 
multifarious voices and strategic or unexpected formation of transnational emotional ties among 
expatriate Brazilians. At the same time, however, my evidence also suggests that not all users of 
globally connected digital media benefit equally from the use of the technology. A certain group 
of racial/ethnic minority, immigrant and diasporic users are structurally excluded from receiving 
those benefits, because they have unstable financial resources and limited time, and/or because 
the interest and values they are trying to share are based on specific experiences, mediated by 
race, ethnicity and transnationality.  
In the next chapter, I shift my focus to a specific group of Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants I interviewed at the Kobe Culture Center, who were mildly active users of the new 
media. I will consider what specific roles mobile phones, the internet and other types of old and 
new media played in their life as transnational migrants. 
 117 
Figures 
 
 
  
Figure 4: YouTube statistics for the "Sonho Lindo" video clip (Retrieved March 14, 2012) 
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Chapter 4: The (Im)possibility of Transnationalism and Reflexive Identity Formation: New 
Media and Old Media, and Transnational Practices and Identities of Japanese-Brazilian 
Return Migrants in Japan 
 
In internet studies as a general field, scholars have been trying to account for average 
users’ everyday internet use. In Social Consequences of Internet Use (Katz and Rice 2002), for 
instance, the authors collect the “actual” data taken from the nationally representative sample of 
users, non-users and “dropout” users in the U.S. regarding their access to the internet, online and 
offline civic and community involvement, and social interaction and expression on the internet. 
They use this data to dislodge some of the utopian and dystopian speculations regarding the 
social impacts of the new media. Haddon (2004) in Information and Communication 
Technologies in Everyday Life emphasizes the importance of internet research that focuses on 
how the internet is perceived, experienced, used and regulated within a household and how new 
technologies change personal relationships and everyday routines and interactions at home. 
Haddon utilizes the framework of “domestication” intended to capture the consequences of 
technology adoption on everyday, domestic life. There is also a growing recognition of 
differentiated access and differentiated use that exist among the ordinary users of the internet 
(see for example Wyatt, Thomas and Terranova 2002; Hargittai 2004; Hargittai and Hinnant 
2008; Hargittai and Walejko 2008). 
This chapter presents a study of immigrant users of new information and communication 
technologies, the internet and mobile phones in particular, that focuses on moderate use and 
everyday cases. Using the narrative evidence I gathered from my interviews with Japanese-
Brazilian and a few Brazilian residents of the Kobe area, Japan, from the archive of comments 
posted online on the Brasil Net website, and from the Portuguese-language newspaper The 
International Press, I argue that some of the claims about the impacts of the internet and mobile 
 119 
phones on the life of transnational immigrants and people in diaspora – which have been 
generated from rather selective observations of very active groups and successful cases – do not 
apply to immigrant users of information and communication technologies who are only 
moderately immersed in online public activities. 
More specifically, I intend to critically engage with two key arguments found in the field. 
First is the idea that new information and communication technologies can “shrink distances” – 
minimize the impacts of physical distances and displacement on day-to-day communication and 
information gathering, family and other personal ties, retention of cultural and linguistic 
practices, etc. – and undermine the powers of nationally-bound nation states. Second is the 
notion that online spaces – because they are textual, persistent and interactive – urge the 
immigrant and diasporic users to reflect upon and renegotiate their subjective awareness about 
national belonging and ethnic ties and take active control of their own national and/or ethnic 
identities. 
 
Brazilian Return Migrants and the Media: Existing Anthropological and Sociological 
Accounts 
 
Existing anthropological and sociological works on this topic suggest that Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants have been actively engaging in transnational correspondence between 
Japan and Brazil. Various types and generations of communication technologies have been a 
crucial part of that.  
Junko Onai (2001) reports that among the Japanese-Brazilian residents in Gunma 
prefecture she studied, more than 85% was getting in touch with their families and friends in 
Brazil at least once a month. In the study, 7.7% responded “almost everyday,” 7.7% “two to 
three times a week,” 11.5% “once a week,” 16.7% “once every two weeks,” 44.9% “once a 
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month,” 9.0% “once every two to three months,” and 2.6% “once every six months” (281). At 
the time of Onai’s research, which the author conducted in the late 1990s, 93.8% used telephone 
and 45.0% used regular mail to contact Brazil. Onai does not differentiate home phone and 
mobile phone ownership in the report. 
Kawamura (2000), based on extensive surveys, interviews and ethnographic researches 
she conducted in the 1990s on Japanese-Brazilian workers/residents at various Japanese 
companies, factories and apartment complexes, also suggests that immigrants in recent years 
“live simultaneously in two countries ([that are involved in the process of transnational 
migration])” (34, my translation). They do so by utilizing “official (travel and employment 
agencies and associations) and unofficial (families, neighbors and friends) networks” as well as 
“advanced technologies (telephone, email and the internet) that enable continuous ‘virtual 
presence’ of immigrants” (34, my translation, parenthetical notes in the original text). Thus, 
Kawamura continues,  
transnational migrant workers can maintain new ties in their destination country of 
Japan, while in critical situations can also sustain social and cultural relationships with 
the destination society as well as with the home society. It is not only because their new 
living place ([Japan]) has people from the same origin country, but also because 
development of communication and transportation in addition to the advancement of 
globalization facilitate accesses to cultural assets in their home country. (36, my 
translation)  
 
Toru Onai (2009) similarly proposes that in order to understand the experiences of Japanese-
Brazilians in Japan, one must look into the ways of life in “transnational living spaces 
(toransunashonaru na seikatsu sekai)” (9), which include “financial and emotional ties with 
family members, communities and networks of compatriots, and means of information sharing 
that are formed across boundaries of nation-states” (10, my translation). It is also important to 
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acknowledge “the worldwide expansion of various institutions, rapid progresses of 
transportation, and the development of the internet and the media are significant support for the 
foundation of transnational living spaces” (10, my translation). 
 While these studies point to the importance of the development and diffusion of 
information and communication technologies as the background of increased transnational 
correspondence and the emergence and sustenance of “transnational living spaces,” none 
includes the study of the actual impacts of different media technologies or the significance of the 
media use as perceived by the immigrant workers. The findings I discuss in this chapter add 
more specific and qualitative details to the existing literature, such as which types of media 
return migrants use for transnational communication and whether or not the increased amount of 
correspondence leads directly to trans-nationalization of their life. 
 
The Use of Information and Communication Technologies among Japanese-Brazilians and 
Brazilians at the Kobe Culture Center 
 
The Research Site and the People I Interviewed 
The Kobe Culture Center where I conducted my interviews was located in a building, 
which formerly served as a medical and educational facility for the people relocating from Japan 
to the United States and the Latin American countries including Brazil. Between 1928 when it 
was commissioned and 1971 when the building ended its life as the national immigration facility, 
thousands of men, women and children spent a week there receiving medical examinations and 
vocational and linguistic training, before boarding immigration ships at the port of Kobe right 
down the street. The building stood on the hillside that looked straight down to the harbor.  
Restored and repurposed to house an immigration museum, an art café, and offices of 
non-governmental organizations that dedicate their efforts to cultural exchange and support of 
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local immigrant population, the building in the current incarnation functioned as a symbolic and 
emotional, as well as, as I discuss below, an instrumental hub for those who have returned from 
Brazil and for Japanese-Brazilian and Brazilian migrant workers living in the area. In front of the 
building was a stone carving commemorating the first group of Japanese immigrants to Brazil, 
showing the historical and sentimental significance of the place. This was also where I met a 95-
year-old man, who once had been a Japanese immigrant to Brazil himself and returned. He 
would stop by at the building every weekend just to sit in one of the rooms and recount tales 
from his Brazilian days to whoever was willing to listen. The Kobe Culture Center (pseudonym), 
which granted me an access to its patrons, was one of the volunteer organizations based there 
and provided help to Japanese-Brazilian and other Latin American immigrants in Kobe and the 
surrounding cities, offering Japanese and computer skill classes for adults and Portuguese classes 
for children, as well as hosting cultural events. 
All the people I interviewed at the Center including the center director were Brazilian 
nationals, and were either immigrant workers themselves or a member of a worker family. Not 
all of them, however, were of Japanese descent, according to their self-description. Other than 
the director, every person I talked to were either the attendees of weekend Japanese-language 
classes or the female parents of the children attending the Portuguese class and activities, which 
were also held in the weekends. Total of six individual and group interview sessions were 
conducted over one month period, and I talked extensively with a total of ten people. Eight of my 
informants were female, including the director of the Center, and two were male. Although I did 
not ask explicitly, their age ranged from early 30s to early 50s, and the length of time spent in 
Japan also ranged from a few months to more than 10 years. All of my informants were married, 
and with an exception of one younger couple, all had children living with them or nearby in 
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Japan.  
Those who gathered at the Kobe Cultural Center were a particular group of Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants. First, they lived outside of the so-called Brazil town. Although Kobe 
and the urban area of Osaka adjacent to it have had the Japanese-Brazilian immigrant population 
at a certain level of concentration, it has never reached the level found in Toyota (Aichi 
prefecture), Hamamatsu (Shizuoka prefecture) or Oizumi (Gunma prefecture) and areas 
surrounding those cities, where one can find neighborhoods with a visible concentration of 
Brazilian residents and businesses. The director of the Center told me that Kobe itself once had a 
larger number of Japanese-Brazilian residents around year 2000, but the relocation of factories 
and food processing plants where most of the Japanese-Brazilians worked resulted in a rapid 
dispersion of the population.  
It is difficult to tell which, i.e. living in or near “Brazil towns” vs. living outside of the 
areas with large immigrant populations, is a typical experience of a Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrant in Japan at the present moment. Numerically, the majority still lives in or close to the 
above-mentioned cities where the local immigrant population is high and where Brazilian stores, 
services and restaurants are more accessible. At the same time, however, as Kajita, Tanno and 
Higuchi (2005) point out, geographical dispersion of the Japanese-Brazilians has already begun 
in 1993 with the downturn of the Japanese economy and it has been continuing ever since.   
At any rate, inclusion of this group of Japanese-Brazilians living away from the Brazilian 
ethnic towns is important to the present study looking at adoption of new information and 
communication technologies by transnational workers, because they experience a sense of dual 
displacement – displacement from their origin society of Brazil and displacement from the 
community of their fellow nationals within the destination society. If the internet and mobile 
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phones were capable of “shrinking distances” and connect people otherwise separated, then these 
media would be able to alleviate difficulties arising from both types of displacement. I selected 
Kobe and the Kobe Culture Center as my research site because the Japanese-Brazilians and 
Brazilians who lived in the area and gathered at the Center fit in this category. 
Second, the people I met at the Kobe Culture Center were moderate users of new and old 
information and communication technologies. Although most of them did have access to the 
internet and mobile phones, in addition to the landline telephone and newspapers, and were 
active users of those technologies, none had expert knowledge or skills related to computers and 
digital media, nor did any one of them actively participated in content creation or public online 
discussions. The Center's website, too, was minimally informational.  
Studying this type of users is important because, as Hargittai and Walejko (2008) 
suggest,  
the myriad of opportunities on the web require different levels of know-how and those 
who possess particular skills will be more likely to benefit from time spent online. Such 
differentiated web savvy is likely to be especially relevant when it comes to advanced 
uses of information and communication technologies such as content creation and 
sharing.  (241)  
 
Wyatt, Thomas and Terranova (2002) similarly note, “The internet ‘user’ … needs to be 
conceptualized along a continuum, with different degrees and forms of participation that can 
change over time” (37). And we have no reason to assume that all immigrant or diasporic users 
of the internet and mobile phones have the same level of knowledge and skills, as well as the 
same amount of time and financial resources they can dedicate to online activities in a sustained 
manner. Rather, considering economic statuses and the types of employment the majority of such 
immigrant and diasporic people have, it is more reasonable to expect the opposite. 
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 Due partly to the type of access I had to this group of people, in which I was only able to 
interview them in the weekends when they gather at the Center, and could not follow them to 
their workplaces and/or to their home, and due partly to the level of involvement they had with 
computer-mediated and mobile-phone mediated activities, this study relies on people’s self-
descriptions about their media-related activities, rather than on direct observations of their 
actions. While it may lack close details of the data gathered through methods involving 
observation, detailed self-descriptions collected through ethnographic interviews are powerful 
source of information, as they are indicative of the informants’ perceptions of their actions. In 
other words, the evidence I gathered and analyze below is what people thought about and how 
they talked about regarding their media use in everyday life.	 
 
Transnational Practices and Performance of Identities: The First Group Interview 
Besides the Center director, to whom I had talked to before beginning interviews with the 
Center patrons, the first group of the people I interviewed at the Kobe Culture Center included 
one male and one female informants in their late 40s to early 50s. Those two were the most 
modest users of information and communication technologies, especially regarding the internet 
and mobile phones.  
The female informant, who was married and had two adult children, told me that 
although she owned a mobile phone, she used it almost exclusively to stay in touch with her 
immediate family members. She lived with her husband and the younger child, while her older 
son was married and living about one-hour train ride away in Osaka. She said she even had her 
text-messaging plan, which she originally had when she purchased her mobile phone for the first 
time a few years ago, cancelled, because she had never sent or received text messages. Although 
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the web functionality was available on her phone as it is on most mobile phones sold in Japan 
these days, she never had mobile web plans or used the functionality.  
She also described herself as a non-active user of the home computer. To call her parents 
and relatives in Brazil, she said she always used landline phones, as none of these people owned 
mobile phones, and calling a landline from a landline would cost less.  
In fact, mobile phones to her family seemed to be seen as a luxury addition. She told me 
that when her daughter (her younger child) was still in school, she did not allow her to have her 
own mobile. Their son was already at the working age when they first came to Japan five years 
ago, and was allowed to have a mobile phone, paying his own way. Now that the daughter was 
out of junior-high school and started working part time, she said, they allowed her to buy a 
mobile, but at her own cost.  
The male informant was also married, with one primary-school aged child. Everyone in 
his nuclear family was living together. He told me that the family owned one computer 
connected to the internet, which he used for email, searching on the web and reading news from 
Brazil on globo.com, a news “portal” run by the Brazilian media company Rede Globo (The 
Globo Network), mostly to check the results of sporting events.  
The family, however, did not own any mobile phones. The informant said using a 
landline phone was sufficient to coordinate the family’s everyday life and family activities, as 
well as to stay in touch with people in Brazil. He also told me that while his son had a Nintendo 
DS, he did not let him play any games on the internet.  
The concern over the cost was again cited as the reason of non-use of the mobile. He 
recounted to me the story of the girl he once worked with at the factory, who “used the web on 
her mobile phone for too long, downloaded too many things, and ended up with a huge bill.” The 
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female informant agreed that she had heard a similar story. The horror of big mobile phone bills, 
especially in relation to data usage, is an oft-cited story in this age of the mobile, both in casual 
conversations and in the news. But here, the story seems to have been retold coupled with the 
Japanese-Brazilian’s fear of losing heard earned dekasegui money (as Ishi [1999] notes, 
Japanese-Brazilians often associate dekasegui – their sojourn in Japan – almost exclusively with 
“making money”), and with their uncertainty regarding the contract terms and business practices 
of the Japanese mobile phone companies. Such an anxiety is also related to the mistrust of their 
own abilities to operate fully in the Japanese society (e.g. to understand documents written in 
Japanese in this case), or the mistrust of Japanese corporations and the ways they treat gaijin 
(non-Japanese) customers.   
 
The narrative evidence I gathered through this group interview indicates that, although 
the high cost of maintaining the full service discouraged them from actively utilizing mobile 
phones, the two informants used telecommunication technologies, namely landline phones and 
the internet, to stay in touch with family members, relatives and friends in Brazil. This also 
suggests that the personal ties my informants had as immigrants living in Japan extended beyond 
the national boundaries of Japan and Brazil. In other words, the social world in which they 
carried out their everyday-life activities was not contained within the national boarder of the host 
society (Japan) or that of the home society (Brazil).  
Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) argue that transnational migrants in the contemporary 
world live in “transnational social fields.” They define the social field as  
a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, 
practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed. Social 
fields are multi-dimensional, encompassing structured interactions of differing forms, 
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depth, and breadth that are differentiated in social theory by the terms organization, 
institution, and social movement. (9) 
 
Deriving from this notion of social fields, “transnational social fields” are the ones that “connect 
actors, through direct and indirect relations across [national] borders” (9). They note that “[t]he 
concept of social fields is a powerful tool for conceptualizing the potential array of social 
relations linking those who move and those who stay behind” (10). 
Levitt and Glick Schiller further contend that contemporary transnational migrants show 
two ways of relating to transnational social fields: ways of being and ways of belonging. Ways 
of being in transnational social fields refers to “the actual social relations and practices that 
individuals engage in rather than to the identities associated with their actions” (11). As they 
write, “[i]ndividuals can be embedded in a social field but not identify with any label or cultural 
politics associated with that field” (11). Ways of belonging in contrast means “practices that 
signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group” 
(11). Those ways “combine practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a 
conscious connection to a particular group” (11).   
One can construe what the two informants told me about their media use as their ways of 
being in the transnational social fields, as talking to family members, relatives and friends on the 
landline telephone and checking sports news from Brazil do not explicitly flag active attachment 
to a particular group marked by ethnicity, nationality or political agendas. At the same time, 
however, this does not mean that these ties that stretch across national boundaries to Brazil never 
have any impacts on their sense of belonging. As Levitt and Glick Schiller themselves note, 
“[t]hey have the potential to act or identify at a particular time because they live within the social 
field” (11).  
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Furthermore, some of the seemingly mundane media and communication activities those 
people said they performed can be construed as the practices of affirming their national 
belonging. Although Levitt and Glick Schiller draw a line between ways of being and ways of 
belonging, sometimes the boundary between those are not as clear. Some everyday and mundane 
activities, such as catching up with news from Brazil and sharing those news stories with friends 
and family members, too, are the practices to flag one’s national belonging.  
Using Billig’s (1995) notion of “banal nationalism” that the residents of Western 
countries feel and renew their sense of national belonging not at the moments of effervescence or 
through special rituals but by mundane, everyday activities and conversations, Boczkowski 
(1999) argues that the expatriate Argentineans on the e-mail newsgroup Argentine Mailing List 
participate in the practice of reminding and reaffirming their national origins through reading and 
posting messages on the List.  
Boczkowski contends that because they live away from the territory of their home 
country, expatriates’ “banal” practices, which according to Billig are usually implicit and often 
forgotten for the citizens living within the boundary of a nation, take on a more explicit 
character. As he notes,  
deprived of a physical anchorage within the Argentine territory, most coneteros/as 
[(expatriate Argentine participants of the List)] repeatedly engage in intensified and 
explicit practices of collective remembering and discursive sensitization. Far from being 
buried in their daily routines, the construction of banal nationalism is inscribed in the 
very surface of their electronic experiences. (103) 
 
While the two informants in my first group interview, as well as other people I talked to at the 
Kobe Culture Center did not have any centralized and/or (quasi-)public space like the Argentine 
Mailing List, nor were they actively involved in online discussion forums or other types of 
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content sharing sites, some practices, such as going to the Globo news portal to read news from 
Brazil and sharing the stories with their friends and family members (both face-to-face and via 
information and communication technologies) serve as banal behavior that renew their sense of 
being connected to the Brazilian nation.  
Of course, belonging to a “nation” may not be a singular experience as Boczkowski 
assumes it to be, nor should the experience of displacement from the home country invoke a 
singular set of reactions from everyone. In Boczkowski’s view – which may be simply reflective 
of Billig’s formulation – all the Argentinean participants of the Mailing List are seen as having 
an attachment to a single image of Argentina, and all try to compensate for the emotional losses 
they feel by explicitly engaging in “banal” nationalism practices. Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants, in particular, are living in their “ethnic homeland” while being away from the country 
of their citizenship. In addition, while this is beyond the scope of this research and needs to be 
addressed in future research, Brazilians with different social and/or ethnic backgrounds may take 
different cues from their everyday life to “flag” their national belonging. Still, this indicates that 
transnational and local personal communications are not simply personal, but are tied strongly to 
mass-media consumption, experience of which is commonly seen as more collective in nature 
and associated with performance of “banal nationalism.” 
Thus, the narrative evidence I gathered through this group interview indicates that this 
group of Japanese-Brazilians I talked to lived in transnational social fields, boundaries of which 
extended beyond the national boundaries of Japan and Brazil. The needs to maintain 
transnational family and friendship ties turned them to telecommunication technologies, although 
the concern over their financial situations made them minimally active users of new media, and 
rely mostly on the landline telephone. This meant transnational communications they made were 
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more personal in nature, rather than being public. My analysis also suggests, however, that 
actions and practices that are frequently seen as private and banal, such as checking news and 
discussing the stories with friends and family members, are also being used as ways to flag and 
renew one’s sense of belonging to a particular group. 
 
A Community in the Concrete: The Second Group Interview 
The next group interview I conducted was with three mothers of the primary-school age 
children who were attending the Portuguese-language class at the Center. All three had at least 
one computer connected to the internet at home. One informant reported her family had two, one 
desktop and one laptop, computers. This informant had one of the machines hooked up to a TV 
outlet, and did not own a television set.  
Informants in this group told me they used the internet mostly to watch YouTube videos, 
both Japanese and Brazilian ones, with children tending to watch more Japanese programs. Two 
of them said they also watched Brazilian television channels on their PCs, using a web service 
and prepaid TV cards sold online. Programs this web service offered encompassed the full range 
of programming broadcasted in Brazil, including news, soap operas and other entertainment 
shows, and sports.  
Sending and receiving email was not the primary use of the internet/computer for any of 
them, although two told me their spouses used email sometimes. The purpose of their email use 
was mostly to buy and trade car parts. Those two also told me that their husbands used the 
internet more often to check car modification shops and online auctions for used car parts.  
Everyone in this group had a mobile phone, and in addition to the adult members of the 
families, the children of those mothers all had mobile phones of their own. The children used 
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their phones to call their parents and send text and picture messages to their friends. Almost all 
mobile phone devices sold currently in Japan are camera phones, even the mass-market phones 
for prepaid plans, which the children had, and they used their phone cameras to snap photos and 
share them with their friends and immediate family members.  
All three children also owned one type or another of gaming console such as Nintendo 
DS, PlayStation and PSP at home, and one mother told me her daughter used to play an online 
game on a Brazilian website, which, from her description, sounded very similar to a Facebook 
game Farmville, where a player grows various plants and animals on a virtual farm. 
 
One notable characteristic of the new media use by this group of people was that they 
used their mobile and the internet mostly for domestic communication within Japan, rather than 
for transnational correspondences. The mothers I interviewed and their children utilized mobile 
phones to coordinate shopping and arrange rides and meetings with their friends and family 
members. The husbands likewise turned to email and the internet mainly to trade car 
modification parts with dealers and personal sellers within Japan, according to the accounts 
given by their spouses.  
 This provides an interesting contrast to the cases of immigrants’ internet and mobile 
phone use other scholars document. Existing works suggest that the wide diffusion of the internet 
and mobile phones foster transnational practices – an increased amount of transnationally 
coordinated actions and interventions in everyday life. Horst (2006), for instance, summarizes 
the findings of her study of mobile phone adoption by Jamaican people,  
[t]he availability and ownership of mobile phones has in many ways collapsed the 
distance between Jamaicans at home and abroad do to their ability to create a sense of 
involvement in each other’s everyday lives. It has also enabled Jamaicans at ‘home’ to 
 133 
communicate their care and concern for their friends and family ‘in foreign.’ (156)  
 
Likewise, a study by Wilding (2006) on the use of email correspondence between transnational 
migrants living in Australia and their families staying behind in the home countries finds that  
[t]he primary advantage of email is that it provides a sense of transcending time and 
space, which contributes to a perception of intimate connectedness. Most families saw 
this capacity for connection as improving the overall quantity and quality of contact that 
occurred. ... Whereas previously geographic distance was a significant barrier to taking 
part in the lives of those who live at a distance, ICTs enable shared social fields to be 
constructed across vast distances. (138)  
 
Also paralleling Kawamura and Toru Onai’s observations that Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants as transnational migrants in the digital age live simultaneously in two worlds of Japan 
and Brazil, Horst and Wilding argue that internet and mobile phones uses are tied strongly to 
“transnational social fields” (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).  
 In the case of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I talked to at the Kobe Culture Center, 
however, the purpose of new technology use by this group of people mostly centered on 
domestic, rather than transnational, communication. Horst (2006) describes in her study that 
Jamaican immigrants in the US and their relatives and family members staying back in Jamaica 
both used mobile phones, which lead them to organically “micro-coordinate” transnational 
actions such as international remittances and sending of “care packages.” While the Japanese-
Brazilian informants at the Center similarly micro-coordinated their everyday life activities, such 
as shopping and arranging rides and meetings, the same type of micro-coordination did not take 
place across the Pacific for them. Neither did they utilize the advantage of asynchronous 
communication email offers as immigrants in Australia in Wilding’s (2006) study did.  
As they relied on landline and public phones as a means of transnational communication, 
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their ability to call Brazil was restricted by time differences between the countries and the 
locations of the phones. It meant, for instance, if the best time to call Brazil coincided with the 
time of one’s commute in Japan, she or he has to let the opportunity to talk to their friends and 
family members slip. The conversations they had across national boarders thus tended to be more 
for “staying in touch” and “checking up on people” every once in a while, rather than to micro-
coordinate activities with people in Brazil on everyday basis.  
 
In addition to the internet, mobile phones and landline phones, this group of informants 
also had accesses to TV programs from Brazil either through satellite or through online 
streaming, although some suggested to me that the latter probably was not 100% legal. The 
common area of the Kobe Cultural Center where I conducted the interviews also had a TV set 
that was turned on all the time I was there, showing a satellite-cast of one of the Rede Globo 
channels in Portuguese. I assume this one was receiving a legal transmission, rather than the 
“gray” online streaming, because, as seen in figure 2 below, it was put on a public display by an 
officially registered NGO.  
The center also maintained and made freely available the collection of the International 
Press, a Brazilian-run Portuguese-language newspaper published in Japan, as well as some other 
Portuguese free papers, most of which featured advertisements from Brazilian-run businesses, to 
its users. A few people I interviewed in other occasions bought the paper from local newsstands 
on a regular basis. The Center itself, too, organized Portuguese-language classes and activities 
for children and the families, to which the mothers I interviewed on this day and their children 
also attended. 
Looking at Greek immigrant communities in Canada, Panagakos (2003) argues that while 
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the early Greek communities relied on reproduced “familiar institutions from the homeland [such 
as the Greek Church, schools and coffeehouses] in order to preserve their traditions and Greek 
culture,” and early immigrants’ “ethnic identity was grounded in the various organizations and 
activities of the ethnic community providing outlets for religious, social, cultural, and political 
expression” (202), new information and communication technologies, the internet, email and 
satellite television in particular, are providing “new outlets for the expression of Greek identity” 
(202).  
Panagakos also suggests that the reproduced physical institutions (the “community in the 
concrete” [203]) equally recreated the patriarchal social structure of Greek culture. In contrast, 
new networks of ethnic Greeks established through World Wide Web and international 
magazines and newspapers may be connecting local immigrant communities to global forces, 
and may be changing local power structures of who can claim “authentic” Greekness. Panagakos 
argues that cultural goods and information gathered through online activities are now used as 
resources to credit one’s “authenticity.” Chat rooms, websites and emails also enable Greek 
Canadians to express “’true’ feelings [which are] often nationalistic and racist,” frequently 
suppressed by the needs to make public face of the Greek communities for Canadian society 
(216).  
One implication of Panagakos’s findings is that the expression and maintenance of ethnic 
identity, which, according to Panagakos, has to be “pre-existing” rather than spontaneously 
emerging from the use of the environment (215), require physical or virtual built environment, 
such as the “community in the concrete” or the internet, periodicals and satellite television 
channels. Physical and virtual environments here are not to be seen as mutually exclusive 
categories, as even the most “virtual” infrastructure – such as the internet and satellite television 
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– rely on the existence of physical equipments like computers, telephone lines and satellite 
receivers. Also, as Panagakos notes, local-physical infrastructures and connected infrastructures 
may have different effects on a local immigrant community.  
For the Japanese-Brazilian and Brazilian people I interviewed at the Kobe Culture 
Center, the Center itself served as one of the physical hubs of their networks that tie them to 
Brazilian culture and/or to Japanese-Brazilian culture. In addition to offering supplementary 
Portuguese-language classes and activities to children, the Center organized and hosted annual 
Festa Junina (Brazilian June Festival), futsal (5-a-side soccer popular in Brazil – and also in 
Japan) events for immigrant families and cultural exhibitions. As I described above, it also had a 
common area named Cantinho do Brazil (the Brazilian Corner), equipped with a satellite 
television receiver showing Brazilian programs. Since no established Brazil towns have been 
around, this Center has, to an extent, been serving the role of the “community in the concrete” 
for those who have been gathering there, at the same time offering not-in-the-concrete resources, 
such as the access to the satellite channels, Portuguese newspapers and magazines.  
The people I talked with at the Center were a self-selected group of people who had 
chosen to attend the Japanese classes offered by a Japanese-Brazilian-directed organization or 
enroll their children in the Saturday Portuguese classes and activities. Their decisions to do so 
indicated that they felt a certain degree of ethnic or national affiliation, and/or that they have 
been paying conscious efforts to improve their life in Japan. It is difficult to generalize the 
typical level of engagement is that the Japanese-Brazilians in Japan have with local ethnic 
communities and other residents, but that the people I interviewed there had made conscious 
choices to gather at the Center were signs that they were tapping into their own “preexisting 
ethnic consciousness” as Panagakos calls it.  
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As a “community in the concrete,” the Kobe Culture Center was a space detached from 
the actual living spaces of the immigrants, making a contrast to Panagakos’s Greek Canadian 
“community in the concrete.” This limited, at least to an extent, the function of the Center to 
transmission of symbolic and celebratory aspects of Brazilian and Japanese-Brazilian culture, 
such as the annual Festa Junina and cultural exhibits, not extending to reproduction of traditional 
power structures and gender roles. Unlike Greek religious institutions and schools in 
Panagakos’s example, the organization of the Center was not hierarchical. At the same time, 
however, this physical community hub also catered to the preservation of certain traditional 
gender roles. That the people I interviewed on this day, when the Center was holding a Saturday 
Portuguese class for primary school-aged children, only included the female parents of the 
students attending the class strongly suggests the prevalence of gendered division of labor within 
the immigrant households from which those mothers and children came.   
 The findings from this group interview and the observation at the Kobe Culture Center 
show that the “media” that surrounds the transnational life of the Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants includes a wide range of technologies, such as landline telephones, mobile phones, the 
internet and the satellite television, as well as physical institutions like the Center. My analysis 
also suggests that each of those technologies and institutions have specificity, or their own 
characteristics as media. For instance, while landline and public phones as used by this group of 
people were capable of transmitting transnational communications, they did not afford 
transnational micro-coordination of daily life like mobile phones, nor did they offer 
asynchronous communication like email. Similarly, while news from Brazil as accessed through 
the internet enabled the performance of “banal” identification with the Brazilian nation, the Kobe 
Culture Center as a “community in the concrete” helped the celebratory and symbolic aspects of 
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Brazilian and Japanese-Brazilian culture move from Brazil to Japan along with the structure of 
family and gendered division of labor.  
 
Generational Differences? : The Third and Fourth Interviews 
On the same day as the second group interview, I also talked with a female informant, 
who was a mother of a newborn baby and a preschool-age child. She described herself as non-
Japanese Brazilian. Her husband, she said, was of Japanese descent, which explained her visa 
status in Japan. She told me that she frequently used email to get in touch with her friends in 
Brazil. She owned a mobile phone on a family plan contract, which she said used mostly to talk 
to her husband. She said the family did not have any landline connections.  
She also told me that she watched webcasts of religious services of the Protestant church 
she belonged to on a regular basis. While she was the only one who mentioned religious service 
among my informants as a motivation behind her/his internet use, the use of email to contact 
friends in Brazil was common among other younger informants.  
 
The last group I interviewed at the Kobe Center consisted a married couple and a female 
informant, all in their early 30s. This group was the most active users or the newer information 
and communication technologies among those whom I talked to at the Center.  
The couple told me that they used MSN Messenger to text chat and video chat with 
friends and members of their family, and share photos on Orkut, a Google-run social network 
service popular in Brazil. While a digital migration of Brazilian users from Orkut to Facebook 
and Twitter is occurring currently, this couple told me that they still preferred Orkut because they 
felt they could protect their privacy better on Orkut. On Facebook and Twitter, the wife said, 
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anyone would be able to read what she posts, which she did not like.  
They had been using MSN and Orkut as means to communicate with friends and in some 
cases with family members when they had been in Brazil, and simply continued to use the same 
channel when they moved to Japan. They also used several online shopping sites, physically 
based elsewhere in Japan, to buy Brazilian produces such as dried beans, canned foods and 
processed meat, and used a web service to watch Brazilian television programs with prepaid 
cards through a service similar to the one mentioned above by one of the moms, but through a 
different provider.  
This couple owned mobile phones on a family plan and used them to coordinate their 
daily life, but did not have any data plans to access the mobile web. They said the data plan was 
too costly for them, but if the cost had not been an issue, they would consider adding data to their 
contract.  
In addition to utilizing those “new” media technologies, they also told me that they 
occasionally buy a copy of the Portuguese-language newspaper International Press, which was 
available from news stands at the local train station. 
The other female informant was the only person I interviewed, who owned a smartphone, 
which was a Sony Xperia phone running the Android operating system to be exact. Contrary to 
what I gathered from one of the brief interviews I had conducted earlier, with people providing 
information and mobile services to Japanese-Brazilian and other group of immigrants in Japan, 
where one person told me that many of the Japanese-Brazilian mobile phone users have been 
migrating to iPhone and other smartphones, I did not observe a high rate of smartphone adoption 
– or, in fact, high rate of mobile web use – among the people who came to this center. As I also 
saw a high volume of smartphone and personal computer advertisement on the Portuguese-
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language free papers, a migration towards smartphones could be happening more rapidly in areas 
where a large number of return migrants live. The wave, however, had not hit the people like the 
Center patrons, who were living away from Brazil Towns.  
This informant told me she used the phone for most of her calling, texting, as well as 
online needs. Google search, map search and occasional YouTube video watching were her 
primary web activities on this phone. The videos she watched on YouTube, she said, were 
mostly Brazilian TV programs uploaded to the video sharing site. 
In addition to being younger, this group of informants was those who had been in Japan 
for shorter periods of time. The couple told me they came to Japan in 2005, and in the case of the 
other female informant, only two months prior to when I did the interview. The director of the 
Culture Center told me previously that the IT infrastructure in Brazil had improved dramatically 
in the past few years, and she was even able to have an access to the internet using a mobile data 
stick at a rate comparable to that in the U.S., which meant a little higher than the tariff in Japan, 
during her last visit to Brazil.  
On the Japanese end, the introduction of unlimited and/or capped data plans, which 
lowered monthly data connection charges compared to the unfettered plans, and carrier-
subsidized smartphones, in which end users pay less upfront for their devices in exchange for 
signing up for two-year contracts, have been recent developments. International calling cards and 
international calling plans for mobile phones have also become available in the last few years, 
while traditional calling cards in general offered better rates for placing calls from landline or 
public phones. (Figure 5 below shows the brochures for both types of services).  
Therefore, while generational differences partly explain why this group of informants 
was the most active adopters to new information and communication technologies among the 
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people I interviewed at the Center, one cannot ignore the improvement of the infrastructure and 
the environment as a contributing factor. The popular diffusion of new technologies in Brazil, 
especially in its urban areas, as well as simplification of mobile phone data plans and availability 
of more affordable smartphones backed by the mass popularization of smartphones in general in 
Japan offered wider range of telecommunication options to this group of informants when they 
migrated from Brazil to Japan and established their strategies for transnational communication as 
well as communication within Japan. Also, although they were the most active users of new 
information and communication technologies, their usage were modest compared to the active 
portion of general internet and mobile phone users in Japan and globally. 
 
To summarize the narrative evidence I gathered through my interviews with the 
Brazilians and Japanese-Brazilians at Kobe Culture Center, all the people I talked to were 
moderate users of new information and communication technologies, with the level of usage 
varying from near non-use to mildly active use. The services they commonly utilized included 
text chat, video chat, online shopping and Google search on mobile devices. None of them, 
however, used the internet or mobile phones to read or post comments on public or semi-public 
forums online, or contribute photos, videos or other types of creative works to the sharing sites, 
where existing works suggest most reflexive and/or expressive conversations are carried out. 
Still, all the people had an access to a wide assortment of old and new technologies, with 
different sets of media specific characteristics, including the internet and the mobile, print media, 
satellite and online television, the landline telephony, and the physical structure and the 
institution of the Culture Center, which they utilized to keep transnational ties with the people 
and happenings in Brazil, and to coordinate everyday life and family activities in Japan. 
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The Possibility and Impossibility of Transnationalism 
As I discussed above, the narrative evidence I collected through my interviews suggests 
that, to a degree, the use of information and communication technologies allowed my informants 
I met at the Kobe Culture Center to stay in transnational social fields and reaffirm and maintain 
their sense of national and ethnic belonging from the distance, away from their home society and 
away from Brazilian ethnic towns within Japan. It indicates that the constellation of the new and 
old media, such as the internet and mobile phones, satellite television, landline phones and 
newspaper, as well as physically built environment of the Culture Center provide an important 
background for the performance of those practices and identity expression. At the same time, 
however, there were crucial limitations to what this environment could offer, to which I turn 
next. 
 
The Limits of “Distance Shrinking” 
Although the Kobe Culture Center and access to the internet and other news media 
provided the Japanese-Brazilians I interviewed at the Center with partial compensation for the 
material and emotional scarcities arising from being displaced from other co-ethnics and co-
nationals, those media and institutions did not totally efface the effects of the displacement. 
While it assumed the role somewhat analogous to the “community in the concrete” in 
Panagakos’s analysis, the Kobe Culture Center was not an extension of the Brazil towns existing 
elsewhere, but rather a temporary hub for the loosely knit group of immigrants who gathered 
there. The Center had hosted the Brazilian Embassy’s long distance passport and visa 
consultation service office, a travelling office set up temporarily for the Brazilian nationals who 
do not have convenient access to the Embassy or the Consulate General’s offices a few times in 
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the past, thus enabling the area Brazilians to access services that may be difficult to get unless 
they live in one of the Brazil towns, some of which have permanent branch offices of the 
Embassy. It did not, however, offer any direct bridges to the established Brazil towns and their 
institutions, for instance an organized bus trips to the ethnic town areas.  
The media similarly provided only partial accesses to the Brazil towns for those living 
outside of those areas. The Japanese-Brazilians and Brazilians living around Kobe had ways to 
find information about Brazilian grocery stores and cultural events through some of the portal 
websites, or more directly by accessing the websites of the shops and services located in those 
cities. However, since those Portuguese-language portal sites were usually set up by people or 
companies in Aichi, Shizuoka or Gunma where the concentration of Brazilian population is 
much higher and in turn attracted posts from those areas, along with ones from Tokyo, where a 
larger number of cultural events are being held, information available from these websites 
proved to be less helpful for those living in and around Kobe. A few of the people I talked to at 
the Center told me they knew about the sites, but none mentioned that they actively utilized or 
participated in communication through them.  
The news coverage of The International Press was likewise heavily concentrated in the 
areas that had larger local Brazilian population. Therefore, reading the newspaper, the Japanese-
Brazilians and Brazilians in Kobe was able to follow the events and happenings in those towns, 
but not the information most relevant to their life, such as supports available from the local 
municipal offices and local cultural events in Kobe. In addition, Japanese-Brazilians living in the 
Brazil towns may never learn anything about what was happening to their co-nationals who live 
away from them through reading the paper. 
That the constellation of media products, services and the built environment of the 
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Culture Center did not completely erase the effect of physical distance runs counter to the claim 
found in transnational communication literature. Existing works on this topic often argue that 
new information and communication technologies, particularly the internet, shrink the distance 
between multiple locations and make physical displacement negligible. In the case above, the 
distance in question has been the proximity to the Brazil towns within Japan. The Japanese-
Brazilian and Brazilian people in Japan, however, also felt the impact of spatial distances 
between the two nations. The persisting importance of the distances and physical presence in the 
transnational context is discussed next. 
 
In their article entitled “Ethnic Groups and Distance Shrinking Communication 
Technologies,” Dahan and Sheffer (2001) note that “[t]hroughout their historical existence, 
ethnic groups have been making extensive use of ‘old’ and later of more modern distance 
shrinking communication technologies” (86). Focusing on the appropriation of the World Wide 
Web by ethnic minority groups and diasporic people, the authors argue that “the growing 
sophistication, availability, low costs and ease of utilization of distance shrinking technology ... 
influences the persistence and prosperity of ethnic groups” (85). They further argue, “the 
extensive use of these means of communication by ethnic groups adds a unique dimension to 
cyberspace, as well as to the new global civic and knowledge society” (86). “The scope, 
availability, low costs, and most importantly the interactivity of this medium [(i.e. the World 
Wide Web)],” they write, “have increased the number of audiences, the functions of these media 
and their efficacy” (87), with ethnic groups’ online activities expanding to include  
the local dissemination of news and cultural artifacts; enhancement of communal 
education; enlistment and transfer of economic, cultural and political resources and 
support; creation of trans-state political communities; communication with local and 
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global NGOs and IGOs; contributions to the emergence of a global civil society; and 
also the very recent creation of virtual ‘nations.’ (87) 
  
To reach this assessment, Dahan and Sheffer start with a premise that new information and 
communication technologies do “shrink distances.” The authors treat the internet and other 
“older” communication media as technologies that “shrink distances” for any users and in any 
circumstances, as long as they have accesses to them. My findings suggest, however, whether or 
not these technologies in fact close the physical gap that may exist between geographically 
dispersed people and/or between those people and the audience needs to be empirically 
examined for different sets of immigrant and diasporic users of the media. 
As the interview data I discussed above shows, the Japanese-Brazilians at the Kobe 
Culture Center utilized online news sites and landline phones, and some used mobile phones, 
instant messaging and emails, to maintain their ties to Brazil. This sense of connected presence, 
however, may be “an imagined construct” as Wilding (2006) points out. As she writes,  
the introduction of ICTs does not completely eliminate the effects of distance. ... It is 
undeniable that the contact became more frequent and the sense of connection to 
everyday lives at a distance was enhanced. But sometimes this regular communication 
served to intensify rather than diminish the sense of distance. The inability to have face-
to-face contact is sometimes made even more poignant by the fact that long-distance 
communication has made the relationship feel so much more intimately connected. 
(138-139) 
 
As I illustrate below, there were instances where Japanese-Brazilian transnational workers were 
unable to overcome the existence of the physical distance between Japan and Brazil, and/or 
compensate for the lack of their physical presence in Brazil. These instances also bring to the 
fore that traditional nation-states still hold hegemonic control over the flow of financial resources 
and physical human bodies. 
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When a global financial crisis hit the economy of Japan in late 2008, numbers of 
Japanese-Brazilian workers were laid off from their work. The short-term contracts under which 
most of the Japanese-Brazilians worked for factories and sub-contractors did not provide with 
them job security. Facing unemployment, many faced a decision to stay in Japan where prospects 
of getting a new job was diminishing and cost of living were high, or return to Brazil for new 
opportunities and lower living expenses. Their decision-making processes were not 
straightforward.  
One comment posted on the Brasil-Net website on January 5, 2009, for instance, says, 
My father is 61 years old and was laid off from the factory he had worked for 12 years, 
and nowadays it is almost impossible for him to get another job at his age. He is already 
depressed. He thinks he cannot go back to Brazil because he had spent so much time in 
Japan by now he fears he would not be able to fit back in again, because those two 
countries are so different (my translation). 
 
Several other comment contributors also indicated their unwillingness to go back to Brazil, citing 
varying degrees of their disconnection from Brazil as part of the reason.  
Such a feeling of disconnection emerged not only because of the imagined cultural 
differences between the two countries, but also from perceptions that they did not have physical 
presences in the Brazilian society for a long period of time. This implies that information and 
communication technologies, media products, and other cultural objects that had constituted their 
transnational social fields were seen as not enough. Transnational social and cultural ties the 
Japanese-Brazilians in Japan sustained through those technologies and artifacts had been unable 
to substitute embodied presence in Brazil. 
Securing a new employment and readjustment to the life in Brazil posed challenges to 
those who decided and returned to Brazil, too. The International Press ran a report from São 
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Paulo in its April 11, 2009 issue that reported “families without cash or in-laws live with parents 
after coming home [to Brazil].” Citing a study conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics that “65.3% of the elderly population in the country are [financially] supporting 
their family,” the article claims that “this is precisely because of the effect of the mass return of 
the dekassegui immigrants to Brazil” (“Apoio de familiares,” my translation) – although one of 
the dekassegui returnees interviewed by the paper emphasized positive aspects of living with 
their aging parents.  
Another article in the June 13, 2009 edition narrates the stories of several Japanese-
Brazilian workers who had to return to Brazil because of the Economic crisis in Japan. 
Francis had intended to stay another year and a half in Japan to build up his savings and 
open his own business in Brazil. The newly married Lia and Alexandre had planned to 
work another year before buying a property in Londrina, Parana. Denise wanted to take 
advantage of the two years remaining on her visa and make sufficient money to attend 
college in Sao Paulo. Artur thought about living forever in Japan with his wife Tatiana 
and his two little children. The plan for each of them in Japan, [however], suffered a 
serious setback because of the crisis, and had to be abandoned almost overnight. They 
were forced to fall back on Plan B. All are back in Brazil much earlier than they had 
imagined and not in the conditions they had hoped for. Now, back home, they joined the 
fight for a place in the labor market along with millions of unemployed or looking for a 
business opportunity, and are struggling to readjust to everyday life in Brazil. Those 
who have lived in Japan for years knows very well that they need to practically relearn 
how to live in their own country. (“Plano B,” my translation). 
 
In both of the cases, in addition to the differences in economic situations in the two countries, 
one’s physical presence in Brazil and the distances between Brazil and Japan mattered 
significantly, so much that an access to information and communication technologies was not 
sufficient to compensate for those gaps. 
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As some studies on the processes of globalization (e.g. Appadurai 1990) and studies 
influenced by sociology of science and technology (e.g. Mitchell 2002; Fouché and Komaki 
2008) suggest, not everything that circulates transnationally or globally flows at the same rate. 
Rather, as Appadurai (1990) suggests,  
the global relationship between ethnoscapes, technoscapes and financescapes is deeply 
disjuntive and profoundly unpredictable, since each of these landscapes is subject to its 
own constraints and incentives (some political, some informational and some techno-
environmental), at the same time as each acts as a constraint and a parameter for 
movements in the other, (298)  
 
and that “people, machinery, money, images, and ideas now follow increasingly on-isomorphic 
paths” (301).  
The global circulation of people, knowledge, ideology, culture, objects, data and financial 
resources are also regulated by restrictions posed by their modes of transportation, and in cases 
of physical objects, production processes involved, which are determined by their material 
dispositions, including shapes, sizes, and needs for certain types of protection and handling. (See 
also Pickering 1995; Franklin 2006). While voice and data travel across the Pacific in less than a 
second, for instance, the movement of physical commodities and human bodies is much slower, 
limited by the speeds of airplanes and ships and processing times at multiple checkpoints they 
have to go through. Their movement, in addition, is regulated by international treaties and 
policies of the origin, destination and in-between countries. New information and 
communication technologies thus can shrink distance for a certain set of things that can travel as 
data, but not for things that belong to other “spheres” and require different mode of 
transportation.  
That the movement of physical human bodies remains to be highly managed by the 
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nation-states and other international political and economic bodies raises another question 
regarding the continuing salience of traditional nation-states in the age of transnational 
communication flows and transnational practices. As Ong (2006) says, contemporary discourses 
around citizenship are embedded in the “situated entanglement of geopolitics, market logic, 
exceptions, and ethical discourses” (18) with traditional nation-states being only one of the non-
hegemonic actors, but that does not necessarily mean that people aided with the digital media 
have gained the power to control their belonging. 
When the Japanese economy was hit by the crisis in 2008 and a number of immigrant 
workers (including the Japanese-Brazilians) were left unemployed without much hope of finding 
a new job, the Japanese national government issued financial support programs that gave ¥300 
million emergency fund to each person of South American nationality who intended to return to 
their home countries but without financial means. In order to receive this fund, however, South 
American transnational workers and their dependents had to give up the privilege to return Japan 
on the same visa status as the one they had been staying in Japan for the period of time specified 
by the Japanese government, which, for many if not all of them meant the loss of their capacity 
to enter Japan to work (“Japão paga retorno”).  
Amid much confusion and protest from the Japanese-Brazilian residents and from the 
Brazilian government (“Prefeito sugere,” “Retorno ao Japão”) the national government of Japan 
set this period to be three years. In this case, despite the availability of information and 
communications technologies and the means of transportation as transnational infrastructure to 
be simultaneously at two places in two nations, the power of the nation-state to regulate the flow 
of human labor made it impossible for the bodies of Japanese-Brazilians to become truly trans-
national and trans-local. 
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In another instance, a Japanese-Brazilian person posted a comment to the Brasil-Net 
website,  
Why we do not have rights to receive the amount we had paid to the pension fund in 
Japan after we go back to Brazil? We know it is not a small amount. But the amount we 
can actually get repaid is only three year’s worth! We are supposed to be full-time 
employers, and I do not understand why we are treated that way. The government 
should consider, so that we can receive the pension we had paid for in Brazil. (April 24, 
2009, my translation).  
 
This post shows that the nation-bound flow of financial resources, such as the national pension 
funds in this case, does not overlap with the transnational social fields in which the Japanese-
Brazilian workers live. It also reveals that in spite of the proximity-enabling technologies, the 
traditional nation-states are still salient, as they still assert strong controls to regulate the flow of 
financial resources. 
 One can only surmise the types of internet access and access to other forms of media the 
comment posters on the Brasil Net and the people like Francis and others The International 
Press reported about had. It may have been about the same as the people I talked to at the Kobe 
Culture Center, or they may have had better accesses. At the same time, it is also difficult to 
imagine that, when put into similar situations like those people, the Japanese-Brazilians and 
Brazilians I interviewed will be turning to the internet and mobile phones to overthrow the 
constraints pressed down onto them by the nation-states.  
That is not because those technologies do not possess revolutionary and democratizing 
potentials, but because the benefits of those potentials come only to very active and successful 
users. Dahan and Sheffer (2001, discussed above) contend that the intensified use of “distance 
shrinking technologies” by ethnic groups result in “further weakening of the ‘nation-state.’ [And 
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while] these states are weakening, ethnic intrastate and trans-state ethnic groups prosper” (105). 
The examples they refer to, such as the virtual nations of Cyber Yugoslavia, Freedonia, virtual 
Afghanistan, liberal American Jewish organizations, or the Zapatista movement, however, are 
high-profile cases that intellectuals, political activists and/or hacktivists from all over the world, 
or certain nation-states with vested interests are involved.  
The Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, which for a while was a favorite example 
of online activism for scholars of the internet, first caught the attention of the global group of 
activists not because it had a groundbreaking web strategies of its own, or even any web 
presences for that matter, but because it raised voice against North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). It was not only a indigenous rights movement, which as itself had many 
followers, but also seen as presenting a new anti-capitalist social movement front (Ross, 2003).  
The online network supporting the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was 
first woven together by activists and journalists entering the region from North America and 
Europe and by the international group of people watching Latin American and indigenous rights 
issues with academic and political concerns (Cleaver 1998). As Cleaver (1998) notes, “Although 
there is a myth that Zapatista spokesman Subcommandante Marcos sits in the jungle uploading 
EZLN communiqués from his laptop, the reality is that the EZLN and its communities have had 
a mediated relationship to the Internet” (628). While the EZLN later began utilizing computer-
mediated communication to get across their messages by themselves (Cleaver 1998: 629), the 
group would not have been able to reach the global audience had it not been for the existence of 
the network these Western activists and journalists had built earlier.  
Dahan and Sheffer (2001) briefly mention the involvement of government funding, when 
they write, “the Turkish government financially supports … networks that have been operated by 
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activists in the small Turkish diaspora in the US” (93), and the importance of “techno-elite” (98) 
and “IT professionals” (99) in the developments they outline. The relationship between adoption 
of “distance shrinking technologies” by ethnic groups and diasporic people and the “weakening” 
of nation-states thus seems to be more complicated than the way Dahan and Sheffer frame it in 
their conclusion. While the part of their statement, in which they say,  
[n]ow even groups living in remote, rural and less developed areas use these means for 
promoting their interests and to ensure progress and growth. Moreover, the much 
expanded and intensified use of these new means of communication has improved the 
chances of achieving not only the cultural and economic but also the political goals of 
such groups (104), 
 
may become increasingly difficult to falsify with widespread access, universal access does not 
guarantee undifferentiated use, as Hargittai (2004; see also Hargittai and Hinnant 2008; Hargittai 
and Walejko 2008) demonstrates in her work.  
We cannot deny possibilities that Japanese-Brazilian voices expressed online, such as the 
one crying foul of the pension system, may eventually influence government policies concerned. 
The Brazilian government, for instance, now appoints several Brazilian schools in Japan as 
officially recognized educational institutions, and offers ENCCEJA, an examination to certify 
one’s completion of secondary education in Japan (T. Onai 2009), responding to the requests 
made by expatriate Brazilians. The existence of websites intended to help Japanese-Brazilian 
returnees to Brazil, such as Associação Brasileira de Dekasseguis (www.abdnet.org.br), may 
alter the situation in the future and help them ease the re-transition from Japan to Brazil, 
culturally, emotionally and financially. Nonetheless, the ways in which the internet and the 
mobile are currently appropriated by transnational Japanese-Brazilian workers in Japan do not 
allow them to escape or raise opposing voices to the power of the nation-states that controls the 
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flow of financial resources and physical human bodies.  
Also, although the affordances of the internet and the mobile to transcend space and 
national boarders are sometimes emphasized and praised, my analysis suggests that, for the 
group of immigrant users of information and communication technologies that I studied, physical 
distances, physical presence and displacement, and traditional nation-states still hold salience in 
this age of globally connected digital media. 
 
Reflexivity’s Limit	 
Discussing that transnational immigrants in the contemporary world live simultaneously 
in their “home” society and destination society owing to the development of information and 
communication, as well as transportation networks, Kawamura (2000) contends that  
[Japanese-Brazilian] migrants cultivate social spaces within workspaces, schools and 
scenes in everyday life and leisure time, using a strategy that mixes Brazilian and 
Japanese culture. This strategy is a mixture of cultural background flavored by the 
‘Brazilian ways of life’ and influences from everyday-life culture in the Japanese 
society... Through their everyday life and suffering, Brazilian immigrants and their 
families create new ways of being by remixing and deconstructing culture, from a 
global view point that accelerates coexistence of multiple cultures. (38-39, my 
translation) 
 
While this statement suggests the emergence of global, or more appropriately, transnational or 
hybrid, identities, it is important to note that Kawamura’s analysis also falls back on nationally 
demarcated cultural differences.  
Rather than relativizing the ties between nation and culture, Kawamura’s assessment of 
the supposedly “new” culture that Japanese-Brazilian workers cultivate from their experiences 
and encounters in Japan describes it as a mix of the “Brazilian” way of life and “Japanese” 
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everyday-life culture. While the mixing the return migrants do is creative, Kawamura’s analysis 
reinforces the view that the boundary of a nation-state and that of a cultural group are one and 
the same. 
This, however, may not be the fault of Kawamura’s analytical mindset, but rather due to 
the ways in which people who directly experience the transnational migration of Japanese-
Brazilians narrate the phenomenon. Tsuda (2001) suggests that while non-contiguous 
globalization (i.e. global flows that do not involve actual movement of human bodies) has 
contributed to the development of transnational identification both for the Japanese-Brazilians in 
Brazil, who willfully accepted their ethnic affiliation with Japan, and for the Japanese people in 
Japan, who felt affinity with the Brazilian nikkeijin population because of the perceived 
commonalities in culture and descent, the contiguous global flow of Japanese-Brazilian labor 
migration to Japan produced local reactions that lead to strengthening of national identities as 
Brazilians (among Japanese-Brazilians) and Japanese (among local Japanese residents). As 
Tsuda notes,  
[a]s the Japanese-Brazilians’ initially positive images of Japanese culture suddenly 
worsen and are replaced by a much more negative understanding of what it means to be 
Japanese, they are alienated from their previous transnational ‘Japanese’ ethnic identity. 
... The result is a greater identification with the Brazilian nation through an increased 
realization and affirmation of those positive qualities that make them Brazilian 
nationals, (72-73) 
 
and  
[t]he reaction of Japanese to their ethnic encounter with the Brazilian nikkeijin is 
analogous to the nikkeijin reaction to the Japanese. Because the Japanese also have 
strong transnational sentiments of ethnic affinity with the nikkeijin and expect a certain 
amount of cultural similarity as a result of shared racial descent, the cultural foreignness 
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of the nikkeijin is disillusioning for many of them. (73) 
 
Furthermore,  
[p]recisely because the ethnic encounter with the nikkeijin de-essentializes Japanese 
ethnic identity by problematizing the assumption that shared racial descent is the 
fundamental determinant of who is Japanese, it produces a more restrictive cultural 
definition of Japanese identity based on an increased “cultural nationalism” among the 
Japanese residents. (78, emphasis removed) 
 
 From his observations, Tsuda concludes that “the movement of migrants around the world does 
not necessarily produce new transnational forms of identification that resist and subvert the 
hegemonic power of nation-states to structure individual consciousness” (79, emphasis 
removed). “For both the Japanese-Brazilians and the Japanese,” he writes, “contiguous global 
migration causes their ethnic identities to regress to the very confines of the national localities 
from which they initially escaped” (82-83).  
Kawamura’s discussion of the “new” Japanese-Brazilian culture and Tsuda’s findings 
about national and transnational ways of identification indicate an extreme difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of leaving nationally demarcated boundaries behind, both at the experiential level 
and at the analytical level.  
 While these obstacles exist, transnational return-migration of Japanese-Brazilians to 
Japan and a series of encounters between the residents of Japan and the Burajiru-jin does, as 
Tsuda suggests in his work, open up possibilities of thinking differently about national, cultural, 
racial and ethnic differences – at least theoretically.  
Some studies contend that the conditions found in the contemporary society, including 
global migration and development and diffusion of new information and communication 
technologies lay ground for rethinking reflexively about one’s identity in a situation like this. 
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Parker and Song (2006), for instance, coin the term “reflexive racialisation” to summarize their 
discussion of online forums for British born Chinese and South Asian youths, “to highlight the 
Internet’s ability as an instantly accessible, interactive and archivable medium to host a self-
authored commentary on the issues faced by racialised minorities in the multicultural context” 
(583). They argue that these online forums  
expand the interpretive resources available to emerging generations of British Asian and 
Chinese young people. The medium of digitally mediated textual and visual interaction 
has broadened the emotional repertoire for discussing ethnic identities, (590) 
 
and that those sites make up an important part of “an ongoing reconfiguration of personal and 
collective identities” (590). In short, according to Parker and Song, textual, visual, as well as 
interactive and archivable nature of the online forums let the forum users engage in reflexive 
practices of identity (re-)formulation. Similarly, Ignacio (2005) argues that the conversations that 
take place on the online newsgroup for diasporic Filipinos/as enable newsgroup participants to 
not only reconfigure and rearticulate their self-awareness of their own racial, ethnic and national 
belonging and gender roles and relationships, but also reconsider the state of post- and 
neocolonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines.  
Parker and Song (2006) formulate their concept of reflexive racialisation against the 
reflexive modernization thesis, which states that recent social changes increasingly favor people 
questioning traditions and inherited identities and self-organizing and self-expressing one’s own 
identity (Giddens 1991). They introduce the idea of racialization into the mix to emphasize the 
continuing importance of race and ethnicity in British youths’ identity formation, even under 
seemingly postmodern (thus reflexivity-enabling) conditions.  
At the same time, their use of the term “reflexive” still highlights self-control and self-
expression. While race and ethnicity may hold salience, Parker and Song contend that online 
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forum participants and forum readers can negotiate and come up with their own ways to deal 
with racialization and racial/ethnic identities. 
 While the prospect that one is able to take an active control of one’s own identity sounds 
promising, it should be noted that, similar to the transnationalizing potential of the internet I 
discussed above, the reflexivity-heightening aspect of new information and communication 
technologies do not benefit the users who do not actively utilize interactive and archivable 
services on World Wide Web or through mobile phones, such as the group I interviewed at the 
Kobe Culture Center. 
Surely, a question like below, which Parker and Song (2006) quotes from the British 
Born Chinese forum, 
Will we see BBCs [(British-Born Chinese)] becoming the leaders of the future? Do 
BBCs have that ambition? Many of our Indian subcontinent couterparts are becoming 
more visible – are BBCs destined to remain invisible? (posted by user ‘flick-serve,’ 
British Born Chinese forum, July 10, 2004, quoted in Parker and Song 2006: 582), 
 
and a comment posted on the forum in response to that question, 
Passiveness and BBCs go hand in hand. It takes ambition and aggression to push and 
excel yourself to the top. Many BBCs don’t carry that. Coupled with issues with regard 
to the Chinese as a race and where they belong in the media and general perceptions, 
BBCs never feel inspired to do more than they need to. They think they will be fighting 
an impossible battle (posted by user ‘kww0ng,’ British Born Chinese forum, July 11, 
2004, quoted in Parker and Song 2006: 582), 
 
would spark reflexive thinking and further critical conversations on one’s ethnic identity and 
self-awareness for those who participate in the dialogue, or even for those who simply read the 
conversation. And the conversation would strike a scholar reading the forum threads as a great 
specimen of “postmodern” identity formation happening online.  
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Or, an insightful remark posted on the Filipino newsgroup that Ignacio (2005) refers to, 
And while you may be right about “there was not single Philippine culture,” there IS 
one that has emerged in the modern day and though it may still be an evolving one, it is 
a cultural thread that runs through all kinds of Pinoy, no matter what region they’re 
from or what dialect they speak. 
Diversity is not a lack of roots MR/MS/whatever prsn, diversity itself can be the roots 
(posted by newsgroup member ‘Rick’ in response to another member ‘prsn,’ quoted in 
Ignacio 2005: 136), 
 
can be empowering to those who are struggling to find one’s own identity. But that is so long as 
they have an access to those texts – and having accesses to new information and communication 
technologies does not equal to having accesses to online spaces where those texts are available.  
Participating in, or even catching up with what is being said – especially when there is a 
long exchange – on interaction-intensive websites and services such as online forums, 
newsgroups, blogs and public discussions through social network sites may offer rewarding 
experiences, such as an opportunity to reflect upon one’s own subjectivity and subject position. 
It, however, is time-consuming. Some online activities, such as maintaining a blog, posting 
artworks on a sharing website and uploading videos to YouTube, demand users to have relatively 
high artistic, writing and/or computer skills to participate.  
This is not to say that Japanese-Brazilian immigrant workers do not possess any of those 
skills. In fact, the YouTube music video by the Oyakawa Brothers I discussed in Chapter 3 is a 
manifestation that they are creative, artistic and skilled people, and the video shows that the 
brothers reflected upon their own life as return migrants in post-financial crisis Japan in the 
process of making the song and the video. Still, the narrative evidence I gathered from my 
interviews suggests that the people I met at the Kobe Culture Center rarely, if not never, 
participated in public exchange of opinions and experiences online. Other than spending some 
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time on social network sites and online chats with their friends and family members, their online 
activities centered on watching television programs and videos and checking the news. While 
these activities take place in online spaces, interactivity and reflexivity those practices enable are 
not qualitatively different from watching and reading the news on the slightly older media of 
television and newspapers.  
Access to the internet and mobile phones alone thus did not give my Brazilian and 
Japanese-Brazilian informants an opportunity to engage reflexively with their own identities or 
take an active control of the process of identity formation and identity articulation. If certain 
types of websites and online services offer new levels of interactivity and accessibility to 
archived texts and visuals, and if increased interactivity and archivability allow the users to 
rethink about and articulate their own identities in entirely new, different ways as existing studies 
suggest, but only a certain segment of the immigrant and diasporic users of new information and 
communication technologies can attain those benefits, it throws into question the promise that 
the internet has democratic and participatory potential for all and everyone would reap the 
benefits of those potentials once access gaps are evened.  
My evidence suggests that opportunities are distributed unevenly, and not all users who 
have access to the internet and/or mobile phones benefit equally from those potentials. That is 
because the moderate users of those technologies, such as my informants at the Center, use them 
differently from not necessarily better-connected, but better-skilled and more active users.  
 
As I presented above, the Japanese-Brazilians and Brazilians I interviewed at the Kobe 
Culture Center used the internet and mobile phones, as well as the older media of ethnic 
newspaper, satellite television and the telephony mostly to check news, watch television 
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programs and stay in touch with their friends and family members from their home country of 
Brazil. These practices enabled them to operate within transnational social fields that stretched 
beyond the national boundaries of both Japan and Brazil. Additionally, those technologies, along 
with the physical institution of the Culture Center served as an infrastructure that allowed them 
to reaffirm and articulate their sense of national belonging to a certain degree. Even the most 
“banal” correspondences that took place over international phone calls and/or chat room 
conversations may have contributed to remind them of their national belonging.  
 At the same time, however, those people were moderate users of those information and 
communication technologies. While not to underestimate the roles that seemingly personal 
communication play in reflexive reconsideration and reorganization of one’s own identity, my 
study suggests that the analyses that the internet and other new information and communication 
technologies afford to the users of the technology potentials to counter the regulatory powers of 
the nation-states and other established global forces and determine their own destinies, and give 
abilities to reflexively reconfigure their self-awareness did not apply to them, even though they 
had access to the internet and mobile phones. It was because those who I interviewed at the 
Center rarely engaged in public conversations and exchanges on online forums, email 
newsgroups, art and video sharing websites or social network sites.  
As I discussed above, the purported transnationalizing and reflexivity-enabling capacities 
of new information and communication technologies derive from observations of highly active 
and successful users, and those conclusions do not apply well to those who, despite evening 
access, are unevenly able to utilize those technologies due to limited skills, time and disposable 
income.	 
This also indicates that, beyond the issue of unequal access, the issue of differentiated use 
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and differentiated participation exist not only among the general users of the internet and mobile 
phones, but also among immigrant and diasporic users. As Hargittai (2004) notes,  
[it is] important to specify in any study what the researcher means by ‘internet use’. Use 
of digital technologies for computer-mediated communication with other individuals 
can be very different from their use for information retrieval of various types. (141)  
 
and  
even studies whose focus is not on social inequality should still take care in identifying 
their relevant populations. When looking at the behavior of participants in an online 
environment or exploring how web use influences people’s actions beyond direct use of 
the network, it is important to clearly state about whom claims are being made and 
which segments of the population are not part of certain inquiries and discussions. (142)  
 
Different online activities may have different implications for “people’s life chances, that is, 
people’s ability to improve their human, financial, political, social, and cultural capital” 
(Hargittai and Hinnant 2008: 603), and “[as] online content becomes increasingly important in 
setting social, political and cultural agendas, the existence of such a participation gap will have 
increasing implications for social inequality” (Hargittai and Walejko 2008: 253).  
The findings I discussed in this chapter show that different websites and services (e.g. 
public forums and content sharing sites vs. news websites and television program streaming) 
offer different online experiences. Different levels of use (e.g. using mobile phones to access the 
web any time and anywhere, always connected through Facebook and Twitter vs. not having data 
plans on one’s mobile phone) also considerably change the meaning of “owning a mobile 
phone.” The result of my study thus suggests the importance of specifying “what the researcher 
means by ‘internet use’” (Hargittai 2004: 141) and “identifying their relevant populations” (ibid.: 
142) in the study of migrant and diasporic users of new information and communication 
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technologies. 
Lastly, my findings also suggest that while some of us as scholars tend to be tempted by 
“good” specimens of postmodern activities happening online – such as reflexive and active 
identity formation and subversion of nation-states, it may be necessary for us to pay closer 
attention to not-too-successful cases, which, in real world, may be more commonplace than the 
successful ones. As this study demonstrates, the assessments derived from observation of those 
non-high-profile cases lead us to different conclusions regarding what the “social impacts” of the 
internet and mobile phones are. 
 
 163 
Figures 
 
Figure 5: Advertisement brochures from Brastel for prepaid international calling 
cards (left) and mobile phone plans with international calling (right) 
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Figure 6: The TV set in the common area of the Kobe Culture Center 
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Conclusion: “Underrepresentation” and New Media 
 
Being “underrepresented” in a society does not only mean the population in question 
receives less media coverage. It also means that the population falls outside of the “intended 
target audience” of the media services and products marketed in that particular society. As I 
showed in this dissertation, established commercial media companies in Japan has been slow to 
expand their products and services to the newly diversified population of the country. Mobile 
phone carriers, too, did not recognize the need to include multilingual portal site in their official 
list of mobile web “menu sites,” nor did they see the “market” for those portal sites, at first. 
Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan thus had to wait for Japanese-Brazilian and Brazilian 
startup businesses and NGOs to fill that void. 
Furthermore, being “underrepresented” does not only mean that the population is left out 
of policy processes, but also they are intentionally or unconsciously left out of design processes 
of material objects in the society. Until recently, for instance, none of the mobile phones sold in 
the Japanese market had Portuguese interface, nor were they able to display Portuguese-specific 
alphabets, such as õ and ç, properly. Therefore, even though return migrant users were able to 
connect to the internet using those phones, they could not read websites written in Portuguese 
directly. The situation changed with the diffusion of iPhone and other smartphones that can 
handle multi-language at the OS level, but that development took place not because smartphone 
makers were interested in Japanese-Brazilian return migrants as potential buyer/users, but 
because of the global strategy of those businesses, looking to sell devices they make in domestic 
markets of Portugal and Brazil.  
We often associate new media, and the internet in particular, with inclusion, participation 
and democracy. We expect globally connected digital media to bring help to those who are 
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underrepresented in a society, such as racial/ethnic minority, immigrants, and members of 
diaspora. When we think of the translocal and participatory potentials of the internet and other 
new media technologies, we also tend to think that access is central. The main, and perhaps the 
sole, determinant of the gap between the information “haves” and “have-nots” is the access gap. 
Once we bridge that gap, then everyone would happily share the same benefits.  
The results of the study I presented in this dissertation show, however, that access is not 
sufficient. The group of Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I interviewed in Kobe had different 
levels of engagement with new media from racial/ethnic minority, immigrant and diasporic 
groups documented in previous works. While most of the people I interviewed had access to the 
internet and mobile phones, the majority of them were consumers of uploaded and streamed 
media, online news and personal communication tools, and did not participate in content creation 
or public online discussions. The access they had to the internet and mobile phones was also 
unstable, largely dependent on their insecure employment status.  
Those findings suggest that we should look beyond the issue of access/no-access, and 
should instead focus on different levels of access and engagement and differentiated use that 
exist among the connected minority, immigrant and diasporic users of new media technologies. 
The transition from information “have-nots” to information “haves” is not a one-time process, 
after which one can join the class of “haves.” Rather, many underprivileged and 
underrepresented users sit, and move, between those categories, and that frequently happens not 
as their own choice.  
My findings also suggest that the internet and mobile phones as used by the Japanese-
Brazilian return migrants I talked to in Kobe did not enable this group of moderately active users 
of the technologies to take an active control of their own fate and identity. Rather, physical 
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distances between Brazil and Japan, physical displacement, and the powers of traditional nation-
states and national boundaries remained salient in the life of the return migrants, even in this age 
of globally connected digital media. 
Furthermore, the findings I presented in this dissertation suggest that even when they 
have access to the spaces for network building and discussion, minority, immigrant and diasporic 
users of new media may not be able to take a full control of their self-expression and the 
networks they create. My findings indicate that while Oyakawa Kyoodai, the Japanese-Brazilian 
return migrant duo was able to directly communicate what was going on in their life after the 
2008 economic crisis to the viewers through their music video and create a temporary network 
among diasporic Brazilians, and while the message board on the website Brasil Net enabled 
other return migrants to raise their own, sometimes differing and disagreeing voices, their 
expressions were heavily mediated by the format of YouTube and the format of the music video 
genre in the case of the Oyakawa brothers, and by the design choices the webmaster of the site 
made in the case of the Brasil Net message board. In the case of the music video, that led to the 
privileging of an individual’s voice, rather than a collectively-developed one, and made it 
difficult to trace the interactions between the video maker and comment posters beyond the 
specific video page. In the case of the message board, the design of the site discouraged 
interactions between message senders, and did not enable development of in-depth discussion or 
collective opinions.  
Not only were their voices mediated, but also the ways in which those online spaces of 
networking and discussion were provisioned to the users limited the extent of control that the 
return migrants were able to assert over their self-expression and online contacts. Currently, both 
the maintenance of the spaces like YouTube and Brasil Net and securing access to those spaces 
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are left to the private sector and individual efforts, as I showed in this dissertation. Individual end 
users must make enough money to be able to pay for mobile phone and internet connections, that 
allow them to participate in online venues of network building, self-expression and reflexive 
discussion. They are also responsible for devoting a certain, and in many cases significant, 
amount of their time and energy to keep online spaces running, either by oneself, or as a member 
of a non-profit organization, and/or make contributions to those spaces by producing images, 
sounds, videos and/or texts.  
If one can generate those costs and efforts from one’s spare money and time, then sharing 
information online and organizing social actions on the web may in fact seem “effortless” as 
Shirky (2008) and, similarly, Earl and Kimport (2011) argue in Digitally Enabled Social 
Change: Activism in the Internet Age. One’s ability to do so, however, rests on one’s 
socioeconomic status and perhaps even on which geographical part of the world one is from. 
Those actions were not as “effortless” for the Japanese-Brazilian return migrant workers in Japan 
I studied, both because they had been underrepresented in the media and in policy processes and 
thus more “efforts” were required to attract the interest of the general audience, and because of 
the global condition of networked capitalism that made them the target of “flexible 
employment.” Although scholars like Ong (1999), Mita (2002, 2009) and Ishi (2003) argue that 
contemporary transnational migrants take the logic of “flexible capitalism,” turn it around and 
use it for their own economic and cultural gain, I contend that only a small fraction of successful 
migrants can attain such a position. Most of the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in my study 
did not have financial and/or cultural resources to make that happen.  
In addition, while it is not a unique condition to the digital media, not only do services 
that ensure access to those online spaces (e.g. internet service providers and mobile phone 
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carriers) are commercially provided, but also online spaces themselves are commercially owned 
and operated. Online venues for network building, expression and discussion are increasingly on 
commercially hosted web spaces, such as YouTube and other social network sites. While most of 
those spaces are open to everyone and are available for free of charge, it also means that users do 
not retain complete control over content they upload to those sites, as well as the networks they 
may foster through images, sounds, videos, texts and comments they post.  
Furthermore, as commercially hosted spaces, those websites and web services may go 
away if they prove to be less profitable. With current popularity, it may be difficult to imagine 
major social network sites fading away in the near future; however, as I showed above, several 
smaller, ethnic- and language-specific media services that targeted Japanese-Brazilian return 
migrants in Japan reduced their service or retreated from the market completely when the 
“ethnic” market shrunk due to the global economic crisis. Also, even larger companies such may 
put an end to its commercial product. Google, for instance, may cease to operate its SNS Orkut, 
which many Brazilian people, including Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in Japan, use as their 
primary SNS, to focus more on newer products such as Google+. 
 The situation was similar for the ethnic and multilingual news and community-based 
media operating in the digital space and offline. As I discussed in previous chapters, several 
ethnic newspapers, radio stations and online portal sites chose to reduce their service or 
withdraw from the market when Japanese-Brazilian return migrant communities throughout 
Japan were hit hard by the 2008 global economic crisis, and ethnic businesses who have been 
sponsoring the printing, broadcasting and online publishing through advertisement retracted 
support. 
Certainly, a few years after the economic crisis, the International Press is still in 
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operation as a digital news outlet, although they cancelled print edition in late 2010, and Globo 
programs are still available to those who subscribe to the service through the IPC’s channels. 
While some smaller and newly started-up businesses, such as the Shizuoka company and the 
radio station in Nagoya I mentioned above, have gone away, a few community-center-based 
radio stations like Rádio Nikkey20 and internet-based Radio Phonenix21 are still around, and, as 
Shiramizu (2001) documents, a nonprofit, community-funded and volunteer-based multilingual, 
multicultural and multiethnic radio station FM Wai Wai in Kobe is going strong, showing us 
how grassroots media can provide spaces for the racial/ethnic minority population and immigrant 
population to share information and experiences and express themselves with limited resources.  
At the same time, however, those grassroots and community-based media often do not 
have networks and capital to cover events and incidents happening outside of the local 
communities in which they are based, even when those situations may affect local minority and 
non-Japanese residents. When the East Japan Earthquake of March 2011, the tsunami and the 
following nuclear plant incidents in Fukushima rocked Japan, many Twitter posts and online 
resources pointed Japanese-Brazilian return migrants living in Japan and looking for information 
to NHK World’s Portuguese-language page22.  
NHK World, operated by Japan’s public radio and television network NHK, is an 
international program that broadcasts news from Japan in English and 17 other languages 
including Portuguese, and is not primarily intended for domestic audiences. It is a product of the 
Koizumi government’s policy, which decided to build multi-language broadcast for international 
audiences to publicize nationalistically driven “cool Japan,” rather than to cater to the 
                                                
20 http://www.radionikkey.jp/  
21 http://www.radiophoenix.jp/  
22 http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/portuguese/top/index.html  
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informational and communicational needs of linguistically and culturally diversifying domestic 
population of the nation. Still, being a part of the public network, and with human and financial 
resources to cover news from all around the nation, NHK’s international broadcast and its 
website were able to provide vital information to the Japanese-Brazilian population within Japan.  
This strongly suggests that it is crucial for diverse and diversifying societies to publicly 
provide the sources of information and means of communication sensitive to the needs of 
multicultural and multilingual population, which at the same time are affordable, stable and 
predictable. It is important not only to satisfy the cultural needs, but also for the safe and 
sustainable living of racial/ethnic minorities and transnational population within the society. 
That we should look beyond the issue of access/no-access also suggests the importance of 
securing long-term access and engagement. While the private sector may expand into the ethnic 
market as long as they see it as a viable, emerging market, and provide initial access to the 
underrepresented users of new media, they may retract their services once the business becomes 
less profitable. And because they are smaller in scale, the “ethnic” markets are more vulnerable 
than the general population market. The Japanese-Brazilian return migrant market, in particular, 
has been made up of people under a very similar condition of dekassegui, people who work in 
the physically intense sector of Japan under unstable, temporary contracts, who the companies 
and factories most likely to lay off first when they need to react to adverse economic situations 
and manage their labor force accordingly. This further adds to the vulnerability of the Japanese-
Brazilian “ethnic” market. 
Thus, while living in well-connected Japan, Japanese-Brazilian return migrants I 
interviewed and looked at through secondary literature, a YouTube video, online posting and 
newspaper articles in this study were “partially connected” to the digital media. As I discussed 
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throughout this dissertation, this condition is a product of the Japanese national government’s 
immigration policy that is indifferent to social and cultural life of the immigrant population 
within the country, its media policy that is unwilling to recognize and cater to the informational 
and communicational needs of the nation’s increasingly diversifying population, and the 
“network capitalism” that drives corporations and governmental bodies to employ the logic of 
“flexible accumulation,” which makes this population only “partially protected” in the labor 
market. Under this condition, the Japanese-Brazilian return migrants in my study had incomplete 
and uneven opportunities to utilize the internet and mobile phones to escape the powers of 
traditional nation-states, build effective transnational and translocal communities, or take part in 
reflexive identity construction.  
This, however, does not suggest that globally connected digital media does not have any 
translocal, participatory or democratizing potentials. They may indeed have those possibilities. 
The findings I presented in this dissertation simply indicate that those are not inherent 
characteristics of the internet and mobile phones. Rather, those potentials and impacts are made 
as the society, media technologies and the users of the technologies interactively shape each 
other – and that means they can be remade, too.  
The process of such a “remake” will certainly be a complicated one. One thing this study 
can contribute to the process, however, is this point: the provision of informational and 
communication media access, affordable and accessible to the residents with any socioeconomic 
statuses, national origins and cultural and linguistic backgrounds is one of the crucial 
responsibilities of the national, regional and/or municipal governmental bodies in the 
diversifying world. When access is unstable and financial and cultural resources and time are 
limited, one cannot engage with online venues of network building, self-expression and 
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discussion in a sustained manner. 
The inclusion of transnational migrants, refugees and the members of the diaspora in 
media provision policies is particularly important. It is because even though non-citizen residents 
of a country, such as immigrants and refugees, can receive certain benefits and have certain parts 
of their civil rights protected by their home country governments and/or by international 
organizations, and even though the world is increasingly becoming wired and going wireless, 
securing access to the web and other informational and communication media remains to be a 
very local endeavor. Under the current configuration of telecommunication technologies, one 
must find ways to hook up to World Wide Web through local “access points.” One must, also, 
obtain a handset and contract in a local market to become a “mobile user.” Local economy and 
local policies, therefore, can disconnect a person from the world. But at the same time, they are 
also capable of connecting one to the world.  
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